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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation examines the question: To what extent does the international news media 
influence the outcome of interstate wars? It considers the longstanding charge that media reports 
of public debates about foreign policy provide ‘aid and comfort to the enemy.’ 
New theory is proposed that addresses this policy problem facing democracies, and also 
addresses gaps in the theoretical literature on the causes of war. The theory advanced in this 
dissertation is that the presence of the international news media influences the outcome of wars 
by providing an additional channel through which information about leaders’ cost sensitivity is 
revealed and by reciprocally influencing the beliefs and behavior of leaders and their foreign 
adversaries in the conduct of wars. Novel variables representing major phases in the emergence 
of the international news media are defined. Original research is conducted using primary and 
secondary sources to characterize the media by year in individual states. The novel media 
variables are combined with variables from other studies to create a dataset spanning 90 
interstate wars involving 51 different states from 1823 through 1990. Hypotheses based on the 
theory are tested using a multinomial logistic regression model.   
The results of this study partially support the theory in that the type of media in a war 
initiator state is strongly and significantly associated with a higher probability of winning. 
Unexpected findings regarding the influence of media speed on the probability of winning, and a 
AID AND COMFORT TO THE ENEMY? INTERNATIONAL NEWS MEDIA, COST 
SENSITIVITY, AND INTERSTATE WAR  
Arthur A. Maxwell II, Ph.D.  
University of Pittsburgh, 2010
 
 v 
failure to find a relationship between media and the probability of losing require further 
investigation. Overall, however, the presence of the international news media appears to 
influence the outcome of interstate wars.  
The results have important implications for future theoretical research as well as for 
policy choices regarding the proper role of domestic debates and media reporting thereof. 
Additional research is required to confirm the findings, examine the unexpected findings, and to 
examine the relevance of the findings in other eras and other phases of war. Deeply rooted 
assumptions within society that media reporting on wars conflicts with national security interests 
must be revisited as part of an examination of policy implications of the findings.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Does the news media ‘harm the troops’ or ‘embolden the enemy’? Does the news media affect 
the outcome of international wars by transmitting reports of domestic debates to foreign leaders, 
thereby revealing weakness or low resolve? Or does the news media facilitate robust debate of 
foreign policy and thereby contribute to greater success? To what extent does the international 
news media influence the outcome of wars?  
This dissertation seeks to answer these questions. It does so by first examining the 
charges and countercharges that are leveled at those who participate in debates of foreign policy, 
next drawing on available literature to develop a theory explaining how the media might have 
such influence, then collecting data, and finally conducting an empirical test of the theory. 
This chapter begins by introducing the problem being studied in a bit more detail and 
posing specific research questions to be answered by this study. It goes on to lay out for the 
reader the bounds and limitations of the study, the approach used to examine the problem, and 
the overall structure of the research project. The chapter closes by describing the organization of 
this paper. The chapter begins next with a discussion of the problem.  
 2 
1.1 DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM 
Foreign policy debates in wartime regularly feature the charge that one actor or another has 
‘harmed the troops’ or ‘helped the enemy’ by openly expressing a particular point of view or 
publicly sharing a particular piece of information. The media is frequently implicated in this 
charge because the media publishes reports about public debates and distributes them such that 
they become available to the enemy. The accused participants in public debate and their 
‘accomplices’ in the media defend their actions on a variety of grounds that tend to be related to 
the concept of free speech. But amid the charges and countercharges is the question: does the 
distribution of news reports about foreign policy debates actually influence the outcome of wars? 
This section examines the charge of ‘aid and comfort to the enemy’ by reviewing examples of 
the charge, and noting the range of circumstances in which the charge is leveled, the kinds of 
actors that level the charge, and the kinds of actors at whom the charge is leveled. First, 
examples of the charge of ‘aid and comfort to the enemy’ are examined. 
1.1.1 The Charge: Aid and Comfort to the Enemy 
Those who speak publicly about foreign policy matters in times of war are sometimes charged 
with ‘harming the troops’, ‘emboldening the enemy’, or even treason because they are believed 
to provide ‘aid and comfort to the enemy’. The charge is leveled in a wide variety of 
circumstances.  
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At times, particular individual actors are charged with ‘aiding the enemy’ and/or 
‘harming the troops’ – or both. The charge was leveled at Senator John Kerry during his 1984 
election campaign:  
… retired general George S. Patton, son of the famous World War II general and 
honorary chairman of Shamie's veterans' committee, called Kerry "soft on communism" 
and said that, by protesting the war, Kerry "gave aid and comfort to the enemy and 
probably caused some of my guys to get killed" (AP 1984). 
 
At other times, the charge is not leveled at any particular actor or actors. At times a 
domestic debate taking place among the general public is blamed for influencing the outcome – 
winning or losing - of a war. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld connected the views of the broad 
American public to the success of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan:  
The enemy hears a big debate in the United States, and they have to wonder: 'Maybe all 
we have to do is wait and we'll win. We can't win militarily.' They know that. The battle 
is here in the United States (Rumsfeld 2005). 
 
At still other times, policymakers assert that domestic criticism of particular policies 
provides a variety of forms of aid to the enemy. In testimony before Congress, Attorney General 
John Ashcroft charged critics of the recently-enacted USA PATRIOT act with ‘aiding the 
terrorists’: 
…to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty; my message is 
this: Your tactics only aid terrorists - for they erode our national unity and diminish our 
resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to America's friends. 
They encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of evil (2001).  
 
The charge of helping the enemy is not just leveled by those in power against their critics. 
It is also at times invoked against those in power. Former Vice President Cheney recently 
asserted a link between Obama administration handling of the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
 4 
(accused mastermind of the September 11 attacks) prosecution and aid to the enemy, saying in a 
recent interview that: “I think it’s likely to give encouragement — aid and comfort — to the 
enemy” (Politico.com 2009). 
The notion that domestic speech can help the enemy is not unique to contemporary U.S. 
politics. In World War II, German propaganda minister Goebbels warned citizens that the enemy 
is often listening to domestic speech:  
He who speaks about the war and its prospects should always speak as if the enemy were 
listening. In many cases, he actually is. Each thoughtless word from our side gives him 
new hope and courage, and therefore prolongs the war… (Goebbels 1944).  
 
The news media is frequently included in the charge of aid to the enemy, whether 
implicitly or explicitly. Vice President Spiro Agnew was a frequent critic of the media and 
asserted that the media could directly help the enemy:  
Vice President Spiro T. Agnew said Monday that if the North Vietnamese launch a 
successful isolated attack in South Vietnam as U.S. troops withdrew, the American news 
media will unintentionally aid Hanoi by portraying the enemy victory as a failure of the 
Vietnamization program (AP 1971). 
 
The link between the media and harm to the troops is taken as an article of faith among 
the military community. As the U.S. military began its assault on Afghanistan in 2001, the 
Pentagon was regarded as having tightly controlled sensitive military news, in stark contrast to 
prior wars. Barry Zorthian, the chief spokesman for the American war effort in Vietnam from 
1964 to 1968, said [the Afghanistan] conflict is ''much tighter than Vietnam…Saigon was almost 
wide open compared to this,'' Mr. Zorthian said. ''We gave out much more information, and we 
had no real problems with the media giving away information that would harm the troops'' 
(Becker 2001).  
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The assertion of media complicity in providing aid and comfort to the enemy is not 
limited to the United States. The media in Israel is routinely cautioned in regard to its coverage 
of acts of terrorism. Israeli professor Raphael Cohen-Almagor, founder and director of the 
Center for Democratic Studies at the University of Haifa has written extensively about media 
coverage of acts of terrorism in Israel and elsewhere. He points to troubling episodes wherein the 
media is criticized for advancing the agenda of terrorists, and offers suggestions to reporters and 
editors for avoiding such problems (Cohen-Almagor 2005). Similarly, in Britain, opposition 
parties demanding an inquiry into the management of the Iraq war were cautioned by Foreign 
Secretary Margaret Beckett about how the media transmit Parliamentary debates far and wide: 
“Our words in the House today will be heard a very long way away. They can be heard by our 
troops who are already in great danger in Iraq…” (Webster 2006). 
These examples show that the charge of ‘aid and comfort to the enemy’ is leveled by a 
variety of actors, against a variety of actors, in a variety of circumstances. Those accused of 
aiding the enemy do not dispute the charges, for the most part. Rather, they offer a variety of 
justifications for their speech, which are considered next.  
1.1.2 The Justification: Democratic values 
Those on the receiving end of the charges of aiding the enemy respond that public debates of 
foreign policy are justified and even essential within a democracy. The justifications take two 
forms. The first justification is that speaking out is a fundamental right of citizens in a 
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democracy. Lawrence Korb1
Korb 2008
, former Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Reagan 
asserted that “criticism of war policy is patriotic” in a recent essay defending critics of the Iraq 
war ( ). He retrospectively examines policy decisions by administrations of both 
parties during the Cold War and argues that most would have benefited from an open debate 
among leaders and the public. On a similar note, noted constitutional scholar and presidential 
adviser Louis Marshall argued during the final year of World War I that “free criticism [is] a fine 
thing for a nation at war.” Further, that “it is the duty of every citizen to do his part toward 
winning the war, to give…his loved ones and all of his possessions to it. That means a constant 
discussion of it, and of the means of winning it, and a constant consideration of its purposes and 
its problems” (Pach 1918).  
A second justification is that open debate strengthens policies and contributes to broader 
public support. In an examination of the U.S. presidency and foreign policy, historian Stephen 
Ambrose argues that policies which were subjected to the most public debate were in fact the 
most successful. And, conversely, he argues that policies devised and implemented in secret fare 
much worse. “The great lesson,” he argues, “is that secrecy and surprise are the enemies of 
democracy; open and prolonged debate is the great power of democracy. The policies that have 
failed have tended to be those adopted by presidents without meaningful debate…” (Ambrose 
1991, p. 136).  
As for its role, the news media argue that publication of news reports about foreign policy 
debates is justified because it facilitates the open debate advocated by Ambrose and others. 
Typical of this reasoning is Salon.com’s justification for publishing in 2006 the second round of 
photos of Abu Ghraib prisoners being detained: “America – and the world – has the right to 
                                                 
1 Lawrence Korb is also former Dean of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of 
Pittsburgh. 
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know what happened in our name.” Making these images available to the public is intended to 
spur “a democratic society… [to] investigate well-documented abuses by its soldiers” (Shapiro 
2006). Since then, US administrations of both parties have sought to prevent the release of an 
additional 2000 photos of detainee abuse, citing concern that, in President Obama’s words, they 
would “inflame anti-American public opinion and…put our troops in greater danger.” In court 
filings demanding release of the photos for media publication, The American Civil Liberties 
Union argued that disclosure and publication “critical for helping the public understand the scope 
and scale of prisoner abuse as well as for holding senior officials accountable for authorizing or 
permitting such abuse” (Zeleny 2009). The arguments advanced in favor of and opposed to 
release of the Abu Ghraib photos are typical of the debate between those who prefer that 
particular information or points of view related to foreign policy be kept private and those who 
favor widespread publication.  
Rather than disputing the alleged impact of their comments, those accused of providing 
‘aid and comfort to the enemy’ respond by justifying their speech in terms of their rights and 
duties as citizens. But in the next section, an unexamined premise that is at the heart of this study 
is explored. Do media reports actually influence the outcome of wars?  
1.1.3 An unexamined premise: does the news media influence wars? 
Whatever the merits of these arguments, it is noteworthy that an underlying premise – that media 
reports of foreign policy debates transmitted to the enemy actually harm the troops or help the 
enemy – goes unexamined and unchallenged. But is this premise in fact valid? Do media reports 
of foreign policy debates actually ‘harm the troops’? Do they provide aid and comfort to the 
enemy and thereby influence the outcome of wars?  
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How could media reports of foreign policy debates influence the outcomes of wars by 
providing ‘aid and comfort to the enemy’? What chain could connect the phenomenon of media-
reported public debates (the cause) to war outcomes (the claimed effect)? A causal chain 
connecting the alleged cause and effect must address at least two elements: the influence of 
information about public debates on the enemy’s conduct of war, and the availability of the 
media as a channel for information about such debates to reach the enemy.  
There are innumerable facets of this problem. In order to develop a tractable problem 
statement, it is vital to limit the scope of the inquiry. In the next section, the causal elements 
considered here are used as a basis for narrowing the analytic focus.  
1.1.4 Narrowing the analytic focus  
The charge of providing aid and comfort to the enemy through public discussion2
                                                 
2 The discussion is explicitly focused on public, as opposed to clandestine, exchanges of information such as in 
episodes of espionage.  
 does not 
appear confined to particular types of actors or particular types of information. The conception of 
what could provide aid to the enemy - the kinds of information, expressed by what kinds of 
actors, in what form – appears to be highly context-sensitive. At times the charge is leveled by an 
incumbent administration at an opposition politician; at other times, the charge runs in the 
opposite direction. At times the charge is leveled at politicians on the left; other times at 
politicians on the right. At times the charge is leveled at private citizens or commentators. The 
charge is not unique to the United States; actors in other countries level the charge as well. No 
particular type or class of information appears to be the exclusive subject of the charge. 
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But in every case, the accused actor expresses a point of view or shares information in 
public, and reports of such public statements are published in the news media, where they are 
widely distributed to friend and foe alike. The news media is a common thread in this 
phenomenon and serves as the basis for narrowing the analytic focus of this study. Information 
reaching the enemy is a necessary precondition of that information having any influence on that 
enemy and thereby affecting the outcome of a war. The international news media is a channel 
whereby information about domestic foreign policy debates is gathered and distributed far and 
wide – potentially reaching the enemy. 
 But the media has not always existed in the form it does today. The first newspapers 
emerged in the 17th century (Weber 2006) and were followed through the centuries by a 
succession of new forms of media as society and technology evolved. The media has changed in 
practically every dimension over the centuries, with today’s media bearing little resemblance to 
the first newspapers. To the extent the media plays a role by disseminating information to the 
enemy, its influence would be expected to vary with those variations in the form and extent of 
the media as it emerged.  
The media provides a practical basis on which to narrow the problem being studied. The 
resulting problem statement is presented next.  
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem investigated by this study is, then: does the international news media influence the 
outcome of wars?  
 10 
No study to date has empirically examined whether in fact media distribution of foreign 
policy debates somehow harms prospects for foreign policy success by informing the enemy. 
Extensive literature examines how a range of variables influence the onset, duration and outcome 
of wars. As would be expected, most of this literature on the causes of war is focused on such 
tangible factors as weapons, soldiers, terrain, military strategy and the like. But this literature has 
not thus far considered the potential role of the media as an information channel to the enemy. 
Other literature examining wartime leadership presents particular instances in history when 
information about public opinion influenced leaders’ decision-making. But the question being 
investigated here is whether, above and beyond anecdotal instances throughout history, there is a 
systematic relationship between the presence and character of the international news media and 
the outcomes of wars.  
1.3 OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY 
This study draws on available literature to construct a causal model that connects public debates 
of foreign policy with war outcomes. One part of that causal model is then empirically evaluated. 
Original research is conducted to gather data representing the emergence of the international 
news media over the past two centuries. A statistical model is created to empirically examine 
whether variations in news media explain variations in war outcomes, while controlling for many 
other factors known to influence wars. The statistical and substantive results of the model are 
interpreted and policy implications are drawn. An agenda for future research is presented at the 
conclusion of the paper.  
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The statistical model developed in this dissertation builds on a model previously 
published by D. Scott Bennett and Alan Stam in a 1998 article and republished by Dan Reiter 
and Alan Stam as a book chapter 2004. This model, which will be referred to as the Bennett & 
Stam model, examines the influence of 14 main-effects variables plus 8 interaction variables on 
war outcomes. Their model includes the spectrum of factors whose influence on war has been 
theorized over the past several decades, including material factors such as balance of forces, 
troop strength, surprise, and distance as well as intangible factors such as regime type, levels of 
repression, and issue salience. This dissertation builds on the Bennett & Stam model by 
introducing variables representing the international news media. Doing so enables the 
examination of the influence of the media while controlling for all the other factors thought to 
influence wars. No attempt is made to revisit the debates over the influence of the many 
variables included in Bennett & Stam’s model. Rather, their model is taken as a representation of 
what is collectively thought to influence wars, so that the role of the media might be examined in 
the full context of all that is already known about wars.   
1.4 RESEACH QUESTIONS 
The current study is guided by an overall research question which is in turn supported by three 
sub-questions focused on specific facets of the problem:  
Main Research Question: To what extent does the international news media influence the 
outcomes of interstate wars?  
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Sub-Question 1: To what extent is the influence of the international news media modified 
by regime type?  
Sub-Question 2: To what extent does the international news media differentially 
influence war initiators and targets? 
Sub-Question 3: To what extent is the influence of the international news media modified 
by war duration?  
 
Ten hypotheses are advanced in response to the above research questions. They are presented 
near the end of the theory chapter beginning on page 84. Before describing the organization of 
the remainder of this paper, the limitations and assumptions surrounding the project are briefly 
discussed next. 
1.5 LIMITATIONS 
This study examines only one element in a causal chain connecting public debates to war 
outcomes. Therefore, unexamined confounding factors could be present. At the same time that 
the international news media is emerging, there may be parallel changes in the way public 
debates take place, the way they influence leaders, the way adversaries interpret debates among 
the enemy, the way wars are conducted, changes in society, advances in technology including 
computers, and so on. Every effort is made to control for a wide variety of factors known to 
influence the outcome of wars.  
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1.6 DELIMITATIONS 
This study is delimited to the years 1823 through 1990 due to data availability. Thus, this study 
examines the influence of the media on war outcomes over roughly the past one hundred and 
seventy years. It does not address how public debates may have interacted with news media or 
other mechanisms to influence outcomes in other eras. During the era being examined, the 
international news media underwent dramatic change, evolving from single-page, special- 
purpose publications to 24 hour global coverage. Future work should extend the study to include 
wars which occurred from 1991 through the present, to examine the influence of more recent 
shifts in the nature of the media.  
 This study relies on a statistical model to examine the influence of the news media on 
war outcomes. It seeks to complement qualitative examinations of the phenomenon in particular 
published historical accounts. It does not seek to qualitatively examine additional individual 
cases.  
Only variables that contribute to a statistically strong model can be incorporated in the 
study. Therefore, some aspects of the problem that are otherwise within the scope of the study 
may fall out of reach of the current study due to limitations in dataset size, the particular 
character of individual variables, and/or modeling techniques. 
The current study is built on Bennett & Stam (1998) and therefore selectively draws on 
their research design. Doing so enables a comparison of the current study’s findings with Bennett 
& Stam’s well-known results. This choice of model may in some ways unforeseen ways hamper 
the accuracy, precision or utility of the findings. If necessary, future research will build on a 
foundation that overcomes any such limitations.  
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1.7 ASSUMPTIONS 
The current study draws in part on recent developments in bargaining models of war in two 
ways. First, bargaining models of war are consulted to formalize an important finding from the 
empirical literature on war: that leaders care about their adversaries’ level of cost sensitivity, or 
resolve, regarding international issues and disputes the resolution of which may involve war. 
Second, bargaining models of war are consulted to generate specific predictions about how the 
presence of the international news media may affect the outcome of strategic interactions 
between states engaged in war. Because war is a strategic interaction, the introduction of any 
new factor necessarily affects the beliefs and choices made by leaders on both sides. The 
ultimate influence of any new factor (such as the emergence of the news media) on war 
outcomes must be considered within the context of such strategic interaction. Bargaining models 
are well-suited to the examination of strategic interactions and can suggest how the introduction 
of new factors ultimately affects the optimal choices for both sides and the likely outcomes that 
result.  
Each of the insights drawn from bargaining models of war is based in part on an 
assumption of rationality on the part of leaders. The first insight – that leaders care about resolve 
– is amply demonstrated in the empirical literature and hence the resort to bargaining models 
does little more than formalize an already-accepted mechanism in the conduct of war. The 
assumption of rationality built into this insight adds little. On the other hand, the second insight 
drawn from bargaining models – the specific predictions about the eventual influence of the 
presence of the media – is based heavily on the formal logic of particular bargaining models. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to briefly consider the assumptions implicit in bargaining models in 
light of the alternative conceptions available to the field on international relations.  
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Bargaining models used to generate specific predictions about the influence of the media 
are built on two important mechanisms: a model of strategic interaction, and a set of rules that 
the participants in such strategic interaction are assumed to follow. There is no substitute for the 
first mechanism when studying war: each leader makes decisions with an eye toward how the 
adversary will react. Each leader necessarily forgoes some courses of action in favor of others 
partially out of consideration of the anticipated reaction of the adversary. To fail to consider the 
adversary’s reaction is to ignore the strategic character of war. But the other mechanism built 
into bargaining models – the set of rules leaders are assumed to follow as they consider their 
moves within a strategic interaction – are the subject of broad debate within the field of 
international relations scholarship. In particular, the assumption of rationality on the part of 
leaders engaged in strategic interactions is known to have limitations.  
The rational actor perspective assumes that individuals perceive the world accurately and 
arrive at decisions through an open intellectual process. A variety of intellectual challenges to 
this assumption have been raised. The cognitive approach3
Rosati 1995, 
p. 53
 challenges this perspective by 
arguing that “individuals are much more closed-minded due to their beliefs and the way they 
process information – that is, they resist adapting to changes in the environment” (
).   
Several scholars have argued that the beliefs and cognitive processes of policymakers 
affect how they see the world and what actions they take in the context of a particular foreign 
policy issue (Rosati 1988). The cognitive approach challenges the assumptions of rationality 
usually applied to the analysis of human interaction (Allison 1969; Simon 1996). As opposed to 
the assumption that actors are “open-minded and adaptable to changes in the environment,”  the 
                                                 
3 See also Allison (1969), Simon (1971), Steinbruner (1974) for more in-depth discussion of cognitive approaches. 
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cognitive approach suggests that individuals tend to be “more closed-minded due to their beliefs 
and the way they process information…tending to resist adapting to changes in the environment” 
(Rosati 1995, p. 50). Other important works in the cognitive approach to international politics 
include Jervis, Perception and misperception in international politics (1976) and Steinbruner, 
The cybernetic theory of decision (1974).  
The cognitive approach to international politics offers several intriguing hypotheses, such 
as prospect theory, the impact of leaders’ operational codes, the lessons of history, and so on 
(George 1972; Holsti 1968; Levy 1997). But several scholars have noted that there are 
conceptual and methodological problems which complicate the task of testing these hypotheses 
empirically. For example, Levy argues that “the problem of identifying the actor’s reference 
point, particularly in the absence of a theory of framing, makes it very difficult to rule out the 
alternative and more parsimonious hypothesis that behavior is driven not by framing, loss 
aversion, and the reflection effect in risk orientation, but rather by a standard expected-value 
calculation” (Levy 1998). For the purposes of this study, a clear distinction is made between the 
availability of information to a leader and the assessment of that information (Finel and Lord 
1999). 
Intellectual challenges to the assumption of rationality come from other bodies of 
literature as well. Organization theory argues that leaders filter new information through the 
dynamics of bureaucratic structures and only partially apply the available lessons from events. 
Studies of learning and entrepreneurship show how the implementation of new approaches 
during the course of a conflict can undercut the process of leaders’ perspectives converging, as 
predicted by the rational approach. Constructivism suggests that war can be better understood “a 
social convention determined and shaped by norms and culture, not as a rationalist choice 
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reflecting costs and benefits”  (Reiter 2003 ‘p.36).A recent work by Herbert Gintis highlights the 
shortcomings of game theory married with an assumption that leaders are purely rational (2009). 
He shows how insights from behavioral economics and other disciplines can be successfully 
married with game-theoretic modeling of strategic interaction to yield richer and ultimately more 
accurate predictions about human behavior  
However, Gintis also highlights the current state of the field, namely that existing models 
of strategic interaction are not able to embrace cognitive, organizational and constructivist 
insights. Technical work to do so is only now beginning and promises to yield a rich new set of 
models of human behavior in the near future. But for the purposes of this study, the available 
models of strategic interaction are the best available. Therefore, this study proceeds by using the 
existing scholarship, noting that the predictions are likely to be flawed in important ways due to 
their pure reliance on an assumption of rationality. Subsequent research is required to refine the 
predictions made here based on better models that will undoubtedly follow. 
1.8 ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION  
The study begins in Chapter 2 by critically examining available theory and empirical research in 
several areas that are relevant to the problem being examined: first, theories of war as an 
information problem are presented in section 2.2; next, section 2.3 presents theories of 
democracies in war; finally, empirical and theoretical literature surrounding the emergence of the 
international news media is presented in section 2.4. The consistencies and gaps among these 
theories are highlighted at the conclusion of chapter 2, as a precursor to drawing the literature 
together to propose theory.  
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Chapter 3 draws on the literature to propose theory in the form of a causal model. The 
causal model connects public debates of foreign policy and media distribution of news reports 
with states’ prospects for victory in war. Observable implications of the theory are presented and 
testable hypotheses are advanced.  
Chapter 4, research design, presents a conceptual model appropriate to the study and 
presents the requirements for data collection. Because of the novel inclusion of the news media 
in the causal model, original research is conducted to operationalize the emergence of the media. 
Primary and secondary sources are drawn on to construct a conceptual model of the international 
news media in each individual state engaged in a war during the period under study. The 
research design is executed in the next chapter.   
In Chapter 8, statistical models are created that represent the relationships among war 
outcomes and the international news media while controlling for other factors known to 
influence wars. Both main effects and interaction effects of media variables are considered. 
Models are subjected to a series of diagnostic tests to determine suitability for testing the 
hypotheses advanced in Chapter 3.  
In Chapter 5, the results of the statistical models are presented. Comparisons between the 
various models demonstrate the explanatory role of variables reflecting the news media. Changes 
in predicted war outcomes as a result of variations in individual variables are presented. Finally, 
the hypotheses advanced in Chapter 3 are tested and the substantive and statistical results are 
presented.  
Finally, Chapter 6 presents the policy and theoretical implications of the findings, and an 
agenda for future research.  
The literature reviewed as part of this study is presented next in Chapter 2. 
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2.0  LITERATURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER 
Examining the idea that the international news media influences the outcome of wars demands 
the consideration of several separate but related phenomena functioning in concert. First, because 
information is what the media gathers and distributes, it requires a model of war that is 
substantially about information, as opposed to the largely kinetic conception based on soldiers, 
tanks, etc. that is featured in many studies of war. Second, the particular kinds of information 
contained in public debates about foreign policy that are alleged to be harmful to one side (or 
helpful to the other side) must be specified. Third, the capacity of the international news media to 
gather and transmit the requisite types of information such that it can potentially exert a helpful 
or harmful influence must be understood. These three elements – war as an information problem, 
particular kinds of information contained in public debates, and the media as a transmission 
channel - must all be considered in order to conceive of the international news media as 
influencing war outcomes.  
This chapter examines literature illuminating each of these elements. The literature on 
bargaining models of war conceives of war as an information problem. Within that conception, 
the purpose of fighting and negotiating is for the parties to overcome incentives to conceal and 
misrepresent information. In particular, information regarding leaders’ cost sensitivity – how 
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sensitive leaders are to the costs incurred in pursuit of a particular policy - is thought to be a 
critical factor in bargaining surrounding war. Literature on democracies in war discusses the 
sources of cost sensitivity and how cost sensitivity contributes to leaders’ beliefs and decision-
making. This literature argues that leaders are cost-sensitive to varying degrees depending on the 
issue at hand and their political circumstances. Through the mechanism of cost sensitivity, 
domestic political costs in the form of opinion opposed to war can influence war policy. The 
literature on the international news media examines the emergence of news gathering and 
reporting over the past two centuries. As the media emerged, economic incentives emerged 
which systematically contribute to media focus on foreign policy and wars, and a steady 
expansion in the speed, scope and geographic reach of the media.  
Literature examining war as an information problem is presented first. But before doing 
so, the next section briefly considers how shifting emphasis in the study of war over the past few 
decades has led to the conception of war as an information problem. 
2.2 THEORIES OF WAR AS AN INFORMATION PROBLEM 
2.2.1 Shifting emphasis in the study of war 
The study of war has undergone significant changes over the past several decades. Earlier work 
from the 1940’s through the 1960’s focused on system-level theories of international politics. 
Prominent among these is a large body of work exploring the so-called ‘paradigm wars’ between 
realism, liberalism and several less-prominent paradigms (Walt 1998). But the paradigm 
approach suffers from multiple inconsistent specifications (Lebow 1994) and therefore 
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significant challenges testing these against the empirical record. In a survey of the state of the 
field ten years ago, Levy argued that “as a field, international relations needs to shift its attention 
from the level of paradigms to the level of theories, focus on constructing theories and testing 
them against the empirical evidence, and leave the question of whether a particular approach fits 
into a liberal or realist framework to the intellectual historians” (Levy 1998, p. 145).  
 Given the shortcomings in systemic theories referenced above, it’s not surprising that 
there has been a shift away from systemic-level analysis toward more examination of dyadic-
level and societal-level explanatory variables. At the dyadic level, in addition to long-standing 
research on dyadic power relationships and power transitions, new research programs emerged 
within the past decade focused on enduring rivalries, bargaining, territorial contiguity, trade, and 
other relationships (George and Bennett 2005; Waltz 1997). This shift has been encouraged by 
the changed international landscape of the post-cold war era, with a decline in the structural 
imperatives of the bipolar world, the increasing salience of politically unstable smaller states and 
sub-state conflicts, and the increased availability of quantitative data on variables associated with 
war (Singer 1978). The finding that democratic states rarely go to war against each other has also 
encouraged a shift toward more examination of societal-level variables (Levy 1998).  
In parallel with shifts in the emphasis of the field from systemic-level to societal-level 
and individual-level variables and theories, there has been a shift in the dominant methodologies 
used within the field. The earliest scientific examinations of international politics sought to 
identify causal factors by performing simple statistical correlations between occurrence of war 
and a variety of variables. By contrast, more recent work employs increasingly sophisticated 
techniques including time series and logistic regression. And more recent work also increasingly 
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draws on multiple methods, including statistical analysis, single and multiple case studies, and 
game theory to develop and test more sophisticated theories. 
Commenting on methodology, Most and Starr observed in a series of articles (Most and 
Starr 1983, 1989, 1990) more than twenty years ago that scholarship examining the causes of 
war consists almost entirely of attempts to identify factors that are both necessary and sufficient 
for the onset of war. They argued that most factors identified within the literature cannot possibly 
be both necessary and sufficient because “through time and across space, similar factors could 
plausibly be expected to trigger different foreign policy acts … and plausibly lead to different 
results” (Most and Starr 1989, p. 383). 
A number of scholars have argued through time that, rather than focusing on system-, 
dyad- or even unit-level variables, war must be viewed within the broader context of 
international politics. Perhaps acting on Clausewitz’s or Schelling’s advice4
Kecskemeti 1958
, many modern 
scholars have examined war as bargaining. As contrasted with the search for static factors 
correlated with war, Kecskemeti, Pillar, etc. are examples of scholars that treat war as the result 
of leaders’ choices as they interact with one another within the context of circumstances 
( ; Pillar 1983). The interactions considered in bargaining models include 
exchanges of information. This makes such models potentially helpful in examining the role of 
an information-transmitting mechanism such as the international news media. Such information 
models of war are considered next. 
                                                 
4 Schelling (1960) remarked that most conflicts “are essentially bargaining situations.” 
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2.2.2 War as an information problem 
Political disputes can be thought of as a contest over scarce goods. Consider that most 
international crises consist of some zero-sum issue. The most basic example is the division of 
disputed territory, but the concept applies equally to policy disputes where each side has a 
preferred outcome and the players seek some middle ground5
Blainey, Morrow and others observed that most wars end in some kind of negotiated 
settlement (
. The allocation of scarce resources 
without resort to force necessarily involves bargaining between the disputants to locate an 
acceptable settlement.  
Blainey 1973; Morrow 1989). This poses a puzzle as to why leaders are unable to 
reach negotiated settlements in advance. An important advance comes from Fearon who showed 
that negotiated settlements always exist which rational states should prefer to the cost and risk of 
war (Fearon 1995). Because war is costly Fearon shows that, “under very broad conditions, 
bargains will exist that genuinely rational states would prefer to a risky and costly fight” (Fearon 
1995, p. 382). Fearon defends this argument with a formal proof, but a simple example illustrates 
the principle. 
Consider two states that are bargaining over the division of $100. If they can agree on a 
split, they keep the entire sum. If one of the states prefers war, he can pay war costs of $20 and 
keep his expected share of the balance6
 
. If each state has a 50% chance of victory, the expected 
value of the war option is $30, which is arrived at as follows: 
                                                 
5 Excluded from this perspective are several classes of conflict where the issue in question is indivisible, and 
situations where the leaders are assumed irrational. 
6 This game is an example of the costly-lottery form shown in Figure 1. 
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Expected value = 50% chance of winning + 50% chance of losing – War costs 
Which yields: 
Expected value = (.5 x $100) + (.5 x $0) - $20 = $30 
 
But note that either side could offer the opponent a better deal at the negotiating table. 
One state could offer to give $31 and keep $69 (or any of a range of more generous offers up to 
give $69, keep $31) which would leave both sides better off than the expected value of war. 
Fearon develops a rigorous proof showing that “the costs and risks of fighting open up a "wedge" 
of bargained solutions that risk-neutral or risk-averse states will prefer to the gamble of conflict. 
The existence of this ex ante bargaining range derives from the fact that war is inefficient ex 
post” (Fearon 1995, p. 388). 
Note that in this example, the odds of victory are 50/50. Fearon demonstrates formally 
that, no matter what the odds, his conclusion holds - with two important caveats. A negotiated 
settlement will always exist that both sides prefer to war, provided both parties agree on the 
odds of victory, and that each player believes the opponent is willing to exercise the option to pay 
the cost and go to war.  
These caveats form the basis of Fearon’s argument that uncertainty regarding power and 
resolve must be an important cause of war. Because bargains exist that both sides would prefer to 
the cost and risk of war, Fearon argues that the inability to locate such settlements is an 
important explanation for war.  
Thus, war can be conceived of as an information problem. Next, the particular kinds of 
information that are important in this conception of war are considered.  
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2.2.3 In particular, uncertainty about resolve  
Fearon argues that “rational miscalculations of relative power and resolve must be due to private 
information.” Furthermore, he shows that “war may result from the combination of private 
information and incentives to misrepresent that information in bargaining” (Fearon 1995, p. 382, 
emphasis added). States have an incentive to represent themselves as powerful or highly 
resolved7 even when they are not. Because of the incentives to bluff, states have difficulty 
distinguishing sincere threats from insincere ones. The well-documented bluffing between 
Germany, Britain and Russia in the weeks before World War I illustrates the importance of 
private information and incentives to misrepresent8
Lebow 1981
. Similarly, states sometimes underestimate 
an adversary’s capabilities, as in Russia’s assessment of Japan prior to the Russo-Japanese war. 
In that case, Japan had no way to reveal private information regarding her capabilities without 
compromising her own interests. The result was war ( ).  
Private information regarding capabilities and cost sensitivity, and incentives to 
misrepresent that information, are an important cause of war (Fearon 1995). Fearon arrives at 
this argument by examining a simple take-it-or-leave-it model. More realistic models show how 
the interaction between leaders in a crisis or war functions to reveal private information about 
capabilities and cost sensitivity. Within the framework of war as bargaining, the behavior of the 
leaders is shaped by the imperative to discover the true capabilities and cost sensitivity of their 
adversaries. The ways states interact to learn about this private information is reviewed next. 
                                                 
7 It is worth clarifying what Fearon means by power and resolve. Simply stated, power is the probability that one 
state would win in a military contest. Whereas Fearon somewhat simply uses the term ‘power’, other scholars prefer 
the more general term ‘capabilities’ to reflect the broader set of factors that might influence the odds of victory in a 
fight. Resolve is the willingness to exercise one’s outside option – that is, to end the bargaining and fight. Resolve, 
then, is ones’ cost sensitivity in the pursuit of the objective. A player that is more sensitive to costs is less resolved 
to fight, and, conversely, a player that is less sensitive to costs is more resolved to fight.  
8 See, for example, Konrad Jarausch (1969) for an examination of Hollweg’s calculated risk.   
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2.2.4 Signaling audience costs 
Given the imperative to discover the true capabilities and resolve of adversaries, states are 
thought to pursue a variety of tactics. Because states have incentives to deceive and withhold 
information, they cannot simply reveal the truth about their circumstances without risk to their 
interests (Schelling 1957). Therefore, much scholarship is focused on how states send credible 
signals that can be differentiated from ‘cheap talk’. A variety of approaches obtain. First, states 
can incur actual costs by, say, mobilizing a large army over some distance. Second, states can 
incur political costs that are visible to the opponent. Our discussion is concerned with the latter. 
Fearon argues that foreign policy crises occur at least partially in public, which makes it 
possible for domestic audiences to evaluate their leaders’ performance. The institutionalized 
electoral constraints in democracies allow the domestic audience to impose large and transparent 
costs on leaders. Therefore, when democratic leaders choose to escalate international crises, their 
threats are taken as highly credible. However, others argue that leaders of almost all regime types 
are subject to political costs at the hands of the selectorate (Goemans 1995). So the audience cost 
phenomenon is relevant for both democracies and non-democracies. It just plays out slightly 
differently for different regime types. To the extent a leader can generate higher audience costs, 
he can send a more credible signal of resolve (Fearon 1994b).  
Thus, leaders interact to reveal information about their level of resolve. As hinted in the 
above discussion, democracies interact in particular ways that set them apart from other types of 
states. The literature on democracies in war is examined next.   
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2.3 THEORIES OF DEMOCRACIES IN WAR 
2.3.1 Democratic peace literature 
This section considers several important facets of democracies in war that bear on this study. A 
substantial portion of the literature on war focuses on the performance of democracies in war. 
Early work in this area referred to this body of work as the ‘democratic peace’ literature, owing 
to the observation that democracies rarely fight one another. More recent work, however, has 
identified additional empirical regularities and hence uses the more general label ‘democracies in 
war’ to refer to this literature. The patterns observed in democracies’ record in war are 
considered first, before turning to the theoretical explanations for those patterns.   
Patterns in Democratic behavior in war 
The democratic peace literature builds on Maoz and Russett’s foundational paper which 
observed that democracies rarely fight one another (Bueno de Mesquita, Koch, and Siverson 
2004, p. 256; Maoz and Russett 1993, p. 626). A significant amount of scholarly attention has 
been paid to this observation.  
In the course of evaluating the democratic peace, scholars have observed a number of 
related empirical regularities. In their comprehensive study, Bueno de Mesquita et al identify 
seven patterns related to the democratic peace (2003, p. 218). These are: (1) the tendency for 
democracies not to fight another; (2) the tendency for democracies to fight with non-democracies 
with regularity; (3) the tendency for democracies to emerge victorious from their wars; (4) when 
disputes do occur between democracies, they reach peaceful settlements; (5) the tendency for 
democracies to experience fewer battle deaths and fight shorter wars when they initiate conflict; 
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(6) the tendency for transitional democracies to be more likely than other democracies to fight 
one another; (7) the tendency for major-power democracies to be more constrained to avoid war 
than less powerful democracies.  
Although a few studies argue against the claim (see Farber and Gowa (1997)), most 
conclude that there is strong support for the claim (Bueno de Mesquita, Koch, and Siverson 
2004; Chiozza and Goemans 2003; Gartzke et al. 2001; Mansfield and Snyder 2002; Maoz and 
Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1997). Surveying the wide range of studies of this issue, Bueno 
de Mesquita argues that “extensive, rigorous statistical tests all show a significant propensity for 
democracies to have been virtually immune from wars with one another (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 2003, p. 218).  
The debate over whether there are valid patterns regarding democracies in war has been 
largely settled. However, the underlying cause or causes of these patterns is the subject of 
ongoing debate. The causes of these patterns have an important bearing on the subject of this 
study and are therefore examined next.  
Debates about underlying causes of democratic behavior 
Theories about the democratic peace tend to be based on either normative logic or institutional 
logic. Normative theories argue that democratic norms influence the behavior of leaders, making 
them less prone to go to war (Doyle 1983; Maoz and Russett 1993). Normative explanations for 
the democratic peace have been examined and weakened by some tests, but will in any case not 
be addressed here.  
Institutional theories of the democratic peace, on the other hand, argue that institutions 
inherent in democracies make leaders accountable to various groups within society. Leaders who 
desire to retain elected office are expected to interact with and consider the views of various 
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interest groups, voting blocs, opposition parties and even the media. And, of course, regular 
elections are an ongoing reminder to leaders that they may be removed from office if the public 
does not approve of their policies (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Lake 1992). 
Underlying the institutional theories of the democratic peace are a variety of causal mechanisms, 
which are briefly reviewed next.  
Rosato surveys the institutional explanations for the democratic peace and notes that 
several causal mechanisms flow from the accountability imposed by democratic institutions 
(Rosato 2003). First, that leaders are constrained by the general public’s aversion for war, or by 
pressure from anti-war groups (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). Second, that leaders are 
constrained by the slow mobilization for war that occurs within democracies, giving time for 
diplomatic solutions to prevail. And, on a related note, since democracies are slow to mobilize 
and must do so in public, they are unable to mount a surprise attack. Therefore, their foreign 
adversaries are able negotiate in good faith with democracies, thereby avoiding war (Maoz and 
Russett 1993). Finally, the processes by which democratic leaders are held accountable serve 
also to make the leader cautious about which conflicts to engage. Indeed, they will only select 
themselves into conflicts if they place a high value on the outcome of those conflicts, if they 
expect escalation to be popular at home, if there is a good chance that they will emerge 
victorious, and if they are prepared to fight hard. This sends a clear signal to other parties: “if a 
democracy escalates the crisis or stands firm, it must be highly resolved” (Bueno de Mesquita 
2002; Fearon 1994a; Rosato 2003, p. 587; Schultz 1998). The first four of these explanations for 
the democratic peace argue that democratic institutions constrain leaders, whereas the last 
explanation argues that democratic institutions inform adversaries. To the extent it is supported 
by the literature, the informing perspective is helpful to this study and is examined next.  
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Theories of the informing role of democratic institutions 
A variety of studies examine the possibility that an informing role played by democratic 
institutions is an important contributor to the democratic peace. Several scholars9
1998
 have examined 
this question, but Schultz ( ) develops and tests a theory which explains whether and how the 
informing role might play out. This theory has potential application to this study and will 
therefore be examined at some length.  
Using a formal model, Schultz (1998) suggests that the presence of a loyal opposition 
party decreases the ex ante probability of war by clearly revealing the state’s preferences. The 
model assumes three important things about the opposition party. These assumptions are 
belabored here because they have implications beyond their immediate use by Schultz. The first 
assumption is that, like all political parties, the opposition prefers to hold office and selects 
strategies toward that end. This assumption implies that the opposition is aware of voter reaction 
to leaders’ performance in foreign policy matters, because this affects voting in future elections. 
And it further implies that the opposition competes with the incumbent leaders. Foreign 
observers thus have two sources of information about the political costs of a given foreign policy 
issue (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989). From the perspective of a foreign observer, then, two sources 
who are in competition are a more reliable indicator than a single source with a vested interest 
(Milgrom 1986). 
Second, the domestic opposition is assumed to have access to relevant information 
regarding foreign policy matters. Members of the opposition party are likely to have previously 
held office and have insights or contacts into such matters. And the opposition party is also likely 
                                                 
9 See Bueno de Mesquita (2004), Filson (2004), Powell (2004), Filson (2007) 
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to have a first-hand sense of the level of public support and other political ramifications 
surrounding a given foreign policy initiative.  
Third, the competition between the incumbent and opposition parties is assumed to take 
place in public. “Open political debate means that foreign states can "overhear" the policy 
statements used to build electoral support” (Schultz 1998, p. 832). The public statements made 
by the domestic actors reveal the political parties’ incentives and strategy for gaining public 
support. Under this assumption, there must be minimal to no regulatory interference with public 
debate regarding foreign policy matters.  
The model shows that domestic political opposition contributes to two important 
functions: its very presence lends additional credibility to the government’s threats, and it makes 
the government more selective about the threats it makes in the first place. Together, these 
mechanisms reduce the uncertainty surrounding the state’s claims about its level of resolve 
(Schultz 1998). 
Schultz also examines the broader question of whether domestic institutions constrain 
leaders or inform adversaries (the underlying mechanisms of which were outlined above). He 
observes that the two perspectives imply different behavior. On the one hand, the constraining 
perspective implies that democracies incur uniformly high political costs for war, meaning that a 
targeted state should be more likely to resist than when it is threatened by a non-democratic state. 
On the other hand, the informing perspective implies that democratic states are less likely to 
bluff and therefore a targeted state should be less likely to resist a democracy than a non-
democracy. These opposite implications form the basis of a critical test of the competing 
perspectives against the empirical record. The empirical record showed strong support for the 
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informing perspective. Schultz’ test, while not conclusively rejecting the constraining 
perspective, does lend strong statistical support to the informing perspective (Schultz 1999). 
Thus, democratic institutions, in addition to whatever else they do, contribute to 
informing adversaries. This finding is consistent with Fearon’s theoretically-driven speculation 
that once a crisis is underway, the state that can generate audience costs faster is more likely to 
prevail (Fearon 1994a). Therefore – if democratic leaders can generate higher audience costs, 
targets are less likely to resist and democracies are more likely to prevail in the event of 
resistance. Because the democratic institutions help the state to generate audience costs, they are 
thought to contribute to the better win-loss record enjoyed by democracies. In the next section, 
the empirical and theoretical literature surrounding the emergence of the international news 
media is presented. 
2.4 THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 
It is useful to begin a survey of the literature on the emergence of the international news media 
by examining the nature of news and the media. One widely used definition of news suggests 
that “First, news is any… story which, in the opinion of the editor, will interest the readers of his 
paper (or the audience of his broadcast). Second, news is always completely true, or it is at least 
a set of facts that have been presented to the reporter as truth. Third, news has a quality of 
recency about it. Fourth, news has an element of proximity about it. Fifth, news must have some 
element of the unusual about it” (Allen 1930; Berry 1976, p. 27-28; Emery 1969; Groth 1930). 
The news media serves an informational function within society, and was described by Jurgen 
Habermas as the opening of a public sphere that complements and competes with the existing 
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private and state spheres (Habermas 1991). Marshall McLuhan is perhaps best known for coining 
the expression ‘global village’ but, more importantly for purposes of this study, whereas other 
scholars examined the content of the media, he argued that medium is the message (McLuhan 
1964). Lasswell argues that three important social functions are carried through the various 
levels of communication within the media. These are “providing a watch on the environment and 
alerting the public to threats or problems developing in the world; Coordinating and categorizing 
the various elements of the social structure, so that members of the public can comprehend the 
forces with which they must cope to survive and prosper; and, handing on from one generation to 
the next the knowledge and ideas that represent our cumulative cultural heritage” (Smith, 
Lasswell, and Casey 1946, p. 238).  
In a more practical sense, the earliest published form of news – the newspaper – is 
usefully defined as being available to a sizeable proportion of the public but also having the 
qualities of: 
 First and foremost, a newspaper is published regularly and frequently (at least 
weekly)…Second, a newspaper, with so many issues to fill, includes a variety of different 
stories in each issue… Third, a newspaper displays a consistent and recognizable title or 
format; in other words, it gains an identity independent of whatever particular news items 
it happens to be carrying… (Stephens 1988) 
 
This section examines the emergence of the international news media as it pertains to the 
subject of this study in five key areas: first, the conception of the media as opening a public 
sphere, second, the early emergence of a public sphere where none had existed before; third, the 
struggle between media independence and state control; fourth, the economic incentives that 
drive the media; and fifth, a taxonomy of the major phases through which the media has 
advanced over the past two centuries. The early emergence of the media is considered first.  
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2.4.1 Conceptions of the media 
The literature examining the media suggests several conceptions of the media. The simplest 
conception sees the media as an information transmission channel connecting people. This 
conception is consistent with information theory that characterizes the direct consequences of 
exchanges of information.  Scholars in this tradition include Glaser, Lasswell, Heidegger, and 
Holsti (Glaser 1995; Heidegger 1977; Holsti, John, and Smith 1967; Holsti 1968; Lasswell and 
Bryson 1948; Smith, Lasswell, and Casey 1946). 
Mcluhan and other media scholars (Habermas 1991; Ivins et al. 1926; Levinson 1999; 
McLuhan 1962, 1964; McLuhan and Fiore 1967; Ong 2004) suggest different conceptions that 
consider the broader impact of the presence of the media. A key concept within this tradition is 
McLuhan’s dictum that media are "extensions" of our human senses, bodies and minds. 
Habermas added that the media represents a public sphere, which mediates between the private 
sphere and the sphere of public authority.  
Whereas the former conception of the media is closely related to the emergence of new 
forms of telecommunications technologies, the latter conception considers the societal impact of 
the media. In the former conception, the accuracy, value, sources and structure of information are 
important dimensions for understanding the impact of reports on leaders and events. However, in 
the latter conception, the very existence of the media is itself transformative: it extends the 
individual across time and space, and it bridges the formerly isolated private spheres and public 
authority spheres. More than simply transmitting information, the media under the latter 
conception transforms the conduct of public affairs by changing how the public engages public 
authorities, which in turn reciprocally changes how public authorities conduct public affairs. 
Considering the nature of the charge leveled at the media – namely, that it exerts an influence on 
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war outcomes by publishing reports about domestic events – it is this latter conception that is 
most important for the purpose of this study. In the next section, literature examining the 
emergence and the spread of a public sphere through history is presented.  
2.4.2 A public sphere opens and spreads around the world 
The international news media has emerged over the past two centuries and represents a shift in 
the role of the public in foreign policy. Its presence leads to both increased public engagement 
with leaders and to increased transparency regarding that engagement. As such, the media is a 
potentially important channel that systematically reveals information about public opinion to 
adversaries. At the turn of the 19th century, reports of domestic policy debates, public support, 
and public opposition to war could be collected by an adversary’s diplomatic personnel or 
commercial actors and transmitted to the adversary’s leaders via courier on horseback or via 
oceangoing vessel. At the turn of the 21st century, such reports are almost instantly available on 
CNN and al Jazeera, over the internet and via satellite TV. Information about foreign policy 
debates is now available on a routine basis to friend and foe alike. This section examines the 
birth of the media and its spread across the European continent and to European colonies.  
The emergence of the international news media flows directly from Gutenberg’s 
invention of movable type in the mid-fifteenth century. At that point, the ability to mass produce 
the written word came into being. Marshall McLuhan argued that print enabled man to develop a 
detached, private point of view. The new technology contributed to the rise of nationalism, 
industrialization, mass markets and universal literacy. And, importantly, “the ability to repeat the 
message in written form meant social, political and economic power” (Dunnett 1988, p. 4; 
Moran 1973). 
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The spread of print culture was intertwined with the changing landscape of religion and 
related conflict in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Economic and religious forces 
contributed to the particular geographic evolution of print. The widely-dispersed demand for 
printed books led to the development of the international book trade. Because of the equipment 
and capital requirements of printing, publishing emerged as a cosmopolitan enterprise, and a 
division of labor developed between the center and periphery of the trade. The regions where 
printing emerged earliest - Germany, Italy, and Holland – came to dominate publishing in Latin 
countries, leaving the publishers that emerged later in other regions to specialize in vernacular 
languages (Starr 2004, p. 26-27). By 1490, at least one printing press is believed to have operated 
in every large city in Europe. The first press in the Western Hemisphere was in Mexico City in 
1539, with others in South America soon thereafter. The first in the British colonies of North 
America was near Boston in 1638 (Desmond 1978). 
The first published reports of various recent events that were publicly available on a 
regular basis – newspapers, in other words – appeared in Europe in the early seventeenth 
century. Most accounts place the first newspaper in Strasbourg in 1605 (see Figure 2-1) and 
Wolfenbuettel in 1609, closely followed by news weeklies in Basel, Frankfurt, Vienna, 
Hamburg, Berlin, Amsterdam, London and Antwerp (Stephens 1988; Weber 2008).  
The English revolution and the Thirty Years War influenced the evolution of newspapers 
and printing in general. But by the late seventeenth century, while Europe recovered from the 
devastation, the press of England moved ahead in terms of its political position, employment of 
advertising, and rising circulation (Desmond 1978; Feather 1988). 
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Figure 2 - 1. First Newspaper, Published In Strasbourg, 1605 
 
During the eighteenth century, the universal newspaper emerged. Groth (1930) defines a 
universal newspaper as having seven characteristics: is regularly published, is printed 
mechanically, is available to the public, has comprehensive and universal contents, has contents 
of general importance, has current information, and operates as an economic enterprise. The 
universal newspaper has most of the features associated with newspapers as they would be 
known through the twentieth century.  
By the second half of the nineteenth century the industrial revolution spread beyond 
England to the continent and beyond. The rise of nation states and imperialism led to large 
numbers of Westerners settling in all corners of the globe. Many of these affluent, literate 
individuals brought their demand for newspapers with them, leading to the establishment of 
English-language newspapers on all five continents. Vernacular press soon followed in most 
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regions. But the early dominance of the English press slowed the emergence of vernacular press, 
since the western-language press captured the available literature, the affluent audience and the 
associated advertising potential (Dunnett 1988, p. 6). Thus, a European model of the media had 
been established on the Continent and in many parts of the world by the nineteenth century. 
Next, the discussion turns to the struggle between the state and the media over control of the 
media.  
Policy and practice of state control and censorship 
The power of the press to challenge entrenched interests and the concomitant motivation of the 
state and of organized religion to control the press are part and parcel of Gutenberg’s invention. 
Throughout the history of the press and the news media, states have attempted to control the 
press at some times while at other times exploited the power of the press to advance its interests. 
These conflicting approaches have meant that at times the press flourishes, expanding its 
political and economic power. But it also means that with some regularity the press has existed 
under censorship in one form or another. One of the first instances of the state exploiting the 
press occurred during the English Revolution (Darnton 1989). This section traces state control 
from this earliest period up to the nineteenth century. 
After newspapers initially appeared in England during the 1620s, King Charles I banned 
them entirely for six years beginning in 1632 (Desmond 1978). As the revolution unfolded, the 
structure of government control gradually collapsed. The Star Chamber was abolished in 1641, 
press licensing and censorship ceased, government-granted press monopolies broke down, and 
the number of printers grew. During the years of armed conflict, the press expanded as both 
Parliament and the King used competing publications to present their views. Up to that point, 
well-established norms treated political issues as inappropriate for public discussion, but this 
 39 
public airing broke down the secrecy that had long governed political communications (Stephens 
1988). 
The division of the press into the center and periphery as described above intersected 
with growing religious conflict to add other dimensions to the evolving struggle between press 
freedom and control. As churches and states attempted to exert control, they forced dissenters in 
many instances to flee to other countries. The exodus of the Huguenots from France contributed 
to Holland’s emerging role as a center of Protestant publishing; English dissenters went across 
the channel to Holland to have their work printed, further strengthening the role of the Dutch 
press. Extraterritorial publishers found a market for the books and journals they printed all over 
Europe. As the language of the elite changed from Latin to French in the seventeenth century, 
press restrictions within France contributed to the Netherlands becoming a center of French 
publishing that was not officially approved. Such transnational and extraterritorial publishing 
frustrated state efforts to control the printed word. Censorship regimes thus had to tackle two 
distinct issues: controlling printing at home and regulating the import of printed material (Starr 
2004). 
 On the Continent and within Britain, the emergence of independent journalism was 
influenced by complementary changes in politics and markets. In the 1690s, divisions between 
Whigs and Tories in England began to open up the space for a more diverse press that included 
opposition newspapers. At the same time, the fragmentation of power in both the Netherlands 
other European states opened up space for a competitive, semiautonomous transnational press. 
But it must be noted that the emerging public sphere of early modern Europe (Habermas 1991) 
was far from the democratic ideal.  
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While the early modern public sphere represented a shift away from political secrecy, it 
was still socially exclusive, subject to the influences of money and status, and routinely 
manipulated by those in power. A market for news emerged that freed the press from dependence 
on the state or officials for patronage, although the market was limited primarily to the elite 
public. The market for newspapers was limited in Britain by the stamp tax and in France by 
similar measures (Darnton, Roche, and Library 1989). Although the public sphere was opening, 
state policies continued for the most part to play a critical role in frustrating the emergence of an 
independent commercial press (Starr 2004, p. 45-46). Public opinion may have emerged as a new 
force in politics, but the public sphere that European states allowed to develop in the early 
modern period sharply limited the opinion that could be heard (Levy 1985; Starr 2004, p. 46). 
The American Revolution played a critical role in permanently institutionalizing freedom 
of the press and a wider public sphere. The American Revolution introduced several important 
innovations: free speech as a constitutional principle; the Constitution itself written and 
published so that ordinary citizens could read it; government subsidies of the press rather than 
taxes; a comprehensive postal network with institutionalized postal privacy; a periodic census; 
and primary schooling was extended earlier to more of its population, including women (Starr 
2004, p. 107). Although both the English and French revolutions also generated a flourish of 
public debate in print, the outcome of all this debate in the American case was far different. The 
crises that preceded the American Revolution established the central role of the press as a venue 
for public discussion that status and rights of the press were consolidated in the aftermath of the 
conflict. None of the European states had by then experienced a comparable transformation, and 
with the debatable exception of France, none would see such changes on any sustained basis 
until the middle of the nineteenth century. Not until the second half of the nineteenth century 
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would many European countries and Canada begin to catch up with the American movement 
toward broader communication and education. The American Revolution turned the page on 
press freedom in history (Starr 2004, p. 79).  
Although the American Revolution established the legitimate role of press freedom, 
states continued then and continue today to make a variety of attempts to control the flow of 
information. This happens to varying degrees during both war- and peacetime and under both 
democratic and non-democratic regimes. The range of techniques employed by states has grown 
more sophisticated over time, including what is arguably the most powerful and still most 
prevalent form of censorship – manipulating the self-interest of the press so that the press itself 
exercises self-censorship out of fear for government punishment (Khazen 1999). Thus, rather 
than the press being either restricted or independent, a third category is apparent. Media 
independence evident in the empirical record runs from very low (restricted by the state) to 
medium (de jure independence, but self-censorship by the press) to high (de facto independence, 
as evidenced by active press criticism of the state).  
The tension between the public demand for news and the state imperative to control and 
censor published news has never been resolved. The ebb and flow of state censorship of news 
continues to the present day, playing out in individual states. The next section presents the 
economic imperatives that drive the norms, practices and technology of the media.  
2.4.3 Economic imperatives driving the media 
Economic incentive to gather the latest news 
The emergence of newspapers and the book trade were closely related to the rise of 
capitalism. But there were critical differences between the economic imperatives that drove 
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newspapers and books. The different imperatives of book and newspaper printing led to different 
technological patterns. A steam powered bed-and-platen press devised by Isaac Adams in 1830 
(Starr 2004) became standard in book manufacture, while steam-powered cylinder presses, first 
put into operation by the London Times in 1814, became the standard in large-circulation 
newspapers.  
The different imperatives of book and newspapers printing also led to different economic 
patterns. Book publishers were constantly seeking capital because of the slow returns on 
investment in books. Newspaper publishers, on the other hand, typically enjoyed low printing 
costs and could often sell their product in advance through subscriptions and advertising fees. So 
capital needs were not the major driving motivation for newspapers. Rather, newspapers 
sustained their subscription and advertising revenues by continuously furnishing fresh supplies 
of their distinctive raw material: news (Starr 2004, p. 32). Early newspapers invested significant 
energy, creativity and resources into finding new ways to get news stories and to get them into 
print before their competition. The media is driven by economic forces to constantly gather and 
report the latest news. 
Economic incentive to expand reach of newsgathering 
The expansion of trade and markets which accompanied the rise of capitalism helped 
newspapers to reach never-ending supplies of news. At the same time, the rise of global markets 
increased the demand for news about the world. Ben Franklin’s Pennsylvania Gazette is 
considered the first modern newspaper to be commercially viable. The emergence of a market 
for mass circulation newspapers can be traced to the social and economic developments of the 
industrial revolution including changes in demographics, political institutions, technology, 
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communications, literacy and living standards. These changes dramatically increased potential 
demand and reduced supply costs. 
With the advent of the industrial revolution, the performance and development of the 
press advanced rapidly. New production and editorial methods, and an easing of government 
restraints and taxes on the press contributed to expanding readership in the 1840s and 1850s. 
Better newspapers became available at a lower price, and newspapers became more appealing by 
a taking a broader view of the news and applying the concept of the ‘human interest,10
Desmond 1978
 story. 
Larger circulations along with growth in advertising volume, enabled newspapers to afford larger 
staffs to gather and publish the news. The introduction of the telegraph brought a sense of 
immediacy and freshness to news reports and enabled the emergence of newspapers in cities 
everywhere, not just in capital or port cities ( ). Early newspapers featured 
extensive coverage of foreign news – often devoting most of the front page to foreign dispatches 
- to satisfy this appetite. Over time, news about foreign wars came to play a major role in the 
emergence of the international news media, as discussed in the next section. 
Economic incentive to cover foreign policy and war 
The US-Mexican War, the revolutions of the 1840s in Europe, the Crimean War, and the 
Italo-Austrian War of 1859 all had a profound effect on the practice of newsgathering and 
publishing, and on the public appetite for daily news. For the first time, news about faraway wars 
could be rapidly gathered and brought to the reading public within days. The drama of the 
battles, suspense about the outcomes, and certainly the violence of these wars received close 
attention in the press. These and subsequent wars affected the lives of many and the public 
                                                 
10 See Desmond (1937) for an engaging discussion of this important milestone in the development of the popular 
press. 
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needed to be informed of the issues and events. Newspapers were the only means for conveying 
the information to the public (Desmond 1978, p. 170). 
The demands of war reporting in this era seem to have brought advances in the practice 
and standards of general news reporting that would likely otherwise not occurred. War 
correspondents learned valuable lessons which would eventually serve to improve the practice of 
gathering and disseminating news in peacetime. The rapid pace of events forces news 
organizations to act with little concern for expense, which led to advances in technology and 
communication that had enduring effects. The drama and suspense of war expanded the 
readership of newspapers, helped establish a habit of newspaper reading among the public, 
resulting in a cycle of growth the led to still better service to the public (Desmond 1978, p. 170-
71). 
The Crimean War brought the first grouping of news correspondents on overseas 
assignment, whether in war or in peace. In that, it made both press and political history. The 
correspondents were almost exclusively representatives of London publications, even though 
five nations were involved in the war. In subsequent wars, correspondents from other major 
powers began to also report from the scene of conflicts (Desmond 1978, p. 177).  
Next, literature pertaining to the role of the media within international politics is 
considered.  
2.4.4 Media as a channel for International Politics 
The international news media has reciprocally influenced and been influenced by society and 
international politics. The emergence of each new type of new media has been accompanied by 
changes in how diplomacy and politics are conducted. New forms of media and new 
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technologies typically infringe upon the diplomatic protocols of the day. In his history of the 
telegraph and diplomacy, Nickles argues that because of institutional resistance to new 
technologies there are three eras in the conduct of diplomacy. Prior to the introduction of the 
telegraph, diplomacy was conducted face to face by ambassadors and envoys relying on 
diplomatic couriers; from 1851 to 1918, the telegraph was adopted as the dominant mode of 
diplomatic exchange; after 1851, even with the advent of radio, the telegraph remained an 
important mode of communication for diplomats. To this day, US State Department writing 
guidelines emphasize brevity, a holdover from the days of expensive, charged-by-the-word 
telegraphy (US State Department 2009).  Historically, as new forms of media and new 
communication technologies have arrived on the scene, diplomats “scoffed at the new invention, 
journalists boasted that their influence had exploded, the public notices that its world was 
shrinking, as if the boundaries of home were stretching to meet the horizon” (Neuman 1996, p. 
58). These themes are echoed in Douglass’ account of the World Disarmament Conference of 
1932-34 (Douglass, Bömer, and Dovifat 1932). Nevertheless, diplomats and policymakers have 
ultimately had to come to terms with new forms of media as they are introduced and become 
dominant. 
Anecdotes from several eras illustrate the effect the international news media has had on 
international politics: After Samuel Morse’s invention of the telegraph, Civil War-era leaders 
lamented that the “chilling influences of time and distance are all gone” (Mabee 1943, p. 207). 
Failure to embrace new forms of technology and media has also proven costly to leaders, as in 
the case of Russian czar Nicholas I who feared the telegraph’s potential to spread information. 
Out of concern that the telegraph would prove subversive, Nicholas turned down a contract with 
Morse to build a telegraph system across his empire. It was an important blunder in that on the 
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eve of World War I, Russian telegraph lines were still so rudimentary that Russian Military 
officials were forced to use radio to communicate with commanders in the field. German 
commanders learned from listening to these un-coded Russian radio broadcasts the exact location 
of two key Russian units. Having this information proved decisive in the German success at the 
Battle of Tannenburg (Livesey, Livesay, and MacDonald 1989). Prior to the U.S. entry into 
World War I, the notorious Zimmerman telegraph was intercepted by British intelligence 
officials who had successfully broken German codes. In order to obscure the role of code-
breaking in the incident, U.S. President Wilson leaked the telegram to the Associated Press, 
leading to U.S. entry into the war (Millis 1935, p. 407).  
More recently, the Suez crisis of 1956 was the first to play out on TV. Initially, the BBC 
in early August reported sharply anti-Nasser reaction from a unified British government under 
Prime Minister Eden. Shortly, the Labour opposition became increasingly critical of the Eden 
government’s stand and began to articulate that position to domestic and foreign audiences in 
BBC television broadcasts beginning August 10. Divisions in the resolve of the British 
government surrounding the crisis had become obvious to both the British public and to Britain’s 
allies and adversaries (Marris and Thornham 2000).  
In a 1968 speech shortly after announcing he would not seek reelection, U.S. President 
Johnson commented on the impact the media had had on the conduct of the Vietnam War and 
wondered aloud about what would have happened in earlier foreign policy crises:  
As I sat in my office last evening, waiting to speak, I thought of the many times of each 
week when television brings the war into the American home. No one can say exactly 
what effect those vivid scenes have on American opinion. Historians must only guess at 
the effect that television would have had during earlier conflicts on the future of this 
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nation: during the Korean War, for example, at that time when our forces were pushed 
back there to Pusan; or World War II, the Battle of the Bulge, or when our men were 
slugging it out in Europe or when most of our Air Force was shot down that day in June 
1942 off Australia (Mandelbaum 1982, p. 157). 
 
While LBJ lamented the intrusion of the media into his conduct of the Vietnam War, 
other policymakers have taken full advantage of the media. In the moments preceding the first 
Gulf War, James Baker issued a message directly to Saddam Hussein on January 11, 1991 via 
CNN rather than via the top U.S. diplomat in Baghdad.  
These episodes highlight the influence of the news media in two facets of international 
politics. The use of the media as a channel for explicitly communicating with adversaries is 
highlighted by the episodes involving President Wilson and Secretary Baker. The experience of 
Civil War-era leaders, Czar Nicholas I and President Johnson highlight that the media can also 
transmit unintended information to adversaries. While the experience of today’s policymakers - 
observing and participating in events in fuller view of ordinary citizens than ever before in 
human history – is perhaps most vivid to contemporary observers, it is by no means unique. Each 
successive form of media has had similar effect, going all the way back to Gutenberg’s invention 
of movable type and the subsequent introduction of the first newspapers. Each new form of 
media – culminating in today’s 24/7 satellite news – has opened up formerly private diplomatic 
communication and brought that into the public sphere, bringing with it new norms of public 
engagement (Neuman 1996).  
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2.4.5 Phases in emergence of the media 
The international news media as we know it today is the product of an evolution through a series 
of distinct phases, from early newspapers through the modern electronic media we know today. 
It’s important to examine the phases that comprise this evolution because each new form of mass 
media has brought to the public more information and analysis and reciprocally expanding norms 
of public engagement. (Starr 2004) The evolution of the media did not happen in a smooth, 
orderly fashion. Rather, the dominant media in any given country at any given time is path-
dependent, the result of a variety of economic, social, political and technological factors (Boyce, 
Curran, and Wingate 1978). Descriptions and definitions of the phases through which the news 
media typically evolves in any particular country are presented next. 
Pre-universal newspaper 
The earliest newspapers were usually exclusively tailored to the needs of a particular trade guild 
or a religious order. They were economically supported by these private interests and featured 
news of interest only to the principles. They were relatively small publications, consisting of a 
single sheet that was published only sporadically 
Universal newspaper 
The next stage in the evolution of the press is the universal newspaper. The universal newspaper 
is the forerunner of the newspaper as it is known to modern readers. Groth defines a universal 
newspaper as having seven characteristics: Is regularly published, is printed mechanically, is 
available to the public, has comprehensive and universal contents, has contents of general 
importance, has current information, and operates as an economic enterprise. (Groth 1930) 
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Press Agencies and the Telegraph 
The invention of the telegraph had a profound effect on the press. Immediately after its 
demonstration in 1844 it was recognized for its potential to meet many human needs. The 
telegraph was the first invention in human history to travel faster than any available form of 
transport. Whereas the telegraph carried information at the speed of light of 186,000 miles per 
second, the railroads of the day could barely muster 2 miles per hour, and a carrier pigeon was 
clocked at 35 miles per hour. (Neuman 1996) Government, industry, and the press all quickly 
grasped the many uses for the new technology. Railroads had by then been built in many 
countries and were rapidly penetrating new areas. The new technology was promptly used to 
improve the performance and safety of railroads. This meant that the first telegraph offices in 
most cities were located in railroad stations. Undersea cables led to the completion of a 
worldwide communications network by around 1900. (Desmond 1978; Standage 1998) 
The introduction of telegraph service had profound social significance. Before 1844, 
important newspapers were published almost exclusively in capitals and seaport cities - places 
where news originated or was brought from elsewhere and therefore most promptly and fully 
available. Other cities and towns were out of the mainstream of affairs, even if they had 
newspapers. Railroads had helped to connect these remote areas and reduce isolation by bringing 
in mail and newspapers from elsewhere. But railroads were ultimately slow and unreliable, and it 
was the telegraph which eventually connected even small towns and cities to the rest of the 
world. Telegraph service was also occasionally interrupted but, by contrast, it was extended more 
rapidly than rail service, and by 1870 it was possible for a newspaper in almost any town or city, 
certainly of North America or Europe, to receive and publish locally whatever was known at 
approximately the same time in the capitals and port cities.  
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In conjunction with the emergence and spread of the telegraph, the first press agencies 
emerged. As the demand for foreign news grew, newspapers everywhere faced the challenge of 
rising costs. The purpose of a press agency was to extend the reach of newspapers by sharing 
costs and thereby gathering news on a wider scale. A press agency would typically gather a 
comprehensive set of news reports and deliver those on a timely basis to dozens or hundreds of 
newspapers each day. These subscribing newspapers would then turn around and publish the 
news to their readership. (Unesco 1953)  
By functioning on a large scale, the press agency could achieve the lowest cost of 
operation, and divide its costs among subscriber newspapers and private clients as well. 
(Desmond 1978, p. 133) The first four press agencies were Agence Havas, of Paris in 1832; the 
New York Associated Press in 1848; the Wolff’sche Telegraphen Buro, of Berlin in 1849; and 
the Reuters Telegram Company, Ltd., of London in 1851. The emergence of press agencies led 
to a dramatic increase in foreign news reporting in the major newspapers. A typical edition of the 
London Times or the Vienna post could now devote as much as half the front page to telegraph 
dispatches from afar. (Read 1999) (Fenby 1986) 
The press agencies and the telegraph thereby brought the newspapers and residents of 
inland places into the mainstream of national and international life. In places where there had 
been no newspapers before, there was now reason to establish them. The publication of timely 
reports received by wire also had the effect of stimulating special interest among the people in 
public affairs and foreign news, helped create an informed society, and led to an increased sense 
of national unity.(Desmond 1937, p. 110) (Starr 2004, p. 153) 
Radio  
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The first radio experiments began in the late 1890s. But the use of radio for commercial news 
broadcasting would have to wait until after the end of World War I. In the military, advances in 
radio were critical at first for naval operations and then more generally enhanced command-and-
control of mobile units. World War I highlighted the vital importance of both communications 
infrastructure and mass media. The belligerents struggled over control of submarine cables and 
radiotelegraphy, invested in new radio technology, and conscripted the mass media into 
propaganda campaigns to mobilize patriotism at home and demoralize the enemy abroad. The 
explosion of radio during the following decade reinforced this growing awareness of 
power.”(Starr 2004, p. 387) 
Some of the earliest commercial radio broadcast stations were by KQW in San Jose, 
WHA in Madison Wisconsin, WWJ in New York and KDKA in Pittsburgh. (Desmond 1978) 
Warren G Harding was the first President whose voice was heard on the radio in 1923. Special 
events coverage was given impetus in 1927 when Charles A Lindbergh arrived in New York 
aboard the US Navy cruiser Memphis, on his return from France after his solo flight across the 
Atlantic. The London Naval Conference opening on January 21, 1930 in the British House of 
Lords became an historic occasion in shortwave radio broadcasting of the news. Although there 
had been earlier voice transmissions across the Atlantic between 1924 and 1929, the Naval 
Conference was the first live news event to be reported. Listeners became familiar with the 
voices of leading personalities in the worldwide drama of the 1930s, Roosevelt and Hitler among 
them. The abdication of Britain’s Edward VIII on December 10, 1936, made Radio history. 
During the 1930s the public became accustomed to and came to expect man-on-the-scene 
coverage of important events around the world. At the same time, the public became accustomed 
to listening to the voices of world leaders so that they could judge for themselves the meaning of 
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the day’s events. The style of news writing familiar to today’s audience – using short sentences 
and simple, concise wording – was honed on the radio in the 1930s. (Desmond 1984a) (Stephens 
1988) 
In the United States, radio news began to prove it had arrived as a significant journalistic 
force when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. There were no evening 
papers on Sunday, so from the first bulletin on the Mutual radio network, right after the wires 
flashed the news at 2:22 PM EST until Monday morning, the news of Pearl Harbor was a radio 
exclusive. (Stephens 1988) (Metz 1976) At the same time as it became established in journalism, 
communications grew to be a factor in economic growth and military power. Broader access to 
telecommunications more advanced long-distance networks, more rapid diffusion of innovation 
in communication technology and products became sources of economic and strategic advantage.  
Television 
Although experiments in the many technologies that comprise television had been ongoing for 
decades, the first broadcasts of electronic television occurred in 1936 in Germany, Britain and 
the United States. Commercial broadcasting would commence in Britain shortly thereafter, with 
over 20000 receivers in operation by September 1939 when the service was shut down following 
the German invasion of Poland. Service in the United States began in July 1941 but was 
interrupted by the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. Broadcasting resumed in Britain and the 
United States following the war, achieving rapid growth on the 1950s. The development of 
television in France was slowed by political instability during the Fourth Republic and was did 
not flourish until the election of Charles de Gaulle. Within the USSR, the founders of the 
communist movement had selected cinema rather than radio as their preferred method of social 
and political communication. This foundation contributed to the slow introduction of television 
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until Prime Minster Nikita Khrushchev decided in the 1960s to feature television in the new 
consumer society he was building. Television within the Federal Republic of Germany would be 
set up by the occupying powers during the late 1940s and 1950s. Most other developed countries 
initiated television service during the 1950s, each governed by policies that emerged from their 
own distinct political landscapes. Lesser-developed countries’ television service was, for the 
most part, established in the 1950s and 1960s by neighboring developed countries or by former 
colonial powers. (Smith and Paterson 1998)  
Television was initially introduced with the notion that it would simply add pictures to 
existing radio broadcasts. But by the time it had become commercially well-established, it 
exercised unanticipated influence in transforming political and social life in democracies and 
non-democracies alike. It would have a symbiotic relationship with the consumer culture which 
emerged in the post-war years. The shape of television has changed over the past 60 years, 
shifting from a regulated, monolithic national medium to a more fragmented one with hundreds 
of broadcast, cable and satellite channels (Emery 1969; Gorman and McLean 2003; Smith and 
Paterson 1998).  
Further important phases in the emergence of the news media include the advent of direct 
satellite television broadcast and the internet. Because this dissertation is limited to examining 
wars from the early nineteenth century through 1990, these later media phases are not reviewed 
here. This concludes the review of the literature on the emergence of the media, which is the 
final element to be considered. The literature reviewed in this chapter is summarized in the next 
section, before moving on to develop a theoretical explanation of the influence of the media.  
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2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY: LITERATURE REVIEW  
The literature examined in this chapter establishes a number of important points which bear on 
the question addressed by this dissertation. First, war can usefully be thought of as an 
information problem, which provides the basis media reports potentially influencing war 
outcomes. Second, the bargaining model of war suggests that leaders in war are driven by an 
imperative to discover information about their adversaries’ cost sensitivity. In fact, some 
theorists argue that war serves an instrumental purpose of revealing this vital information. Third, 
the literature suggests that domestic debates occurring within democratic institutions impose 
costs and constraints on leaders which ultimately make it feasible for democratic leaders to send 
credible signals to adversaries. Fourth, the international news media is driven by economic 
incentives to gather and distribute news reports about these debates to friend and foe alike. And, 
finally, the empirical record demonstrates how the geographic reach, speed, independence and 
richness of media reporting have all varied significantly over the centuries. These points will be 
drawn together in the next chapter, where the task of developing a theoretical explanation for the 
influence of the international news media on war outcomes is undertaken.    
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3.0  THEORY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER 
This chapter draws on the existing literature to develop a theory explaining how the international 
news media influences the outcome of international wars. It begins by situating the media within 
the context of a conflict between two state actors and the democratic institutions of one of the 
states. From this picture, the elements that comprise the claim of aid and comfort to the enemy 
are enumerated. The elements of the claim are next examined in some detail, drawing on the 
literature. This leads to a discussion of the contributions of the literature and the shortcomings of 
the literature, which, in turn, leads to the theory advanced in this dissertation. After an 
examination of the theory, observable implications of the theory are drawn out, and a set of 
testable hypotheses is advanced. 
The chapter begins by situating the media within the context of international politics.   
3.1.1 Situating the media within international politics 
It is useful to begin by explicitly situating the international news media within the context of two 
states engaged in a foreign policy dispute or war, and within the context of the democratic 
institutions of one of the states.  
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Consider two states, A and B, engaged in a war, with several international news media 
entities reporting on the war from within State B. Figure 3-1 illustrates the paths11
State A’s leader learns about State B leader’s political costs through a variety of 
channels, including diplomacy and the news media. The media process begins when war events 
occur and news about these events is gathered by reporters in the field. The news media entities 
resident in State B publish news of these war events to the general public. The news media also 
report the ensuing domestic discussion. To the extent that the media entities in State B distribute 
their news products internationally, they make these reports available to foreign audiences, 
including the State A leader. As the international news media has emerged over the past two 
centuries, such international distribution of news has increasingly become the norm. Within this 
context, then, the State A leader has the opportunity to gain insight into the political costs related 
to State B leader’s foreign policy. These insights should contribute to State A leader’s beliefs 
 that 
information takes to provide State A leader with insight into State B leader’s political costs 
related to the war. The process of generating political costs takes place within the democratic 
institutions of State B, as the public and elites express support and/or opposition to war. The 
domestic discussion includes the policy positions of the domestic opposition parties that are 
competing for electoral support in future elections. The discussion may also include elite opinion 
from actors such as elder statesmen, pundits or prominent citizens. The discussion may also 
include the opinion of ordinary citizens in the form of letters to the editor, formal or informal 
opinion polls, public demonstrations of support of opposition for the incumbent leader’s policy, 
and so forth.  
                                                 
11 Figure 3-1 represents the flow of information, not necessarily the geographical relationships between the site of 
war events and the sites of government. The war could occur within the territory of either state or remote from 
either. 
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about State B and ultimately influence decisions made about how to conduct the fighting and 
negotiating that comprise the war. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - 1. Situating the International News Media (Maxwell 2010) 
 
The international news media, then, plays a role independent of the domestic political 
institutions within State B. The media both contributes news reports about war events to the 
domestic discussion and reports on those domestic discussions. The media also distributes 
reports of those domestic discussions to audiences near and far, potentially including State A’s 
leader.  With the news media properly situated, the next section addresses the claim of aid and 
comfort to the enemy.  
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3.1.2 Aid and Comfort to the Enemy: What are the elements of the claim? 
Drawing on the literature, it is possible to break the claim of aid and comfort to the enemy down 
into its constituent elements. For domestic debates about foreign policy matters, or media reports 
of the same, to provide aid and comfort to the enemy, the following elements must be present: 
An information channel to the enemy carrying information about domestic debates that is 
generated by democratic institutions, affecting enemy beliefs in the context of strategic 
interaction. Each of these elements is next examined in some detail.  
3.2 EXAMINING THE ELEMENTS OF A CAUSAL MODEL 
3.2.1 An information channel 
Viewed in its most basic sense, the media is nothing more than a pipe or a channel connecting 
one entity to another. It simply moves information. In this conception, the media is akin to a pair 
of tin cans and some string that might be used by children to communicate across the backyard. 
Or, in a more advanced vein, two telegraph machines connected by copper wires strung from 
wooden poles across great distances. Such a pipe, or channel, must span distances so great that it 
can reach faraway capitols so that the information it carries reaches foreign leaders. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the media of today certainly does reach virtually all world capitals, but 
media with such global reach has not always existed. There has been significant variation in the 
presence, reach and scope of the media over the past two centuries (Standage 1998; Starr 2004).  
 59 
The channel connecting disparate parts of the world is an important but relatively 
straightforward element of this picture. But the news media is more than just a telegraph line or 
radio signal passively transmitting information. The news media also functions to gather and 
distribute particular information (Starr 2004). It is the information transmitted over the channel, 
importantly, which must exert the influence within this causal model. In particular, reports of 
domestic debates, which are discussed next.  
3.2.2 Transmitting reports of domestic debates  
To support the claim of aid and comfort, the media must be more than just a pipe or a channel. It 
must have the capacity to gather insight into the domestic debate that takes place surrounding 
foreign policy and wars. The empirical record shows that the first newspaper (in 1605) gathered 
and reported news of political matters and thus began the process of opening up the public sphere 
(McLuhan 1964; Weber 2008). In time, reports of domestic debates regarding foreign policy 
matters were gathered and published on a routine basis (Boyce, Curran, and Wingate 1978; 
Desmond 1937; Stephens 1988). By the time of the Crimean War, the capacity of the newspaper 
enterprise in Great Britain had grown to the point that it could bring to the public first-hand 
accounts of battles, and even commentary on the conduct of the war by the British officer corps 
(Desmond 1978). Such reporting and commentary elicited public response from both the 
incumbent administration and the loyal opposition. The performance of the British press 
surrounding the Crimean War is exemplary of a growing capacity of the media to draw out and 
report the contrasting policy positions and interests of various elite actors and the public. 
It is not enough to note episodes of the media demonstrating the capacity to gather and 
report the public debate. In order to support the claim of aid and comfort to the enemy on an 
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ongoing basis, there must be evidence of a sustained, systematic advance in the capacity of the 
media to do so (Desmond 1978). The media must demonstrate a vested interest first, in gathering 
and reporting the domestic debate in general and, second, in covering foreign policy in 
particular. The overall economic incentives surrounding the media appear to satisfy the first 
requirement. As distinct from the book publishing business, the advertising model supporting 
newspapers demands a fresh supply of news in order to sustain demand and revenue (Starr 
2004). The empirical record of the media over the past two centuries demonstrates ample 
incentive regarding the second requirement. The media has consistently found in practice that 
coverage of foreign policy and wars generates readership and advertising revenue. The media has 
clear inherent incentives to exercise and further develop its capacity to gather and report insights 
into domestic debates of foreign policy (Boyce, Curran, and Wingate 1978). But beyond the 
debates themselves, the sources of the debates – democratic institutions – are themselves also 
important and are considered next.  
3.2.3 Generated by democratic institutions 
The domestic debates transmitted to the enemy by the media have their origins in the democratic 
institutions12
                                                 
12 This examination of the influence of the media necessarily conceives of the media as separate and distinct from 
the other democratic institutions within society. 
 of society. Government leaders, opposition political parties, opinion leaders, 
scholars, elites and the general public all participate to varying degrees in the discussion. These 
many interested parties may or may not all share the same points of view regarding the choice of 
foreign policy. The differing interests of the various actors fuel the debate. And, the fact that 
there are multiple competing perspectives has a very important implication in the context of this 
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dissertation. Competition among the many interests sends a confirming signal to the enemy 
(Milgrom 1986; Schultz 1998) because competing interests are less likely to collude in 
formulation of their messages. Whether or not the political opposition agrees with the leader’s 
policy, the very existence of the opposition tends to moderate the leader’s behavior (Baum 2004; 
Partell and Palmer 1999).  
The reports of domestic debates transmitted to the enemy are important because they 
have the potential to influence enemy beliefs. Enemy beliefs are examined next. 
3.2.4 Affecting enemy beliefs 
The domestic debates generated by democratic institutions and transmitted to the enemy by the 
media are important because they have the potential to affect enemy beliefs. The bargaining 
perspective on international war suggests that the enemy is driven by the imperative to 
understand the cost sensitivity of the opponent (Filson and Werner 2002; Powell 2004; Slantchev 
2004). As discussed above, this is the case because the parties to a war understand that political 
costs can be an important factor in their opponent’s resolve surrounding a foreign policy issue. 
And, because the debates have their origins within the domestic competition among the 
government leader, opposition political parties and the media, they are interpreted by the enemy 
as being more credible (Baum 2004; Schultz 2001; Slantchev 2006). And, in the context of the 
strategic interaction of war, the enemy beliefs in turn affect behavior. The strategic interaction is 
considered next. 
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3.2.5 In the context of strategic interaction 
All of the elements outlined here – an information channel, domestic debates, democratic 
institutions, and enemy beliefs – exist within the context of strategic interaction. The strategic 
interaction takes place both on the domestic level and the international level. As shown by 
Schultz, the competitive interaction with opposition parties helps the government leader send 
more credible signals of resolve to the foreign leader (Schultz 1998). These more credible signals 
of resolve help the leaders overcome the information problem inherent in war (Schultz 1999; 
Slantchev 2004). And, as Fearon argues, the ability to send credible signals contributes to the 
superior record of democracies in war (Fearon 1994b). 
But the relationship between the media and the government leader is also competitive in 
nature. And, similar to opposition parties, the media therefore imposes constraints on the actions 
and threats the government leader undertakes. These constraints, in turn, enhance the credibility 
assigned to the government leader’s signals of resolve by the foreign leader, and thereby 
influence the outcome of wars.  
Thus, the elements outlined above - an information channel to the enemy carrying 
information about domestic debates that is generated by democratic institutions, affecting enemy 
beliefs in the context of strategic interaction – form a causal model through which the presence 
of the international news media is theorized to influence the outcome of wars. Most of the 
elements of the causal model are supported by the existing literature. However, the existing 
literature fails for the most part to include the media. The next section touches on those elements 
that are drawn from the existing literature and then goes on to discuss the novel media elements.  
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3.3 THE NOVEL ELEMENTS OF THE CAUSAL MODEL  
Most of the elements of the above causal model are drawn from well-established literature 
reviewed in the prior chapter. Briefly, it is relatively well established that information contained 
in domestic debates provides an indication of a leader’s cost sensitivity. The democratic 
institutions that are the source of the debates constrain leaders and impose audience costs. In 
turn, enemy perceptions of constraints and audience costs contribute to enemy beliefs about the 
credibility of government threats and actions. And, finally, these beliefs influence behavior. As 
each of these elements plays out within the context of strategic interactions – domestically and 
internationally – they influence outcomes. These elements of the causal model are relatively 
well-established in the existing literature. Those elements of the causal model that are introduced 
in this dissertation are considered next.  
Several novel elements are proposed in this dissertation which must be theoretically 
justified and empirically tested. The information generated by domestic institutions is assumed in 
the existing literature to be available for consumption by the enemy. The enemy simply 
‘overhears’ the domestic debate (Schultz 1998, p. 832). But the literature fails to consider the 
distinct influence of an information (‘news’) gathering mechanism and an information 
transmission (‘reporting’) channel, separate and apart from the influence of ‘democratic 
institutions.’ While it may be reasonable to conceive of the news media as part of the construct 
of ‘democratic institutions,’ it is also reasonable to consider the role played by the media as 
distinct from democratic institutions. The media should be distinguished from other institutions 
for two reasons: first, the charge of ‘aid and comfort to the enemy’ specifically implicates the 
media, not just ‘democratic institutions’; second, the media has emerged through history in its 
own way and its own pace, in parallel with, but distinct from, the emergence of democracy. In 
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order to examine the charge of ‘aid and comfort,’ and in order to examine the distinct influence 
of the media (and thereby more clearly understand the influence of democracy), it is essential to 
treat the news media as separate and distinct from other institutions. The next novel element of 
the causal model – the relationship between the media and the government – is considered next. 
The existing literature fails to consider how the media’s adversarial relationship with the 
government contributes to government credibility. The nature of the media relationship is 
analogous to the relationship between opposition political parties and the government leader, 
with analogous influence. Schultz and others demonstrate how the presence of distinct political 
opposition and a domestic political audience influence the behavior of the government leader 
(Baum 2004; Baum and Potter 2008; Schultz 1998; Slantchev 2006). Namely, the presence of the 
political opposition constrains democratic leaders in terms of the threats and actions they 
undertake; and, in the context of a strategic interaction, this in turn influences enemy beliefs and 
behavior. Schultz develops this argument using a formal model that is based on three 
assumptions about the political opposition. First, that the opposition party [is self-interested in 
that it] seeks to hold office and conducts itself accordingly; Second, the opposition is assumed to 
have access to inside information regarding foreign policy, owing to having previously held 
power; Third, a competition for power between the incumbent and opposition parties takes place 
in public such that it can be observed by the foreign leader. Each of these assumptions is equally 
relevant to the news media: first, it is self-interested and therefore unlikely to collude with the 
government in the crafting of messages; second, it has access to information in part because both 
incumbent and opposition politicians maintain contact with the media for their own self-
interested reasons; third, its adversarial relationship with the incumbent leader takes place in 
public. Thus, short of developing a formal model specifically to examine the influence of the 
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media in the strategic interaction between government leaders and the political opposition or 
between government leaders and foreign leaders, it is reasonable to rely on the analogous 
findings from Schultz (1998).  
Therefore, treating the media as an entity separate and distinct from other democratic 
institutions, it is reasonable to expect that the presence of the media both constrains the actions 
and threats undertaken by the government leader and contributes to the enemy interpreting 
government signals of resolve as being more credible.   
3.4 THE THEORY ADVANCED IN THIS DISSERTATION 
Bargaining models of war have been successfully used to show how a series of battles and 
negotiating moves serve to reveal information about each side in order to reduce uncertainty 
about relative strength and cost sensitivity. The information revealed in turn affects each side’s 
beliefs and ultimately the decisions made during successive moves. Each side must conserve 
scarce resources while carefully choosing battlefield and negotiating moves designed to reveal 
the adversary’s strength and cost sensitivity while revealing as little about one’s own side as 
possible. The theory advanced here argues that the international news media is an alternative 
channel for discovering information about relative cost sensitivity.  
It is certainly true that foreign adversaries have always had ways to gather insight into 
domestic debates. Since ancient times, anecdotal evidence suggests that leaders employ both 
diplomatic and commercial espionage to gather insights into the enemy. While much espionage 
may be directed at discovering sources of strength, strategies, and so forth, the record also 
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reflects that leaders are interested and seek out information about cost sensitivity or resolve. The 
emergence of the news media over the past two centuries represents an important development.  
Domestic leaders enjoy a natural advantage in understanding the level of support for their 
policies among their own public, as compared to faraway foreign leaders trying to gain such 
insight. Domestic leaders have access to information about public opinion from a wide variety of 
sources. They are physically located in the midst of society and have regular interaction with the 
public and with political elites. All of these interactions provide domestic leaders many channels 
of information for understanding the level of domestic public support for, or opposition to, the 
foreign policies and wars they pursue. The challenge, as suggested by bargaining theories of war, 
is for leaders to credibly communicate to foreign leaders their preferences and cost sensitivity 
regarding particular foreign policy matters.  
In the example above, State B leader has many channels of information for obtaining 
information about the level of public support and opposition among State B public. State A 
leader, by contrast, has relatively few channels for obtaining information about the level of 
support for State B leader’s policies among the State B public. Historically, channels for State A 
leader to gain insight into State B public opinion have been limited to intelligence gathering 
associated with State A’s diplomatic mission to State B or State A’s commercial activities taking 
place within State B. The emergence of the international news media represents a significant 
additional channel whereby a foreign leader can gain insights into the domestic political support 
enjoyed by an adversary.  
The fact that the media has a competitive, strategic, relationship with government leaders 
has important implications for the particular influence of the media. As argued in the literature, 
democratic institutions generate information about political costs and have an influence on both 
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domestic and foreign leaders. But the news media is a separate and distinct element in the causal 
chain. And the existence of the media should shed light on the distinct influence of the 
democratic institutions themselves. In summary, the argument advanced in this paper is this: The 
international news media is an important alternative channel for revealing information about cost 
sensitivity and thereby influencing the outcome of wars. 
It is useful before proceeding to consider an example from history that illustrates the role 
of the media. 
3.5 ILLUSTRATION 
An episode from the historical record illustrates how the international news media functions as 
an alternative channel for revealing information about cost sensitivity. The Russo-Japanese war 
of 1904-1905 featured military campaigns wherein Russia suffered significant losses but was far 
from totally defeated (Walder 1974; Warner and Warner 1974; White 1964). As is typical of 
most wars, inquiries through private diplomatic channels were undertaken to determine the 
interest in peace negotiations and the acceptable terms. But at the same time, prominent media 
outlets published reports about the level of support among elites and the public for continued 
fighting or for peace negotiations. These news reports were frequently distributed to readers in 
foreign capitals. Given the availability of this information, the domestic political support enjoyed 
by leaders for a given course of action could be partially observed by the enemy. This, in turn, 
enabled leaders to better assess the cost sensitivity or resolve of enemy leaders for continued 
fighting. Based on their updated beliefs about relative strength and resolve as a result of the 
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information from the media, negotiating channels, and the battlefield, the leaders of Russia 
ultimately chose to engage the peace process with terms that were favorable to Japan.  
The Russo-Japanese war was closely monitored by both the news media and military 
observers from every major power. The continuing quest by the news media to gather the latest 
news is illustrated in this campaign in the use of the wireless ship Haimun by The Times of 
London (Walder 1974). This was the first instance of a boat dedicated to entering active war 
zones to gather and transmit news reports wirelessly. The operation was assailed at various times 
by both Russian and Japanese military officials who feared it would give away vital information 
about the position of troops or naval assets. By the time of this war, the prominent role of The 
Times of London was supplemented by the advent of The New York Times as another paper of 
record (Boyce, Curran, and Wingate 1978). The recent acquisition of possessions in the Pacific 
meant that the US press closely followed Asian developments. Both newspapers provide 
searchable archives of every issue and hence provide a reliable source of reporting about the 
Russo-Japanese War. 
After negotiations with Russia in 1903 over the status of Manchuria and Korea proved 
futile, Japan initiated war with a surprise attack on the Russian garrison at Port Arthur in 
February 1904. By the end of 1904, Japan was able to occupy Korea and parts of Manchuria and 
destroy the Russian Pacific fleet during the siege of Port Arthur. In early 1905, the Russian 
commander surrendered Port Arthur to the Japanese.  
Japan had inflicted significant costs on Russia’s Army and Navy by New Year’s Day 
1905. The Times of London noted the significance for Japan: “Port Arthur is more than a fortress. 
In taking it the Japanese wipe out a bitter memory of unmerited defeat received ten years ago at 
the hands of the Triple Intervention” (White 1964, p. 187-188). But the Japanese progress so far 
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lacked “anything like the finality of a real victory” (White 1964, p. 185). The Japanese press 
reported this prevailing sentiment, and reminded readers that the war was by no means over, and 
more difficult fighting remained (White 1964, p. 188).  
Japanese diplomats took careful note of how the Russian press reported the events of the 
war and the ensuing public debates. Foreign Minister Komura and Ambassador Hayashi 
maintained an active correspondence regarding the foreign press coverage prior to and during the 
war (Warner and Warner 1974; White 1964). On the one hand, the Russian newspaper Novoe 
Vremya equated the honor of the Army and the Port Arthur Garrison with the honor of the 
Russian people, and urged the Russian people to follow the example of General Stessel’s gallant 
defense and fight to complete exhaustion if necessary. On the other hand, the Nasha Dni and the 
Nasha Zhizn newspapers presented the opposition view that the recent events presented a 
favorable occasion for ending the war (White 1964). For his part, Lenin argued in Vperiod that it 
was the Russian aristocracy that had failed the Russian people and that the capitulation of Port 
Arthur is the prologue to the capitulation of tsarism (Naida 1955). In the immediate aftermath of 
Port Arthur, rumors that Russia was seeking peace reached such a level that the government in 
St. Petersburg was compelled to issue a semi-official statement reported in The New York Times 
of Mar 12, 1905:  
The defeat at Mukden is furnishing the European press with material for conjectures of 
peace pourparlers. It has been stated in all seriousness that the Russian Government has 
informed the French Government that it is the intention of the Emperor to engage in 
peace pourparlers. We are authorized to declare in the most categorical fashion that all 
statements to the effect that it is the intention of the Russian Government to open 
pourparlers with a view to the conclusion of peace are absolutely without foundation.  
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Russia suffered another setback at the Battle of Mukden in March, after which military 
action largely paused while the Russian Baltic fleet steamed toward Asia. During the interlude in 
fighting, the two sides continued to have the opportunity to take measure of one another’s 
resolve for continuing. The Times of London published a report on March 15 1905 from its Tokio 
correspondent outlining peace terms demands that are being discussed in Japan, including 
territory and indemnity. And, despite the denial issued by St. Petersburg, The New York Times 
reported on March 24 1905 that a “peace move by Russia [is] said to be imminent” and that 
dispatches from behind Russian lines estimate that Russia may be unable to prevent Japanese 
occupation of Russia soil at Harbin without at least 200,000 reinforcements. It is noted that for 
such a report to have cleared Russian censors at the front it must be consistent with the view of 
commanders. These estimates, it was reported, “may account for his Majesty’s [the Czar] 
increased disposition to listen to peace counsel and open negotiations before the Japanese 
establish themselves on Russian soil.”  
At the same time, Japanese commanders were aware of the weaknesses in their own 
position, having essentially reached the limits of their supply lines and any additional progress 
would require an expansion in the armed forces (Warner and Warner 1974). And they realized 
that “Russian defeats in South Manchuria would not be sufficient to induce capitulation on the 
part of a vast empire whose soil had not yet been touched by war” (White 1964, p. 202). During 
this period, Russia was constantly moving men and material eastward by rail while St. 
Petersburg made efforts to increase its transport capacity. 
By late April 1905, with the fleet expected to arrive in Asia shortly, western diplomatic 
observers were reported by The New York Times on April 29 1905 as having expressed the view 
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that “whatever the results of the naval battle diplomats here [in Washington] believe the first real 
opportunity for the successful initiation of peace negotiations will come after it. The defeat of 
Russia’s fleet would, it is believed, give the Russian peace party renewed power, while even a 
partial victory for the Russians would have the effect of scaling Japan’s peace terms to what 
Russia would regard as a reasonable basis.” At the same time, speculation regarding Russia’s 
deteriorating financial condition began to appear in the western press, as exemplified by reports 
in The Times of London of May 27 1905. For its part, Japan had thus far managed to conceal her 
difficult financial position (White 1964, p. 202).  
These reports in the press demonstrate that fissures in Russia’s resolve were publicly 
apparent in the months prior to the arrival of the Baltic fleet. Japan, meanwhile, appears in press 
reporting to be uniformly resolute.  
The Baltic fleet reached the Sea of Japan in late May and was destroyed in its first 
encounter with the Japanese fleet in the Tsushima straits. Japan naturally reacted with joy at the 
same time western observers reacted with shock at the stunning Japanese victory. The New York 
Times reported on May 30 1905 that “Japan war bonds leaped” at the news of the victory. 
 The Times of London reported on June 1 1905 that Japan announced the expansion of 
conscription immediately following the naval battle, in a show of her intention to continue the 
fight even after such an important victory. 
In Russia, only one newspaper, the pan-Slavist Sviet, urged resolve, arguing that “we are 
beaten on sea; what of it? Let us continue on land till we secure the victory” (Walder 1974, p. 
38). In a survey of Russian reactions, The Times of London reported on June 1 1905 that other 
papers, including Novoe Vremya, Slovo, Listok and the Gazeta advocated peace.  
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In Japan, Foreign Minister Komura privately but formally requested Roosevelt’s 
mediation, stipulating that he undertake mediation “entirely on his own motion and initiative,” 
which was intended to avoid any appearance of eagerness for peace on the part of Japan (White 
1964, p. 208 ).  
Several war councils were reportedly held at Tsarskoe Selo in early June. The Times of 
London reports on June 7 1905 that “instructions were telegraphed this afternoon to the Russian 
Ambassadors in Washington and Paris to the effect that Russia is desirous of learning Japan’s 
conditions of peace.” This news report is consistent with the diplomatic record (Warner and 
Warner 1974; White 1964). 
The Times of London reported on June 13 1905 that “Russia’s reply to Roosevelt’s Note 
sent by [Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs] Count Lamsdorff to [U.S. Ambassador] Mr. 
Meyer…merely acquiesces in the president’s proposal and declares Russia’s readiness to appoint 
a plenipotentiary.”  
As of the beginning of summer, Russia had not publicly exhibited a convincing resolve to 
continue to war, whereas Japan had announced expanded conscription, Japan’s war bonds had 
appreciated, at the same time she had successfully hidden her role in initiating peace 
negotiations. As arrangements for peace negotiations are made, Japan continued to appear 
resolved to continue fighting. 
Leaders of Japan’s Constitutionalist opposition party and Progressive opposition party are 
reported in The Times of London of June 29 1905 as expressing partisan positions that the peace 
terms should be very demanding, including indemnity, territory, and restrictions on Russia’s 
future actions in Asia.  
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Japan invaded Sakhalin Island on July 10, providing a reminder that Russia lacked a 
Pacific fleet (Walder 1974). In a private exchange, Roosevelt, concerned about Russia reneging 
on its commitment to the peace negotiation, had previously urged the Japanese to seize Sakhalin 
as a forceful demonstration of the military reality in Asia (Bishop 1926, p. 396). The occupation 
of Sakhalin proceeded while the Japanese and Russian diplomats made their way to Portsmouth 
for the negotiations. Japan maintained the threat of additional military action as an ongoing 
incentive for Russian participation in the negotiations, as reflected in an article in the Jiji on July 
11 1905: 
“Tsushima in the south and Saghalien in the north form the natural challenge gates to the 
Sea of Japan and the possession in our hands of the one is as important as that of the 
other. Further, to make control of that northern gateway really secure in our hands, it is 
indispensible to hold the littoral country on the opposite continent. Then with the Mamiya 
Strat in our grasp, the blockade of Vladivostok will become a very effective undertaking” 
(White 1964, p. 224).  
 
The published record in the U.S. and British press demonstrates that Japan exhibited 
consistent resolve prior to and during the organization of peace negotiations, despite her 
somewhat fragile military situation. At the same time, Japan actively monitored Russia’s 
wavering resolve as represented by newspaper reports. Initially, Russia maintained indifference 
toward negotiations to end a war that had not yet reached Russian soil. But Russia eventually 
chose peace. The decision-making of Russia’s leaders was undoubtedly influenced by a variety 
of factors, both international and domestic. The military events of 1905, the diplomacy on the 
part of the great powers, and Russia’ own domestic political situation all likely weighed in the 
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decision. But it is reasonable to infer that the evident differences in public indicators of resolve 
between Russia and Japan can only have helped Russia conclude that peace was the prudent 
choice.   
Before proceeding to outline the implications and hypotheses flowing from the theory, a 
number of potential weaknesses of the theory are considered. 
3.6 POTENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THE THEORY 
3.6.1 Is transparency a good thing? 
Several observers have argued that the increased transparency featured in the contemporary 
environment may not, in fact, help states overcome information problems. The outline of this 
criticism is that the multitude of signals sent by opposition parties, opinion leaders, prominent 
citizens, and other elites may overwhelm the enemy leader’s ability to interpret them. In a 
critique of the bargaining literature, Rosato argues that “a lot of information is not always good 
information...simply because democracies provide a substantial amount of information about 
their intentions from a variety of sources does not mean that their opponents will focus on the 
appropriate information or that the information will be interpreted correctly” (Rosato 2003, p. 
598). Similarly, others argue that transparency afforded by the modern media can complicate 
crises by mixing diplomatic signals with the complicated discourse of domestic politics, 
ultimately confusing foreign leaders as to which voices are authoritative. Finel (1999) examines 
this issue using a small number of cases studies and finds mixed support for the argument that 
transparency can be confusing. The small number of cases examined in that study leave 
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unanswered the broad question addressed by the current study, namely whether the news media 
appears to exert an influence on outcomes across wars. The existence of particular cases where 
transparency appears to interfere with credible signaling does not necessarily invalidate the 
overall argument of the current study. Ultimately, the findings of the current study should be 
compared with Finel’s findings for areas of agreement and disagreement, and ultimately further 
research should attempt to identify the reasons for any such disagreements. The next critique of 
the theory advanced in this dissertation concerns the role of the particular content of news media 
reporting as distinct from the mere presence of the media and is discussed next. 
3.6.2 The message…or the medium? 
It is not unreasonable to assume that the international news media reporting on a state’s domestic 
public opinion only advantages that state’s adversary when it reports high levels of cost 
sensitivity. A cost-sensitive state whose unwillingness to sustain a fight over a given issue is 
well-known is certainly in a weaker bargaining position than a state whose level of cost 
sensitivity is unknown. That weaker bargaining position would, ceteris paribus, be expected to 
lead to worse outcomes, such as a reaching a draw rather than a victory or a loss rather than a 
draw. In fact, because war is a strategic interaction, both formal and informal analyses suggest 
that the mere presence of an alternate signal has an equally effective informing effect. Schultz’ 
formal analysis was presented above but is briefly revisited here before using informal analysis 
to make a similar point.  
A number of parallels exist between the presence of an alternate information channel and 
the presence of an opposition party. Schultz (1998) uses formal logic to demonstrate how in a 
strategic interaction, the presence within a state of an opposition party that meets certain 
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assumptions contributes to a higher probability of winning. This is the case because the 
opposition both constrains the government leader and makes policy position statements of its 
own which are interpreted by the enemy as confirming the government leader’s statements. 
Together, these mechanisms make it easier for the state to more credibly reveal information 
about its own cost sensitivity or resolve. The results of the model are shown to hold regardless of 
whether the government policy is supported or opposed by the opposition political party.  
The presence of the news media should have an influence that is analogous to the 
influence of an opposition party, provided the media meets the assumptions imposed by the 
model: incentives to compete with the government, access to relevant information, and 
competition with the government takes place in public. Each of these assumptions is plausibly 
valid and therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that it is the presence of the alternate channel of 
information, not the particular content of the channel that matters. An informal analysis of the 
media during a conflict is presented next that advances a similar point of view. 
Consider two states, A and B, engaged in a war. All other things being equal, State A is 
trying to decide its strategy based on beliefs about State B’s cost sensitivity. Formal models 
show that states engaged in a bargaining interaction such as war attempt to screen out more 
demanding opponents from less demanding ones in order to reach the most advantageous 
outcome possible. State A knows its own level of cost sensitivity, which for the purposes of this 
example can take one of three stylized states: remaining steady, increasing, or decreasing. 
Without insight into State B’s cost sensitivity, State A would, ceteris paribus, base its strategy on 
its own level of cost sensitivity, leading to the strategies shown in Column I of Table 3-1. In the 
case that State A finds its level of cost sensitivity decreasing, it would be expected to adopt a 
demanding negotiating stance and extend the fight to maximize gains. If, on the other hand, State 
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A were aware that its own cost sensitivity was increasing, it would adopt a less demanding 
negotiating stance and seek an early settlement to the conflict to minimize the possibility of 
losses. Finally, if State A’s cost sensitivity appeared steady, it would chart a middle negotiating 
stance and proceed based primarily on other factors. 
If State A is able to gain insight into State B’s level of cost sensitivity, it would be 
expected to factor that information into its choice of strategy. Letting State B’s cost sensitivity 
take one of the same three stylized states, the choice of State A’s strategy given this information 
is shown in column II of Table 3-1. In several cases, the knowledge about State B’s cost 
sensitivity would logically lead to a different choice of strategy than what State A would choose 
without such insight. Consider the situation where State A is aware that its own cost sensitivity is 
steady. If it additionally knew that State B’s cost sensitivity were increasing, it might adopt a 
more demanding stance, recognizing that a more protracted contest could play to its advantage as 
State A loses the will to continue. On the other hand, if State A were aware that State B’s cost 
sensitivity were decreasing, it might choose to reach a settlement earlier. The intersection of 
three stylized types of cost sensitivity for each of the two states yields a possible 9 combinations. 
In four of these nine combinations (shaded in Table 3-1), the additional insight into State B’s 
cost sensitivity enables State A to make a better decision regarding strategy than it would 
without the information. Note that regardless of whether the additional information reveals that 
State B  
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Table 3 - 1. State A Strategy with and without insight about State B cost sensitivity (Maxwell 2010) 
 (Column I) 
Without Insight 
About State B 
Cost Sensitivity 
(Column II) 
 
 
With Insight About State B Cost Sensitivity: 
 State B cost 
sensitivity 
increasing 
State B cost 
sensitivity 
steady 
State B cost 
sensitivity 
decreasing 
St
at
e 
A
 P
riv
at
e 
In
fo
rm
at
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n 
State A cost 
sensitivity 
decreasing 
Extend fight for 
maximum gains 
Extend fight for 
maximum gains 
Extend fight 
for maximum 
gains 
Avoid prolonging 
the fight (seek 
Quick Win versus 
protracted draw or 
quick Draw versus 
protracted Loss)  
State A cost 
sensitivity 
steady 
Sustain the fight Prolong fight for 
maximum gains 
(seek protracted 
Win versus 
premature Draw) 
Sustain the 
fight 
Settle as soon as 
possible to 
minimize losses 
(seek quick Draw 
vs. protracted Loss) 
State A cost 
sensitivity 
increasing 
Settle as soon as 
possible to 
minimize losses 
Prolonging the 
fight is not 
necessarily bad 
(seek protracted 
Draw versus 
premature Loss) 
Settle as soon 
as possible to 
minimize 
losses 
Settle as soon as 
possible to 
minimize losses 
  
 
is increasingly or decreasingly cost sensitive, it is to State A’s advantage to have this insight. 
State A can drive toward a better outcome given the additional information, even if the 
information reveals it is facing a tough opponent.  
This informal analysis suggests that regardless of what information is learned about State 
B’s cost sensitivity, State A can always make a better decision with the information than without. 
The difference between having and not having the information is clear in the four shaded 
scenarios. If State A is steadily or decreasingly cost sensitive and it learns that State B is 
decreasingly cost sensitive, then it learns the importance of reaching the best possible settlement 
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as quickly as possible, before State B becomes a more demanding negotiator. If State A is 
steadily or increasingly cost sensitive and it learns that State B is increasingly cost sensitive, then 
it learns the opportunity in prolonging the contest in anticipation of State B becoming a less 
demanding negotiator.  
In summary, both formal and informal analyses suggest that the presence of an additional 
channel exerts an influence independent of the particular content of the signal, as long as the 
channel meets important assumptions. The media appears to meet those assumptions and 
therefore it appears reasonable to expect that the presence of the media should have an influence 
on war outcomes independent of the content of the news reports.  
Neither of the potential shortcomings examined in this section significantly alters the 
theory. Therefore, the analysis can therefore proceed toward testing. The next section outlines 
the observable implications of the theory. 
3.7 OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY 
The media should influence outcomes, controlling for other variables 
As an alternate channel for credibly revealing information about cost sensitivity, the presence of 
the media should influence the strategic interactions within war and ultimately the outcomes of 
wars. Of course, the influence of the media takes place within the context of other factors known 
to influence wars. The influence of the media must therefore be observed while controlling for 
other variables. 
 
 80 
The influence of the media should vary with the phases of the media’s development  
Literature describing the emergence of the media argues that with each successive phase of 
media development, new norms emerged regarding how society, leaders and the media 
reciprocally engaged. At the very beginning of the media’s emergence, the public sphere did not 
exist and it was considered vulgar for ordinary citizens to discuss affairs of the state (McLuhan 
1964). The transformation of the media role to that of the contemporary environment occurred 
not in a smooth progression, but rather through a series of phases. As each new type of media 
appears, society, leaders and the media all adjust behavior until a new set of norms emerges 
which shape the role of the media. For example, the pre-universal newspaper differs in important 
ways from the universal newspaper, not the least of which is that the latter is driven by a 
subscription- and advertising-based business model. The economic incentives underlying the 
universal newspaper contribute to a much more active and engaged press, and a reciprocally 
much more engaged citizenry as the habit of daily consumption of news takes hold. Similar 
discontinuities in the forms of reciprocal engagement among the press, leaders and the people 
occur with each successive phase of the media’s emergence.  
In general, each successive phase of the media features increased speed of newsgathering 
and reporting. In addition, each successive phase features richer reporting as the style of the 
media changes and the amount of information reported with each dispatch increases. At the 
advent of the telegraph, the novel ‘telegraph dispatch’ became a standard feature on the front 
page of most major newspapers. This contributed to increased circulation and popular 
engagement with foreign news. However, the expense and poor reliability of the new technology 
meant that such dispatches were limited to a few lines. In contrast, within two decades, telegraph 
lines circled the globe, giving multiple paths for news to travel in the event any particular line 
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failed. And, importantly, the costs of transmission fell dramatically such that stories from abroad 
could run to multiple pages, featuring multiple correspondents and perspectives (Desmond 
1937).  
The role of the media and hence its influence on leader’s beliefs and behavior should be 
expected to vary as the speed of media increases and the type of media advances.  
Influence of media independence 
The informing mechanism carried out by the media depends on the level of media independence 
from state control. No credible signaling is possible if the information channel gathering and 
reporting the news lacks independence. Lacking independence, media reporting becomes 
indistinguishable from statements issued directly by government leaders. Therefore, such reports 
would neither constrain the government leader, nor send a confirming signal to the foreign 
leader.  
While state controls on media are a component of regime type, the literature on the 
emergence of the media shows an important distinction between de jure and de facto press 
independence (Khazen 1999). Statutory press freedoms do not necessarily correspond to press 
freedoms in practice. The difference between the two is in the actual behavior of the media, 
which the empirical record shows does not immediately act on reduced press censorship. Rather, 
in many instances the media fails to actively challenge government policies despite de jure press 
freedoms. The norms of an independent press emerge slowly and may lag changes in the 
regulatory environment. And recall that the informing mechanism depends on the press visibly 
competing with the government leader. Therefore, it is important to distinguish the regime type 
of any given state from the observed level of media independence.  
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Given that media independence is distinct from regime type, variations in media 
independence across states is expected to contribute to variations in war outcomes. Specifically, 
the credible signaling mechanism suggests that states with less media independence should have 
less success due to their comparative inability to send credible signals. 
Media exerts influence distinct from influence of regime type 
As discussed above, the news media complements the credible signaling function of democratic 
institutions. Since the media emerges over time and geography in a manner that is distinct from 
the emergence of democracy, the unique influence of each on war outcomes should be 
discernable. And, it should be apparent that regime type modifies the influence of the media on 
war outcomes.  
Therefore, controlling for media, the theory suggests there should be variation in the 
performance of democracies versus non-democracies in war. Similarly, controlling for regime 
type, there should be variation with type of media and phase of the media’s emergence.  
Media exerts a differential influence on targets as compared to initiators 
The news media should have a different influence on war targets compared to war initiators, 
because the role of information is thought to be different for each. Bargaining models of war 
suggest that because domestic audiences react differently to being attacked than to leaders 
choosing to initiate a war, their role in generating audience costs is different (Baum 2002; Lai 
and Reiter 1948). Because domestic audiences tend to rally behind the leader when attacked, the 
credible signaling function of the domestic audience and domestic political institutions is less 
important in targets than initiators (Powell 2004; Reiter and Stam 2003; Schultz 2001). And, 
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because the theory advanced in this paper draws on the same credible signaling mechanism, it is 
reasonable to expect that the media should have less influence on targets than on initiators. 
Differential influence with time 
The media may influence leaders’ behavior and war outcomes both through mechanisms that 
unfold prior to wars and mechanisms that unfold during wars. In the first of these, the mere 
presence of the media can serve to ex ante constrain leaders’ actions or threats because they are 
strategic actors who are aware of the media’s informing function. In the first of these 
mechanisms, the domestic leader is constrained by cost sensitivity and therefore only makes 
threats selectively, and the foreign leader understands this and therefore interprets the domestic 
leader’s threats as being more credible. In the second of these, the information transmitted by the 
media in the context of a specific crisis can serve to reveal changing information about leaders’ 
cost sensitivity regarding that specific crisis. While the first of these mechanisms has no 
influence once a conflict is underway, the second of these by its nature exerts its influence over 
time, as follows. At the outset of a foreign policy crisis or war, there is a gap between the 
information known by the domestic leader and the public. Over time, debates within democratic 
institutions take place and are reported by the media. The media reporting gradually narrows the 
gap between what is known by the leader and what is known by the general public. Similarly, the 
gap between the domestic leader’s knowledge and the foreign leader’s knowledge narrows as 
news reports arrive, in parallel with the bargaining and fighting that comprise the war (Baum and 
Potter 2008). In this way, the informing role of the media should change with the duration of a 
war. To the extent that the news media exerts its influence as wars unfold, the theorized 
influence of the media on war outcomes is expected to be modified by the passage of time as war 
duration increases.  
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 The observable implications of the theory suggest a series of hypotheses which are tested 
in later chapters. The hypotheses are presented next. 
3.8 HYPOTHESES 
Testable hypotheses are developed by drawing on the Research Questions presented on page 11 
in section 1.4 and the observable implications of the theory presented above. Ten hypotheses are 
presented here, grouped by the Research Question to which they respond: 
 
Main Research Question: To what extent does the international news media influence the 
outcomes of interstate wars? 
As an alternate channel via which leaders can send credible signals, the news media 
should have an influence on the outcome of international wars. In this broadest sense, the 
presence of the international news media should influence the outcome of wars, controlling for 
other factors known to have influence. Stated another way, the unexplained variance in existing 
models of war outcomes should be addressed by the inclusion of variables representing the 
media.  
The credible signaling mechanism theorized above should provide advantage 
corresponding to the level of media present in any given state. States with more advanced media 
should enjoy a relative advantage; states with less advanced media should suffer a relative 
disadvantage. This leads to hypotheses H1 through H6, which are discussed next.  
As the media emerges through a series of media types (pre-universal newspaper, 
universal newspaper, press agencies, radio, broadcast television), the public sphere enlarges. The 
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norms of public engagement emerge as well, enhancing the ability of leaders to send credible 
signals. H1 and H2 address the influence of the media as the media type advances:   
H1: Probability of winning should increase as a state’s media type advances.  
H2: Probability of losing should decrease as a state’s media type advances. 
 
The theorized influence of the media depends on the independence of the media from 
state control. Therefore, states with more independent media should be expected to enjoy 
relatively greater success than states with less independent media. H3 and H4 address the 
influence of media independence on the outcome of wars: 
H3: Probability of winning should increase as a state’s media becomes more independent. 
H4: Probability of losing should decrease as a state’s media becomes more independent. 
 
As the media emerges, the speed at which news is gathered and reported increases, owing 
to changes in the practices of media enterprises made possible by advances in telecommunication 
technology. While the theory advanced above is silent regarding the role of media speed, it is 
reasonable to assume that the increasing speed of the media should complement the influence of 
media type as it advances. H11 and H12 address the influence of the media as media speed 
increases:  
H5: Probability of winning should increase as a state’s media speed increases. 
H6: Probability of losing should decrease as a state’s media speed increases. 
 
Sub-Question 1: To what extent is the influence of the international news media modified by 
regime type? 
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The theory advanced in this paper argues that the media exerts an influence on wars that 
is distinct from the influence of democratic institutions. In order to examine this part of the 
theory, it is important to examine the influence of the media in the context of regime type. H7 
addresses the potential confounding influence of regime type on the theorized influence of the 
media.  
Hypothesis H7: The influence of the media on the probability of winning should increase 
under a democratic regime.  
 
Sub-Question 2: To what extent does the international news media differentially influence war 
initiators and targets? 
The theorized credible signaling mechanism of the media has a different relevance for 
war initiator states than for targeted states. Specifically, when a state is attacked, the public 
generally rallies around the leader, which makes audience costs a less reliable indicator of 
resolve. Therefore, while the probability of winning is expected to increase for initiator states 
with more advanced media, the probability of target states winning is not expected to be affected. 
H8 and H9 address the influence of the media on initiator states and target states:  
H8: Probability of winning should vary with type of media for initiator states 
H9: Probability of winning should not vary with type of media for target states 
 
Sub-Question 3: To what extent is the influence of the international news media modified by war 
duration? 
The theorized influence of the media on war outcomes is expected to vary with the 
duration of wars. Within the time required for the gap between the leader’s knowledge and the 
 87 
public’s knowledge to narrow, the theorized credible signaling mechanism cannot function. 
Therefore, the media is expected to have comparatively less influence on shorter wars and more 
influence on longer wars. H10 addresses the interaction between the influence of media and the 
duration of wars:  
H10: Influence of media on probability of winning should increase as war duration 
increases. 
3.9  CHAPTER SUMMARY: THEORY 
In this chapter a theory has been developed explaining how the international news media 
functions as an alternative channel for discovering information about relative cost sensitivity, 
thereby influencing the outcome of wars. Drawing on existing literature, the elements necessary 
to support a claim of ‘aid and comfort to the enemy’ are examined. These elements are linked to 
form a causal model. The causal model suggests a series of observable implications of the 
theory, which in turn lead to a set of testable hypotheses. The next chapter presents a research 
design and set of methods for evaluating the hypotheses. 
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4.0  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
4.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the research design and methods used to evaluate the theory. First, a 
conceptual model that operationalizes the theory is presented. A research design based on the 
conceptual model is presented next. The research design section describes the basic elements 
(population of cases, unit of analysis, dependent variable, and independent variables) of the 
design as well as the methods for collecting the data. The analysis section describes the tools and 
methods used to perform both the statistical and the substantive analysis of the data. The chapter 
concludes by examining threats to reliability and validity and their implications for the study. 
4.2 CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The theorized influence of an additional channel of information on the parties’ decisions plays 
out over time, in the series of interactions that comprise war. In order to examine these 
processes, a model that examines outcomes of wars must be used. An attrition model of war that 
examines both outcomes and duration - based on Gartner and Siverson (1996) – is well-suited to 
this purpose. The outlines of such a model are presented here. 
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The ultimate outcome of any war is reached with the parties arriving at consensus about 
relative capabilities and relative cost sensitivity. In each period during a conflict, the players 
mutually choose one of four outcomes: initiator wins, initiator loses, the players mutually choose 
a draw or the players mutually choose to continue fighting. Each player makes these decisions 
based in part on an evolving estimate of their adversary’s capabilities and cost sensitivity.  
The relative capabilities and cost sensitivity of different types of actors will be reflected 
in the proportion of the four outcomes they achieve over the duration of wars. To illustrate, the 
use of a similar model by Bennett and Stam (1998) is briefly presented in Figure 4-1. Their 
model shows that democracies between 1816 and 1992 tend to win shorter wars but that as the 
duration of wars increases, the advantage passes to autocracies. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - 1 Predicted Outcome Probabilities By War Duration (Bennett & Stam 1998) 
6 18 30 42 54
Win (Democ) 0.491 0.189 0.1 0.074 0.058
Win (Nondemoc) 0.321 0.272 0.261 0.259 0.252
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Outcome Probabilities by War Duration
Democratic Initiator and Nondemocratic Initiator
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Bennett and Stam (1998) use their model to highlight the difference between 
democracies’ and non-democracies’ chances of victory, which they attribute to democracies’ 
higher ability to generate audience costs and thereby send credible signals to opponents. Their 
study is consistent with most studies of the democratic peace in that they attribute the signaling 
mechanism to democratic institutions and they do not examine how the performance of 
democracies in war varies with the emergence of the international news media. But their model 
can, with the addition of several variables, be extended to examine the implications of the 
emergence of the international news media.  
4.3 CONNECTING THEORY TO CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
It is useful at this point to briefly examine the overall conceptual relationship among independent 
variables and war outcomes in the conventional model of war presented in Bennett & Stam 
(1998) as a prelude to situating the theory advanced in this dissertation within that. 
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Figure 4-2 graphically presents the relationships encompassed by Bennett & Stam’s 
model of war outcomes. There are several causal paths in their model. First, a block of material, 
or ‘realist’ variables such as balance of forces, terrain, the element of surprise, etc., have a direct 
influence on war outcomes, shown as segment A. But time modifies the influence of the realist 
variables, as indicated by segment B. Similarly, polity-related variables such as regime type, 
level of repression, etc. have a main effect on war outcomes, as indicated by segment C. Time 
also interacts with the polity-related variables to modify their influence on war outcomes, as 
indicated by segment D. And, finally, time exerts a direct influence on war outcomes, as 
represented by segment E. Note that because all wars in the dataset are coded as dyadic conflicts, 
each of the realist and polity variables is coded for both the initiator of the war and the target of 
the war. To simplify the diagram in Figure 4-2, the initiator and target variables are lumped 
together, although their distinct influence is retained in the actual process of model development.  
Material/Realist 
Variables 
Polity-related 
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Figure 4 - 2. Conceptual Relationships Between Independent Variables 
And War Outcomes -Conventional Model (Bennett & Stam 1998) 
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This conceptual model of the main-effects and interaction-effects influences the variables 
have on war outcomes will guide the development of the statistical models used to evaluate the 
theory advanced in this paper. It is useful at this point to use a similar graphical approach to 
examine the conceptual model underlying the theory advanced in this paper. Figure 4-3 
graphically presents those relationships.  
In Figure 4-3, the media variables are situated within the context of the blocks of realist, 
polity and time variables that are included in the previous diagram. The block of media variables 
has a direct influence on war outcomes, as indicated by segment F. But time interacts with the 
media variables, as indicated by segment G, to modify the influence of the media on war 
outcomes. Similarly, the polity variables interact with the media variables, as indicated by 
segment H, to also modify the influence of the media on war outcomes. As with the first 
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Figure 4 - 3. Conceptual R elationships B etween I ndependent V ariables 
And War Outcomes -Conventional Model Plus Media. (Maxwell 2010) 
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diagram, Figure 4-3 is a simplified representation in that it lumps the media variables for the war 
initiator together with the media variables for the target state. However, in the actual process of 
model development, the distinct roles of the media in the initiator and in the target are 
individually considered. The conceptual model in Figure 4-3 clarifies how variable main effects 
and interaction effects are expected to contribute to a model of war outcomes, based on the 
theory advanced in Chapter 3.  
Model development is presented in Appendix B. At each stage of model development, 
variables are selected for inclusion based on theory and on their contributions to the strength of 
the model. The process proceeds in an iterative fashion, adding and removing variables, 
assessing the fit of the model, and so on until a suitable model is arrived at. The research 
perspective of this dissertation is presented next. 
4.4 RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE 
This dissertation adopts a positivist perspective in that it seeks to explain and predict the 
influence of the international news media on the outcomes of wars. Various perspectives 
including post-positivism, constructivism, and so forth are excluded. The positivist perspective 
adopted here necessarily limits the scope of the study in that it assumes that the empirical record 
must be observed and measured and cannot be subject to interpretation by the analyst. Issues 
such as the existence of a reality separate and distinct from our observations and the fallibility of 
the analyst are explicitly not addressed by the chosen research perspective. The discussion 
proceeds to research design next.  
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4.5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This dissertation employs a deductive method of reasoning. Drawing together strands from 
several bodies of theory, a series of hypotheses is generated which are then tested against 
observations gathered from the empirical record. Specifically, a statistical model is employed to 
examine the empirical record for evidence of the influence of the international news media on 
outcomes of wars. The analysis proceeds by building on appropriate existing datasets and 
methods for analysis. In order to enhance comparability with previously published research, the 
analysis performed here extends studies by Reiter and Stam (2002), Bennett and Stam (1998) 
and Gartner and Siverson (1996). Novel variables are developed to reflect the emergence of the 
international news media.  
The theoretical model suggests the appropriate form for the dependent variable and the 
unit of analysis. The dependent variable consists of the four outcomes categories that are 
possible in each year: initiator wins, initiator loses, joint draw, joint decision to continue. Note 
that these four outcomes are not ordered – they are simply categorical. The use of a categorical 
dependent variable implies the use of a multinomial logit procedure. This procedure will 
generate a separate equation estimating the likelihood of each outcome. By themselves, these 
equations are not all that helpful. But within each time period, as the likelihood of one outcome 
rises, the likelihood of the other outcomes falls, which means that the results can be combined. 
The results of the three equations are integrated to arrive at a model that shows how the 
probability of each of the outcomes rises and falls as the independent variables vary (Gartner and 
Siverson 1996). 
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4.5.1 Unit of analysis  
Many analyses within the literature define the war as the unit of analysis, but in this case, that is 
not appropriate. During each time period, the parties reach a joint decision to continue fighting or 
stop. Thus, each war eventually ends in one of three decisive outcomes – ‘win’, ‘lose’ or ‘draw’ 
– but until then the parties mutually agree on the intermediate outcome of ‘continue.’ Defining 
the unit of analysis as a war-year makes it possible to examine how changing conditions 
contribute to the eventual decision to end the war in one of the decisive outcomes.  
Ideally, the unit of time would be as small as possible, but the availability of data dictates 
that the unit of time must be a year. Most available datasets in international relations contain data 
values that are measured annually. “Most scholars rely on annual data both because data are 
widely available at this level of temporal aggregation, and because the year represents a natural 
political break due to budget cycles, electoral cycles, and the presence of winter that in many 
areas hampers military action” (Bennett and Stam 2000, p. 4; Green, Soo Yeon, and Yoon 2001). 
Therefore, each war which crosses a year boundary is subdivided into multiple observations. For 
example, the single case of the Crimean War of 1853 – 1856 is represented in the dataset as a 
series of four observations, one for each year-end (1853, 1854 and 1855) plus one for the end of 
the war in March 1856. In this way, the variables surrounding the annual decisions of the parties 
to continue fighting, reach a settlement, etc. are captured in addition to the variables surrounding 
the decision-making that leads to the eventual termination of the war.  
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4.5.2 Population of cases  
To enhance comparability with existing literature, the population of cases is based on the 
population used in Bennett & Stam (1996, 1998). This population consists of all interstate wars 
contained in the Correlates of War (COW) dataset(Singer 1978). Following Bennett & Stam, 
wars that involved coalitions or other combinations of belligerents are disaggregated into dyadic 
conflicts to facilitate analysis. An example of such disaggregation is the Second World War, 
which is coded as a series of very short dyadic conflicts between Germany and the various states 
it overran in 1939 through 1941, and a dyadic contest initiated by Great Britain against Germany 
in 1940 and a dyadic contest initiated by Germany against Russia in 1941. The involvement of 
the United States, France and the other Allies in the war effort are treated under this coding 
scheme as supporting the dyadic contests engaged by Great Britain and by Russia against 
Germany. Thus, each war is treated in the dataset as one or more war-years each of which 
consists of a dyadic contest between an initiator and a target.  
In the current study 7 war-years were dropped from the analysis due to the unavailability 
of data regarding media for the target, the initiator, or both. These are: 
• Columbia versus Ecuador in 1863 – No media data available. 
• Germany versus Austria-Hungary in 1864 – No data available on this war. 
Suspect this war is miscoded in Bennett & Stam dataset. 
• Yugoslavia versus Bulgaria in 1885 – No media data available. 
• Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977-1978 – No media data available. 
• Uganda and Tanzania in 1978-1979 – No media data available. 
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None of these cases appears to be particularly influential to the subject at hand and 
therefore their absence is not expected to substantially affect the findings. Dropping these cases 
yields a total population for this study of 193 observations. The population ultimately examined 
consists of 90 wars spanning 1823 through 1990. The wars vary in length from less than 1 year 
to over 12 years. A complete list of the population of cases is presented in Appendix A.  
4.5.3 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is war outcomes, as discussed above. The dependent variable is 
categorical and has four values corresponding to the four possible outcomes of a war in any 
given year: initiator win, initiator lose, mutual draw, mutual continue. Note that this set of values 
enables the model to distinguish between the two sides – the state that initiated the conflict and 
the state that was targeted in the conflict. This is potentially very valuable because the role of 
public opinion and cost sensitivity may be very different in a state that initiates a conflict and a 
state that is the target of conflict. Further, the conflict literature and bargaining models of war 
show that initiators and targets make very different calculations regarding the value of continued 
fighting. The value of the dependent variable is coded for each side for each year of each war 
following Bennett & Stam (1996). 
4.5.4 Independent Variables 
Independent Variables reflecting the emergence of the international news media 
The literature on the international news media presented in section 2.4 beginning on page 32 
guides the operationalization of the international news media construct. Four dimensions of the 
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media are important within the context of the theory advanced here: the availability of the media 
within one state to its adversary state, the type of media which predominates within each state, 
the independence of the media within each state, and the speed of the media within each state. 
Instruments are developed to measure and code each media variable for each side for each year 
of each war. The documentary record is drawn on: published examinations of the international 
news media in general; studies of the evolution of media technology including newsprint, 
telegraphy, radio and television; studies of media coverage of particular countries’ foreign policy 
and war history; and, primary source evidence such as archived news accounts of particular wars. 
Before presenting the data collection procedures, the instruments used to measure each of the 
four dimensions of the media are presented next. Descriptive statistics for media variables and 
other variables used in this study are presented in Table 4-1 on page 104. 
Media Availability  
Media availability is coded as a dichotomous variable reflecting the availability of the news 
reports published within each state to leaders of the other state. Since the structure of the 
dependent variable distinguishes the initiator from the target state, media availability is 
separately coded for each state. That is, both the availability of the initiator state’s media to the 
target state and the availability of the target state’s media to the initiator state are coded. In most 
cases, each state’s media is available to the other state (coded as “1”), but in certain rare 
instances one side or the other places an effective embargo on news which is coded as non-
availability (coded as “0”) (Herman and McChesney 1997). 
Media Type 
Literature on the emergence of the international news media demonstrates that in virtually every 
state, the media evolves through a series of distinct phases from the introduction of the first 
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newspapers to the eventual introduction of television. Each new type of mass media has brought 
to the public more information and analysis and reciprocally expanding norms of public 
engagement (Starr 2004). The additional information and expanding norms of public engagement 
make each successive type of mass media more valuable to an adversary in that it is capable of 
presenting a higher-resolution portrait of a society’s domestic debate regarding foreign policy. In 
terms of the theory advanced here, each new type of media is expected to give an adversary more 
information on which to base an estimate of cost sensitivity.  
Drawing on the media literature, the type of media predominant in the initiator state and 
in the target state each year is coded using a categorical variable. Categories used are: (1) pre-
universal newspaper13; (2) universal newspaper14; (3) universal newspaper with international 
news agencies; (4) radio broadcasting; (5) television broadcasting.15
Level of Media Independence 
  
The extent to which the media functions independent of the state (as opposed to being state-
controlled or state-influenced), directly affects its ability to provide credible signaling.  The 
media literature informs the definition of a variable reflecting the level of independence from the 
state enjoyed by the media in any given state. State regulations, norms and the practice of press 
freedom vary through time and by country, as illustrated by an example. The independence of 
the media in Russia during the Crimean war provides an illustration. At the outset of the war, the 
state under Czar Nicholas I tightly restricted press reports of the conflict. However, the 
                                                 
13 The category of pre-universal newspaper includes private newspapers, non-commercial newspapers, and literary 
journals. 
14 Groth (1930) defines a universal newspaper as having seven characteristics: is regularly published, is printed 
mechanically, Is available to the public, has comprehensive and universal contents, has contents of general 
importance, has current information, and operates as an economic enterprise. 
15 Note that because the most recent wars included in the dataset conclude before the widespread adoption of 
satellite TV and the internet, these media types do not appear in this study.   
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ascendance of Alexander II in 1855 led to the great reforms of the 1860s. The first steps toward 
these reforms were taken almost immediately and in the summer of 1855 Russian newspapers 
obtained permission to publish news on the Crimean war (Read 1999). In 1856 the earliest 
foreign telegrams appeared in Russian newspapers, signifying further opening. But although 
news reports of the conflict were now permitted, the level of Russian media independence from 
the state contrasts sharply with that enjoyed by the British press. It was during the Crimean War 
that Howard Russell achieved renown by reporting critically on the British Army’s performance 
for the Times. He was alternately praised for saving the situation and for being treasonous 
(Desmond 1978; Read 1999; Ruud 1982). There are no comparable examples of the Russian 
press using the newfound ability to report on the war to actually criticize the state. The Russian 
Press was initially tightly controlled before being given de jure independence from the state in 
1855, publishing reports of the war, although not making a practice of criticizing the state. On 
the other hand, Russell’s reporting for The Times of London shows that the British press was de 
facto independent of the state. Therefore it would be important to distinguish the level of 
independence exhibited by the Russian press – initially low and later de jure independence – 
from the de facto independence exhibited throughout the conflict by the British press.    
Media independence is coded using a categorical variable as follows: (1) low media 
independence – essentially state controlled; (2) de jure media independence – nominally free 
press but norms and practice of criticizing state are only just emerging; (3) de facto media 
independence – legal guarantees of press freedom are accompanied by established practice of 
media criticizing state (Khazen 1999; Merrill, Gade, and Blevens 2001). As with media 
availability and media type, the level of media independence from the state is coded for each side 
for each year of each war.  
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Speed of Media 
The theory suggests that the speed at which news reports of foreign policy events travel also 
affect their usefulness to an adversary. A long delay between events and news reports of those 
events makes those reports less useful for informing strategy and tactics. Contrast news reports 
that must travel across oceans on wind-powered vessels with those that are transmitted over radio 
while military action is underway. The former represents the ‘first draft of history’ whereas the 
second presents the opportunity to influence beliefs and decision-making regarding current 
military operations. The construct of the speed of the media within a state is coded as a scale 
variable with the units defined as the number of news dispatches possible per month. This is 
arrived at by inspection of the empirical record. First, the time (in days) required for a news 
dispatch to travel (given prevailing technology and practice) from the location of fighting to 
publication in the news media of the country’s capital city is determined. Next, this figure is 
divided into thirty to yield dispatches per month. As with the other media variables, media speed 
is coded for each side for each year of each war.  
Independent Variables from existing studies 
Several important factors thought to influence war outcomes will be included as controls 
although they are not the focus here. These factors essentially comprise the accumulated wisdom 
of the field as to what influences the outcomes of wars, as of their date of publication (Bennett 
and Stam 1998; Reiter and Stam 2002). For the most part, these factors affect the rate or the 
amount of costs that a state can inflict on its opponent. Because these draw on well-established 
datasets (Bennett and Stam 1996), they are presented here with only a brief summary: 
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Initiator and Target Democracy 
Description: Institutionalized democracy in both the initiator and the target state, 
measured on a 10-point scale.  
Source: Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers 2003) 
Time 
Description: For each year, the number of months the war has been ongoing at the end of 
the fighting in that year. 
Strategy and Doctrine 
Description: Strategy plays a role in war outcomes (Epstein 1987; Mearsheimer 1983). 
Following Stam 1996, strategy is defined as the way a state uses its military forces in war – 
maneuver, attrition or punishment. Doctrine is distinct from strategy and represents a state’s 
foreign policy goals and plans for attaining them – classified as either offensive or defensive.  
Source: (Bennett and Stam 1996) 
Terrain 
Description: Terrain is known to affect the difficulty and speed with which forces can 
find and defeat the enemy. Rough terrain (mountains, jungles, etc.) makes it difficult to achieve 
quick victory whereas open terrain makes for quick battles and quick wars. 
Source: Bennett and Stam 1998 (1998) codes terrain on a scale from 0 for open terrain to 
.75 for rough terrain. 
Balance of capabilities 
Description: Total forces on each side are computed using the COW national capabilities 
index. These values are discounted by the distance to the location of fighting to account for 
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diffusion, following Bueno de Mesquita (1981). The balance of forces is calculated by dividing 
each side’s capabilities by the sum of both sides’ capabilities. 
Source: COW database (Singer 1978) 
Initiator and target repression 
Description: repressive states are more likely to be able to suppress mass dissent that 
could impede mobilization of forces. Measured based on the degree of political competition. 
Source: (Marshall and Jaggers 2003) 
Initiator and target salience 
Description: The salience of the issue at hand should affect how hard each side fights for 
it. Conflicts involving survival, territory, unification, reputation and autonomy are coded as 
salient. Conflicts involving policy, empire, and trade are coded as nonsalient. 
Source: Bennett and Stam (1998) based on Holsti’s (1991) categorization of issues. 
Distance between adversaries 
Description: Distance between the initiator and the target may make it harder for the 
initiator to project power and win the conflict. Although national capabilities are discounted by 
distance, this additional variable directly incorporates the effects of distance. 
Source: Bennett and Stam (1998) 
Surprise 
Description: Military surprise can help a state achieve victory by quickly imposing costs 
on the other side. This variable represents the difference in the proportion of military forces 
surprised between the two sides. The larger the value, the greater the advantage to the initiator. 
Source: Bennett and Stam (1998). 
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Total military personnel and population 
Description: States with more military personnel or larger populations are better able to 
sustain fighting and draw on additional resources.  
Source: Bennett and Stam 1998 (Bennett and Stam 1998) 
 
Table 4 - 1. Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean N Min Max Std Dev Median 
Variables from existing studies 
Balance of Forces 0.529747 193 0.052177 0.982875 0.276538 0.520278 
Sum of Population 205919.8 193 1332 1219733 276097.6 82177.5 
Rough Terrain 0.360704 193 0 0.75 0.209786 0.440241 
Sum of Military 
Personnel 2828.401 193 4 22151.5 3848.141 1270 
Strategy 1.92228 193 1 3 0.539262 2 
Distance 1828.387 193 1 11084.8 2438.035 1100 
Surprise 0.000361 193 -0.21104 0.299821 0.059447 0 
Time 27.27446 193 0.03 148 31.40016 15 
Initiator Democracy 2.465102 193 0 10 3.147161 0.468676 
Target Democracy 2.69126 193 0 10 3.609233 1 
Initiator Repression 3.781515 193 1 6 1.356271 4 
Target Repression 3.363447 193 1 6 1.332527 3 
Media Variables 
Initiator Media Type 3.455959 193 1 5 1.163408 4 
Initiator Media Speed 19.38601 193 0.5 30 10.86901 15 
Initiator Media 
Independence 1.34715 193 1 3 0.538811 1 
Target Media Type 3.352332 193 1 5 1.311093 4 
Target Media Speed 18.10363 193 0.5 30 10.84789 15 
Target Media 
Independence 1.564767 193 1 3 0.741059 1 
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4.6 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
Data reflecting the four dimensions of the media as described above were collected from the 
empirical record of the international news media. Data were collected for each of the four 
dimensions of the media, for both the initiator and the target of each war, for each year of the 
war. The dataset encompasses 90 wars conducted from 1823 through 1990, involving 51 distinct 
states, for a total of 193 war-years, requiring 1544 distinct data points representing the media. 
This section presents the data collection, data coding and data preparation procedures used in the 
analysis.  
4.6.1 Data collection from secondary sources 
Published studies of media history present a foundation of data 
Studies of the media are drawn on to gather basic information about the emergence of the news 
media. Many works of media studies examine the emergence of the media in modern society 
without regard for national borders (Gorman and McLean 2003; McLuhan 1964; Nordenstreng 
1997), with a particular national focus (Frenkel 1994; Hibberd 2008; Humphreys 1996; Rugh 
2004), or an issue concentration such as globalization and the media or the like (Bennett 1998; 
Brune and Garrett 2005; Herman and McChesney 1997; Kleinert 2004).  
The practice of reporting on foreign policy and wars is typically an important part of the 
emergence of the news media. Many of the advances in telecommunications which help the 
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media to gather and distribute news happen because of a security imperative. Similarly, wars 
news tends to attract the interest of the public, leading to higher circulation which in turns funds 
expansion in geographic reach, depth of reporting, and speed of gathering and distribution. 
Robert Desmond published six volumes from 1937 to 1984 chronicling the emergence of war 
reporting around the world (Desmond 1937, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984a, 1984b). Others have 
covered narrower aspects of the parallel emergence of the media and war correspondence (Hallin 
1984; Hammond 1998; Mandelbaum 1982; Nickles 2003).   
Published studies of particular news media actors 
A number of prominent news media organizations and actors have been the subject of extensive 
study. Historians have written numerous volumes on such pioneers in the field as The Times of 
London, The New York Times, Reuters, William Randolph Hearst, Edward R Murrow, etc. These 
accounts present additional details regarding the dates of and context surrounding the 
introduction and conduct of the news media in various countries (Hearst 1961; Kendrick 1969; 
Read 1999; Times of London 1947). 
Published accounts of particular foreign policy episodes  
The news media on occasion plays a direct role in the conduct of foreign policy. Descriptions of 
such episodes within published accounts of a particular conflict serve as a basis for 
understanding the presence of media, the type of media predominating, the level of independence 
from state control, and the speed with which news reports travel in the direct context of foreign 
affairs. Examples of this category of source include Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the 
Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert (1972), Aspinall-Oglander, Military 
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Operations: Gallipoli (1929) or Engelhardt, The Battle of Caseros--the Dawn of Modern 
Argentina (1948). 
Published studies of communications technologies  
The introduction of communications technologies such as the drum printing press, the telegraph, 
radio and television broadcasting are well-documented in the literature. Scholarly studies of 
these technologies typically present dates and locations of introduction, impact on norms and 
practice of news reporting, regulatory responses, and even impact on conduct of foreign policy. 
This works in this category typically describe the advent of new types of media as new 
technologies, new customs, and new regulatory regimes emerge. Works such as Standage, The 
Victorian Internet : The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century’s on-
Line Pioneers (1998) provide in-depth accounts of the growing use of new technologies to reach 
new places faster and at less expense (Berthold 1922; Neuman 1996; Nickles 2003; Stephens 
1988). 
Published studies of political, economic and social history of particular countries 
Studies of particular countries typically make reference to the presence of, practices of, and the 
impact of news media on a country’s affairs. An example of this category is Robert Darnton’s 
Revolution in Print: The Press in France, 1775-1800 which examines in depth the interaction 
between political dynamics and the emerging business of book and newspaper printing in one 
particular country (1989). Another example is Rugh, Arab Mass Media : Newspapers, Radio, 
and Television in Arab Politics (2004) which chronicles the emergence of the media in the 
unique political climate of the Middle East. 
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4.6.2 Data collection from primary sources 
In many cases, published studies described above provide a relatively complete record of the 
presence of the news media, the type of predominate news media, the regulatory regime 
influencing the news media, and the speed with which the news media reports news within 
particular countries at particular times. But primary research into news archives has been 
employed to complement these secondary sources. This primary research was conducted using 
copies of newspapers stored in the form of paper copies, microfilm copies, and electronically 
scanned copies available by interlibrary loan or over the internet. These primary research sources 
serve two important functions: first, dates and other particulars extracted from published 
secondary sources have been validated where possible by referring to published news reports of 
the time; second, occasional gaps in the empirical record as published in secondary sources have 
been filled by directly consulting news reports of the time.  
4.6.3 Data Coding 
The war between Argentina and Brazil in 1851/52 provides an illustration of how primary 
sources are used to support secondary sources. Englehardt (1948) and other historians provide 
detailed accounts of the political events and the fighting but they do not address the presence, 
type, speed or independence of the media within Argentina and Brazil at the time. But these 
details can be derived from an examination of newspaper archives.  
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Figure 4 - 4. NY Times October 21, 1851 Article 
 
 
Although it is not possible to secure access to archives of the Brazilian and Argentine 
press of the day, it is possible to find references to their reporting in the historical archives of two 
prominent newspapers of that era – The Times of London and The New York Times. In this case, 
an article (see Figure 4-4) from The New York Times on October 21, 1851(New York Times 
1851) makes mention of reporting by the Jornal Do Commercio (a universal newspaper 
published within Brazil) through September 16th about details of the movements of the Argentine 
General Urquina during the previous July. This report and others enable one to determine that 
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one or more universal newspapers – the Jornal Do Commercio and the Commercio Del Plata – 
are reporting to the Brazilian public about the Argentine conduct of the war. These news reports 
further establish the speed with which reporting is published, and the level of independence from 
state control or other bias exhibited by the press. In this way, a primary source complements and 
confirms the account provided by a secondary source reporting on this war. 
4.6.4 Data Preparation 
Raw data collected from the above sources is collected for each of the 90 cases of war in the 
population. This data is examined and coded for each side in each year of each war, yielding four 
data points (availability, type, independence and speed) for each side (initiator and target) for 
each observation (a war-year), for a total of 1544 data points for 193 observations (war-years).  
The data collected reflect the novel variables described above. This data is combined with 
data reflecting the variables previously analyzed by Bennett & Stam (1998) to yield the dataset 
used in this analysis. This dataset is examined for missing data, etc. prior to beginning statistical 
analysis. As mentioned above, several cases contained in Bennett & Stam (1998) are dropped 
due to the unavailability of data reflecting the emergence of the international news media. 
In the next section, the procedures used to analyze the data are presented.  
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4.7 ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 
4.7.1 Statistical analysis  
The categorical form of the dependent variable dictates the use of a multinomial logistic 
regression procedure to predict the outcome of each war-year. Drawing on authoritative texts, 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow 2004; Long and Freese 2001; Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt 2007; Royston 
and Sauerbrei 2008) a statistical model is constructed to approximate the relationship between 
the independent variables (both the media variables and those variables from previously 
published studies) and the dependent variable. All statistical analysis is performed using Stata/IC 
10.1 for Windows.  
The analysis proceeds using a modeling strategy recommended by Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (2004) with additional suggestions from Long and Freese (2001). The general 
strategy followed in constructing the model is to first conduct a thorough univariable analysis of 
each variable to identify candidates for inclusion and/or rejection from a preliminary model. 
Considerations during this step include numerical problems such as complete or quasi-
separation, coding errors, unexplained anomalies, and identification of variables that require 
transformation. Next, a preliminary main effects model is created that includes those variables 
that exhibit the best fit during univariate inspection. An iterative process of deleting variables, 
refitting the model, and verifying the model continues until all variables have been considered 
singly and in combination with the others. Next, the assumption of linearity in the logit should be 
checked for all continuous variables by examining graphs of the univariate relationship between 
those variables and the logit. Appropriate adjustments in scale or other transformations must be 
made to yield the main effects model. Next, inclusion of any theoretically-justified interaction 
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terms is considered for statistical appropriateness. This preliminary final model is subjected to an 
assessment of its adequacy and fit and adjustments are made and iteratively compared using a 
likelihood-ratio test. The main elements of each step in this strategy are presented here. 
Note that the model development process involves a measure of trial and error and is 
ultimately subject to a number of conflicting priorities. The process is guided first and foremost 
by inclusion of variables that represent the factors contained in the theory. Second, the selection 
of variables is limited by the nuances discovered during a thorough analysis of the data which 
can identify variables that are unsuitable for inclusion in a model for one or more reasons. Third, 
not all variables contribute to a statistically strong model, in the sense that they do not meet tests 
of statistical relationship. Therefore, model development proceeds using a process of deleting, 
refitting, and verifying as discussed above and may result in a model that is not completely 
satisfying in one or more ways.  
Univariable analysis of each variable 
For nominal, ordinal, or continuous with few integer values, a contingency table of outcome 
versus independent variable is constructed using a likelihood ratio chi-square test for significance 
or a Pearson chi-square test. For variables exhibiting a moderate level of association, odds ratio 
and confidence limits are estimated using one of the levels as a reference. Any observed zero 
cells must be addressed at this point; Hosmer recommends strategies to resolve: Collapse 
categories of the IV; eliminate one or more categories; or, if ordinal, try modeling the variable as 
continuous (2004, p. 93). 
For continuous variables, the univariable analysis begins by fitting a univariable logistic 
regression model, with means, standard deviations, t statistic, and p value. Construct a smoothed 
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scatterplot to assess the presence and effect of extreme observations and to assess appropriate 
scale for each variable.  
Identify and address numerical problems 
Hosmer advises that “in general, the numerical problems of a zero cell count, complete 
separation, and collinearity, are manifested by extraordinarily large estimated standard errors and 
sometimes by a large estimated coefficient as well” (2004, p. 141). Each of these is considered 
here in turn. Frequency of zero in a contingency table, the signature which is large coefficients 
and estimated standard errors, which produce either zero or infinity estimates of odds ratios. 
Complete separation, wherein every observation exhibiting the outcome has the same value of 
some covariate. Collinearities among independent variables result in variable inflation factors 
(VIF). VIFs greater than 5 are cause for mild concern. VIFs greater than 10 are indication of 
severe multicollinearity and necessitate some remedy or the results will be suspect or misleading.  
Define a preliminary model 
Variables that exhibit some degree of association in the univariable analysis will be included in a 
preliminary model along with variables that are critical to examining the theory in question. 
Within the context of a preliminary model, variable contributions to the strength of the model 
will be examined and candidates for inclusion and removal from the model should be identified. 
Stepwise selection is recommended in many modeling texts, but this approach must also be 
guided by theory. Once a set of variables has been selected for inclusion in a preliminary main 
effects mode, variables that are expected (as guided by theory) to interact will be examined for 
possible inclusion in a preliminary main effects plus interaction effects model following a similar 
stepwise approach. 
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Note that the inclusion and interpretation of interacted terms must be approached very 
carefully – see works by Braumoeller (2004), Brambor et al (2006), and Huang et al (2000) for 
detailed discussion.  
Note also that the substantive interpretation of the results of multinomial logistic 
regression models can be difficult due to the simultaneous contribution of multiple variables to 
multiple equations (Agresti 2002; Agresti and Finlay 1997; Freese and Long 2001; Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2004). Rather than directly inspecting the size and direction of the coefficients for 
individual variables, it is recommended that overall model predictions be generated for values of 
interest for particular independent variables. The methods employed to conduct substantive 
interpretation of the statistical models are discussed in the next section. 
4.7.2 Substantive analysis 
Recycled predictions 
The method of recycled predictions is employed to generate predicted outcomes given specific 
values of particular variables. This method is used, for example, to generate the predicted 
outcomes for specific values of initiator democracy and war duration presented in Figure 4-1.  
Following Bennett & Stam, the method of recycled predictions “uses actual variable 
values on actual (observations) but sets variables of interest to particular values on all 
(observations) and then assess(es) the change in outcome probabilities” (1998, p. 360). The 
method is applied here by drawing on the initial dataset of 193 observations and the set of 
coefficients estimated by a statistical model based on the theory.  
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To illustrate how Bennett & Stam arrive at the predicted outcomes presented in Figure 
4-1, the method of recycled predictions is presented here in detail. First, the value of initiator 
democracy (initiator democracy) is set to 9 and the value of war duration (time) is set to 6 
months for all observations in the dataset. All interactive variables involving time or democracy 
are recomputed and the resulting values substituted into the dataset for all observations. The 
computed coefficients from the statistical model are then used to calculate the predicted 
probabilities of each outcome for each observation. The resulting probabilities are then averaged 
across observations to arrive at an overall probability of each outcome, given a democratic 
initiator (initiator democracy=9) and a war duration of 6 months (time=6). The procedure is 
repeated for durations of 18, 30, 42 and 54 months. Next, the value of democracy is set to 2 
(initiator democracy=2) and the procedure is repeated for war durations of 6, 18, 30, 42 and 54 
months. This yields a table with predicted probabilities for each outcome (continue, win, draw, 
lose) for each of 5 war durations, for 2 different values of initiator democracy (see Table 4-2).  
While the method of recycled predictions is useful for generating substantive predictions 
from a statistical model, it presents several drawbacks. First and foremost, it can generate 
numerically unstable results in certain circumstances. Consider what happens when the method 
is used to generate predicted outcomes for various war durations for initiators with mean levels 
of democracy. Two methods can be used to generate recycled predictions for such conditions. 
First, the actual values of initiator democracy can be used for all cases, yielding predicted 
probabilities of the initiator winning of 0.33, 0.25, 0.21, 0.19, and 0.18 for the war durations of 
interest. Second, the mean value of initiator democracy (initiator democracy=2.46) could be 
substituted for all cases in the dataset, yielding predicted probabilities of the initiator winning of 
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Table 4 - 2. Predicted Outcome Probabilities By War Duration Per Bennett & Stam (1998) 
Time 
Level of Initiator 
Democracy P(Continue) P(Win) P(Draw) P(Lose) 
6 Nondemocratic .528 .321 .037 .113 
6 Democratic .318 .491 .023 .167 
18 Nondemocratic .566 .272 .039 .123 
18 Democratic .458 .189 .153 .200 
30 Nondemocratic .494 .261 .133 .11 
30 Democratic .416 .100 .365 .118 
42 Nondemocratic .458 .259 .190 .093 
42 Democratic .295 .074 .575 .056 
54 Nondemocratic .409 .252 .253 .087 
54 Democratic .219 .058 .697 .026 
 
 
0.33, 0.26, 0.24, 0.23, and 0.22 for the durations of interest. The small but nonzero differences in 
results between these two approaches are a direct consequence of limitations in the method of 
recycled predictions. A second drawback to the method of recycled predictions is the difficulty 
in generating confidence intervals associated with a given set of predictions. Despite these 
drawbacks, the method of recycled predictions is used in this analysis to facilitate comparison of 
the results with those published by Bennett & Stam in their original study (1998) 
Predicted outcome probabilities using Stata commands 
Predicted outcome probabilities are also generated from the statistical models using the prvalue 
command within Stata. Prvalue is contained in the Spost package written by Jeremy Freese and 
J. Scott Long (2001). The prvalue command is used to compute the conditional probability of 
each outcome, given specific values of particular variables. The prvalue command can be used to 
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generate the same outcome probabilities as the method of recycled predictions, but with two 
notable differences. First, prvalue generates results that are numerically stable and do not 
fluctuate when the mean value of variables are substituted for all observations. Second, prvalue 
generates a confidence interval for each prediction, which is critical to determining the 
substantive implications of a given model.  
Predicted outcome probabilities are generated using prvalue for specific values of 
particular independent variables. The probabilities are generated by first recalculating the value 
of each interacted variable (as is done in the method of recycled predictions above) and 
substituting these values for all cases in the dataset. Next, the prvalue command is issued in Stata 
and the resulting predictions and confidence intervals are collected. Whereas the method of 
recycled predictions (see Table 4-2) generates a single predicted value for each outcome, prvalue 
generates three: the mean prediction, and two additional predictions representing a confidence 
interval around the mean prediction.  
4.8 BIAS AND ERROR 
Like all research endeavors, this project contains potential sources of bias and error (Helberg and 
SPSS 1996). Measures have been taken in the design of this research to eliminate or mitigate 
such potential, but there are nevertheless a number of potential sources of bias or error that are 
unavoidable. The potential sources of bias or error are presented here with a brief discussion of 
how their presence may influence or limit the findings.  
The model used here builds on the work begun decades ago under Singer’s Correlates of 
War project (1978). While significant progress has been made using the Correlates of War 
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foundation, a number of valid criticisms of the approach have been raised and must be 
acknowledged. Most generally, Moore observes that Correlates of War uses a particularistic 
rather than a holistic conceptualization of war and as such removes it from the broader context 
(2006). Because the Correlates of War framework operationalizes war as a militarized 
international dispute in which a minimum threshold of deaths occurs over a period of time, the 
Correlates of War approach is unable to distinguish between zero values of the dependent 
variable representing the absence of conflict behavior and those where conflict is present but is 
of an intensity below the threshold of a militarized interstate dispute. This is the familiar problem 
of “selection bias due to truncating the values of the dependent variable one observes” (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994, p. 129-32; Moore 2006, p. 10). 
Also related to the use of Correlates of War as a foundation, the model constructed here 
uses annual data to represent the construct of war. This operationalization makes it impossible to 
consider how decision-making is influenced by conditions changing throughout the year. This 
critique is not unique to the present study, however. As discussed previously, most literature in 
the international relations field uses annual data because of data availability (Bennett and Stam 
2000). 
There are a number of aspects of the international news media’s role that are beyond the 
scope of this project. First, it is a well-established historical fact that the news media is 
sometimes used for propaganda purposes by states engaged in war. Second, the news media 
sometimes engages in so-called ‘yellow journalism’ in an effort to increase circulation or 
advertising revenue. Third, norms and practices of reporting on public reaction to foreign policy 
events undoubtedly exhibit variation across time and space. Although the theory advanced in this 
dissertation conceptualizes the news media as a form of transmission channel, it is not 
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unreasonable to consider the possible roles of the news media in affecting the content of news 
reports. Such roles could potentially introduce confounding influences and therefore significantly 
affect the findings of this research. Future research should consider these influences.  
The linkage between public debates as reported by the international news media on the 
one hand and leaders’ cost sensitivity on the other hand may vary under the influence of cultural 
or other local factors. The design used here makes no attempt to account for such potential 
variations. No attempt is made to trace the micro-linkages which presumably are influenced by 
the presence of a new channel for information or carried over that channel. 
4.9 VALIDITY  
Because this dissertation introduces novel variables representing the emergence of the 
international news media, a measure of attention must be paid to the issue of validity. Drawing 
on Cook and Campbell, four types of validity are considered: conclusion validity, internal 
validity, construct validity, external validity. (Cook and T. Campbell 1979) 
Conclusion Validity addresses the question of whether a relationship exists between the 
variables examined. Given the quantitative focus of the research design, this is the most 
straightforward to evaluate. The results of the logistic regression will clearly spell out whether 
there is a non-random relationship between the independent and dependent variables.  
Internal Validity: Given a relationship between the variables, internal validity is 
concerned with the issue of whether the relationship is a causal one. Internal validity is addressed 
in this design by deriving a broad range of predictions from the theory and assessing how 
consistently those theoretical predictions agree with those generated by the statistical model 
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which is based on the empirical record. To the extent that the preponderance of the theoretical 
predictions are supported by the empirical record, the internal validity of the findings can be 
confidently asserted.  
Construct Validity: Given a causal relationship, Construct Validity is concerned with 
whether is it reasonable to claim that the constructs that comprise the theory are accurately and 
fairly operationalized by the variables employed in the research design. The novel variables 
representing the construct of the international news media are the primary focus of concern 
regarding validity here. The remaining variables have significant research behind them and 
examining their validity is beyond the scope of the project. Several strategies are employed to 
ensure construct validity where the media variables are concerned. Before operationalizing the 
construct of media, the literature on media and communications are thoroughly examined to 
identify dimensions of the media that apply to the research problem. What emerges from this 
examination is that the primary strategy for ensuring the construct validity of the design is to 
examine four distinct facets of the media – availability, type, independence, and speed. It is 
anticipated that threats to construct validity should not affect all of them.  
External Validity is concerned with whether any causal relationship observed between the 
constructs of the cause and effect can be generalized to other cases. Within the literature 
examining the onset, duration and termination of war, the well-established practice is to include 
all wars for which data is available in the population of cases. Therefore, any causal relationships 
observed within the population can only be generalized to the next war or to future wars. This 
limitation is consistent with the approach employed throughout the causes of war literature 
(Trochim 2006).  
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4.10 RELIABILITY 
As with validity, the primary concern with respect to reliability of the findings is the introduction 
of novel variables reflecting the international news media construct (Walonick 2004). Each of 
the two steps involved in developing these variables has the potential to influence reliability.. 
First, the collection of empirical data from the historical record, which necessarily involves a 
manual search for sources and records. Reliability of this phase is ensured by cross-checking 
critical dates and facts across multiple sources to avoid introducing error. Second, the raw data 
collected from the empirical record is coded to create the variables which will be ultimately 
included in the statistical model. For two of the variables – media availability and media speed – 
the translation of the historical record into a value of the variable is a simple mathematical 
operation involving no coder judgment. But for the other two variables – media type and media 
independence – coder judgment is involved and therefore represents a potential threat to 
reliability. To guard against this threat, the coder made two passes through this step and 
compared the results for consistency. While this approach does not guard against bias introduced 
during the process of collecting the raw data, it does provide a check on the judgment applied by 
the coder when the raw data is converted to scores. This inter-coder comparison yielded 
agreement between the two passes for more than 94% of the data points (742 out of 772). The 
rate of agreement suggests that the research instrument for these variables generates satisfactory 
reliability. 
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4.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY: RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter has presented the research design and methods used to evaluate the theory advanced 
in Chapter 3. First, a conceptual model that operationalizes the theory is presented. A research 
design based on the conceptual model is presented next. The research design section describes 
the basic elements (population of cases, unit of analysis, dependent variable, and independent 
variables) of the design as well as the methods for collecting the data. The analysis section 
describes the tools and methods used to perform both the statistical and the substantive analysis 
of the data. The chapter concluded by examining threats to reliability and validity and their 
implications for the findings. The development of statistical models suitable for testing the 
hypotheses is presented in Appendix B. The results generated by those models are presented in 
the next chapter. 
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5.0  RESULTS 
This chapter uses the statistical models developed in Appendix B to test the hypotheses presented 
on page 84 in Section 3.8 . The chapter is organized by research question and hypothesis.  
5.1 MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION  
Main Research Question: To what extent does the international news media influence the 
outcomes of interstate wars? 
5.1.1 Overview of Statistical Model Results 
Model 3 is used to predict changes in the probability of each possible war outcome16
Table 5-1
 (win, draw, 
lose, continue) as media and control variables are varied. The logistic regression coefficients for 
Model 3 were presented in Appendix B but are reproduced in  for the convenience of 
the reader. 
                                                 
16 As discussed in Chapter 4, the four war outcomes are labeled from the perspective of the war initiator. For the 
remainder of the discussion, ‘winning’ refers to the initiator winning; ‘losing’ refers to the initiator losing, and so 
on.   
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Table 5 - 1. Model 3 Logistic Regression Results (Maxwell 2010) 
Model 3: Influence of Media Variables plus Controls on War Outcome Probabilities 
 Multinomial Logit Estimatesa 
Independent Variables Win vs. Continue Draw vs. Continue 
Lose vs. 
Continue 
Balance Of Forces 3.491063***  (1.098528) 2.43519  (1.957763) -3.74823  (2.642367) 
Sum Of Population -1.13e-06  (1.01e-06) 3.28e-06**  (1.54e-06) -.0000122**  (4.44e-06) 
Rough Terrain 30.34893***  (8.434361) 33.26401**  (12.00702) -11.66131  (11.19558) 
Rough Terrain*Initiator Strategy -13.56259***  (4.009495) -14.33361**  (4.772376) 4.943956  (5.100339) 
Sum Of Military Personnel -.0000399  (.0000718) -.0002304*  (.0001267) .0003848**  (.0001273) 
Initiator Strategy 9.684771***  (2.396563) 8.138004**  (2.791037) -4.963213*  (2.565978) 
Time -.0106329  (.0126406) .0235162  (.0130854) .005305  (.0200067) 
Initiator Democracy -.6116132  (.4166819) -.5390515  (.7409285) 3.826952**  (1.5863) 
Target Democracy .0762646  (.5106091) -.6292981  (.7636223) -3.534492**  (1.267869) 
Initiator Media Type .9802716*  (.5867809) -1.830452  (1.138183) .4185405  (1.162991) 
Initiator Media Speed -.1565062**  (.0689421) -.0455221  (.1166524) .3845732***  (.1153324) 
Initiator Media Independence -.7119558  ( .998833) 3.200408**  (1.218296) 3.783921**  (1.335889) 
Target Media Type -.0789779  (.3113761) .3740885  (.6368387) -.5759963  (.6622109) 
Target Media Speed -.0473793  (.0463894) .1292832  (.0939225) -.3993923***  (.0897512) 
Target Media Independence -.8938125*  (.4825785) -.7848033  (.4835764) .942536  (.9826756) 
Initiator Democracy*Initiator Media Type .1592469*  (.0910348) .2415834  (.15263) -.6664941**  (.3083906) 
Target Democracy*Target Media Type .0169385  (.1181943) .1672011  (.169489) .9046992**  (.3199671) 
Initiator Democracy*Initiator Media Independence .1581317  (.163842) -.3046931  (.2592132) -1.256907**  (.5292474) 
 (N=193) 
Log-likelihood = -121.26 
X2 (df=54) = 6833.49 
Pseudo R2 = 0.4285 
aRobust standard errors are in parentheses 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed tests) 
T
able 5-1. M
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ogistic R
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It is difficult if not impossible to determine the influence of individual variables on 
outcomes by directly inspecting the coefficients returned by a multinomial logistic regression 
model (Agresti 2002; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2004; Long and Freese 2001). A more effective 
approach entails setting particular variables to values of interest and inspecting the resulting 
predicted outcomes generated by the model. To get an overall understanding of the model, it is 
useful to first examine the influence of individual variables on predicted war outcomes as they 
are varied one at a time. Table 5-2 presents changes in predicted probabilities of each war 
outcome as individual variables are varied from their minimum to their maximum values while 
the other variables in the model are held constant at their mean values. As discussed on page 113 
in section 4.7, special care is exercised when calculating the influence of variables (initiator 
democracy, target democracy, initiator media type, initiator media independence, target media 
type) that appear in interaction terms17
It is useful to examine several of the results presented in 
. For these variables, both their main-effects contributions 
and their interaction-effects contributions are included in the calculation of predicted 
probabilities.  
Table 5-2 to illustrate how to 
interpret Model 3. To consider one example, as balance of forces is varied from its minimum to 
its maximum value (while holding all other variables at their mean values), the probability of the 
initiator winning increases by 40.0%, and the probability of a war continuing decreases by 
38.0%. To consider another example, as rough terrain varies from its minimum value to its 
maximum value, the probability of the initiator winning increases by 69.4%, the probability of a 
draw increases by 30.6% and the probability of the initiator losing falls by 58.1%. These 
examples illustrate the interpretation of Model 3: both balance of forces and rough terrain 
                                                 
17 See (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Braumoeller 2004; Huang and Shields 2000; Jaccard 2001) for discussion 
of how to interpret models containing interaction terms. 
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appear to increase the probability of the initiator winning as they are individually increased, 
holding all other variables constant at their mean values.  
The results of Model 3 presented in Table 5-2 enable the examination of the importance 
of the news media variables relative to the factors traditionally thought to influence the outcome 
of wars. The examples of balance of forces and rough terrain just considered show that these  
 
 
Table 5 - 2. Model 3: Influence of Independent Variables on War Outcome Probabilities 
 Change in Predicted Probabilitiesa 
Independent Variables Win Draw Lose Continue 
Balance Of Forces 0.400 0.044 -0.064 -0.380 
Sum Of Population -0.129 0.463 -0.107 -0.228 
Rough Terrain 0.614 0.386 -0.448 -0.552 
Sum Of Military Personnel -0.148 -0.052 0.947 -0.746 
Initiator Strategy 0.963 0.037 -0.541 -0.459 
Time -0.153 0.341 0.006 -0.193 
Initiator Democracyb 0.236 -0.039 -0.030 -0.167 
Target Democracyb 0.203 -0.018 -0.015 -0.171 
Initiator Media Typeb 0.595 -0.389 -0.099 -0.106 
Initiator Media Speed -0.734 -0.007 0.405 0.336 
Initiator Media Independenceb -0.115 0.665 0.006 -0.557 
Target Media Typeb -0.037 0.078 0.071 -0.112 
Target Media Speed 0.051 0.127 -0.907 0.729 
Target Media Independence -0.168 -0.030 0.037 0.161 
(N=193) 
X2 (df=54) = -121.26 
Pseudo R2 = 0.4285 
aChange in the predicted probability of each outcome, given an increase from minimum to maximum value of each 
independent variable, while holding all other independent variables constant at their mean values. 
bChange in predicted probability includes both main-effect and interaction-effect influence for these variables. 
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realist factors have a substantial influence on the probability of winning. Another realist variable 
– initiator strategy – also has a very strong influence on the probability of the initiator winning, 
with the probability of winning increasing by 96% as the initiator moves from a losing strategy 
(the minimum value of this variable) to a winning strategy (the maximum value). The substantial 
influence of these three variables predicted by the statistical model is consistent with the 
importance that military leaders throughout history place on these factors. So it is interesting to 
compare the influence of the novel media variables with these more traditional factors. Two of 
the media variables in particular – initiator media type and initiator media speed – have an 
apparent influence on winning that is of a similar order of magnitude to the most important 
realist variables. At the same time, other media variables have less influence. The media variable 
with the least influence, target media speed, appears to increase the probability of winning by 
only 5.1% as it varies across its range. This brief examination of the individual influence of the 
variables (holding all others constant at their mean values) shows that some of the media 
variables may be very important to our understanding of war outcomes.  
 
5.1.2 Hypotheses H1 and H2 
The theory advanced in this paper argues that as the media emerges through a series of media 
types (pre-universal newspaper, universal newspaper, press agencies, radio, broadcast 
television), the public sphere enlarges. The norms of public engagement emerge as well, 
enhancing the ability of leaders to send credible signals, which should in turn influence war 
outcomes. H1 and H2 address the influence of the media as the media type advances:   
Hypothesis H1: Probability of winning should increase as a state’s media type advances.  
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Hypothesis H2: Probability of losing should decrease as a state’s media type advances. 
 
Table 5-3 presents the change in probability of the initiator winning as the initiator state 
media type varies from minimum type (pre-universal newspaper) to maximum type (broadcast 
television). The results show that the probability of the initiator winning increases by 59.5% as 
the initiator media type varies from minimum to maximum. The 95% confidence interval for this 
prediction ranges from an increases of 21.6% up to an increase of 97.4%. In other words, the 
model predicts with 95% confidence that as the initiator media type increases, the probability of 
the initiator winning increases by between 21.6% and 97.4%. The type of media in the initiator 
state appears to substantially and (statistically speaking) significantly increase the probability of 
the initiator winning. Therefore, hypothesis H1 is supported. 
Table 5-3 also presents the change in probability of the initiator state losing as its media 
varies over the same range. The probability of losing decreases by 9.9% as the media varies 
across the same range of values. However, the 95% confidence interval for this predicted change 
ranges from -22.1% to +35.5%. In other words, the change in probability of losing as the media 
type varies is predicted to be between a 22.1% decrease and a 35.5% increase. Therefore, the  
 
 
Table 5 - 3. Model 3: Change In Outcome Probabilities As Initiator Media Type Varies 
 Change in Predicted Probabilitiesa 
Outcome Change 95% Confidence Interval for Change 
Win 0.595 0.216 0.974 
Lose -0.099 -0.221 0.355 
aChange in the predicted probability of outcome, given an increase from minimum to maximum value of initiator 
media type, holding all other independent variables constant at their mean values. 
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model is not able to provide a statistically significant prediction regarding the change in 
probability of losing, and hypothesis H2 cannot be supported. At the same time, however, the 
null hypothesis for H2 cannot be rejected because the model does not rule out zero change in the 
probability of losing as the type of media varies. 
Based on the results presented in Table 5-3, hypothesis H1 is supported, but the null 
hypothesis for H2 cannot be rejected:  
Hypothesis H1: support 
Hypothesis H2: unable to reject null hypothesis Ho 
5.1.3 Hypotheses H3 and H4 
The theorized influence of the media depends on the independence of the media from state 
control. Therefore, states with more independent media should be expected to enjoy relatively 
greater success than states with less independent media. H3 and H4 address the influence of 
media independence on the outcome of wars: 
Hypothesis H3: Probability of winning should increase as a state’s media becomes more 
independent. 
Hypothesis H4: Probability of losing should decrease as a state’s media becomes more 
independent. 
 
During model development it was noted that interaction between media independence 
and the level of democracy is statistically significant. Therefore, the influence of initiator media 
independence on war outcomes must be interpreted with care. Table 5-2 shows that the 
probability of winning decreases by 11.5% as initiator media independence varies from its 
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minimum (state controlled media) to its maximum value (de facto media independence), while 
holding all other variables at their mean values. However, the modifying effect of democracy on 
the media’s influence must be considered as well by examining how media influence varies for 
different levels of democracy. The influence of media independence is examined under a 
democratic regime and a non-democratic regime. For this analysis, a democracy is defined as 
having a value of initiator democracy=5.6, which is one standard deviation greater than the 
mean value of democracy for all observations in the dataset. A non-democracy is defined as 
having a value of initiator democracy=.89, which is one half of a standard deviation lower than 
the mean for all observations. As with the analysis of other variables presented above, the change 
in probability of winning is calculated as media independence is varied from its minimum (state-
controlled media) to its maximum (de facto media independence) for both a democracy and a 
non-democracy. The same approach is used to calculate the influence on the probability of 
losing. Table 5-4 presents the influence of media independence on the probability of winning and 
the probability of losing for the two different levels of initiator democracy.  
Table 5-4 shows that when the modifying effect of democracy is considered, the 
influence of media independence on war outcomes is in agreement with the theory’s predictions. 
For a democratic initiator, variations in media independence from the minimum to the maximum 
value increase the probability of winning by 48.0%. However, the confidence interval for the 
predicted change ranges from -2.8% to 66.2% which makes the prediction statistically 
insignificant at the 95% confidence level. For a non-democratic initiator, the results show that as 
media independence varies, the predicted change in the probability of winning is a statistically 
significant -12.3%. Together, these results show that the predicted influence of media 
independence on the probability of winning are modified by the level of democracy. When 
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Table 5 - 4. Outcome Probabilities: Modifying Effect Of Democracy On Influence Of Media Independence 
 Change in Predicted Probabilities of Outcomea 
Outcome Change 95% Confidence Interval for Change 
Win (Initiator Democracy=.89) -0.123 -0.217 -0.029 
Win (Initiator Democracy=5.6) 0.480 -0.028 0.662 
Lose (Initiator Democracy=.89) 0.251 -0.263 0.531 
Lose (Initiator Democracy=5.6) -0.039 -0.137 0.059 
aChange in the predicted probability of outcome, given an increase from minimum to maximum value of initiator 
media independence, holding initiator democracy at specified value and all other independent variables constant at 
their mean values. 
 
 
the level of democracy drops below approximately initiator democracy=4 (approximately one-
half deviation above the mean value of initiator democracy), the influence of media 
independence on the probability of winning shifts from positive to negative (analysis omitted). 
The results suggest that as the level of democracy increases, the positive influence of media 
independence on the probability of winning increases. 
Table 5-4 also shows the influence of media independence on the probability of losing for 
two values of democracy. The probability of a democratic initiator losing decreases by 3.9% as 
media independence varies across the same range. However, the prediction regarding the 
probability of losing is not statistically significant since the confidence interval for the predicted 
change ranges from -13.7% to 5.9%. The modifying effect of democracy on the influence media 
independence has on losing is apparent in these results, although they fail to meet tests of 
statistical significance. Based on these results, then, the results of hypothesis tests for H3 and H4 
are:  
Hypothesis H3: Unable to reject null hypothesis Ho  
Hypothesis H4: Unable to reject null hypothesis Ho 
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5.1.4 Hypotheses H5 and H6 
The model of the media reporting on wars suggests that as the media emerges, the speed at which 
news is gathered and reported increases, owing to changes in the practices of media enterprises 
made possible by advances in telecommunication technology. While the theory is silent 
regarding the role of media speed in particular, it is reasonable to assume that the increasing 
speed of the media should complement the influence of media type as it advances. H5 and H6 
address the influence of the media as media speed increases:  
Hypothesis H5: Probability of winning should increase as a state’s media speed increases. 
Hypothesis H6: Probability of losing should decrease as a state’s media speed increases. 
 
Model 3 predicts that as initiator media speed increases from its minimum to its 
maximum value, the probability of a war initiator winning declines by 71% (see Table 5-5). The 
95% confidence interval ranges from a 75.2% decrease in the probability of winning to a 20.5% 
decrease in the probability of winning. This result is the opposite of that predicted by the theory 
advanced in this paper and is quite surprising. Therefore, H5 must be rejected.  
 
 
Table 5 - 5. Model 3: Change In Outcome Probabilities As Media Speed Varies 
 Change in Predicted Probabilitiesa 
Outcome Change 95% Confidence Interval for Change 
Win -0.734 -0.752 -0.205 
Lose 0.405 -0.272 1.000 
aChange in the predicted probability of outcome, given an increase from minimum to maximum value of initiator 
media speed, holding all other independent variables constant at their mean values. 
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Considering hypothesis H6, the model predicts that the probability of a war initiator 
losing increases by 40.5% as the initiator media speed varies from its minimum to its maximum 
value. The confidence interval for this prediction ranges from a 27.2% decrease in the probability 
of the initiator losing up to a 100% increase in the probability of the initiator losing. This means 
that the model does not provide a statistically significant prediction of the change in probability 
of the initiator losing as media speed varies. Therefore, for hypothesis H6, the null hypothesis of 
no change cannot be rejected. The surprising finding here that media speed has an opposite effect 
of media type will be discussed along with a discussion of all results later in this chapter. The 
findings for hypotheses H5 and H6 are: 
Hypothesis H5: Reject 
Hypothesis H6: Unable to reject null hypothesis Ho 
 
A discussion of the results for the main research question is presented after the results are 
presented for the remaining sub-questions. Results for sub-question 1 are presented next. 
5.2 SUB-QUESTION 1 
Sub-Question 1: To what extent is the influence of the international news media on war 
outcomes modified by regime type? 
The theory advanced in this paper argues that the media exerts an influence on wars that 
is distinct from the influence of democratic institutions. In order to examine this part of the 
theory, it is important to examine the influence of the media in the context of regime type. H10 
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addresses the potential modifying influence of regime type on the theorized influence of the 
media on war outcomes.  
5.2.1 Hypothesis H7 
Hypothesis H7: The influence of the media on the probability of winning should increase under a 
democratic regime  
 
During model development in Appendix B, it was established that interactions between 
media variables and the level of democracy make a statistically significant contribution to Model 
3. That finding alone suggests that H7 is probably supported, but further exploration is 
warranted.  
Whereas Table 5-2 presents the change in outcome probabilities when a single variable is 
changed from its minimum to its maximum, H7 is concerned with the influence of two variables 
on war outcomes. Furthermore, the two variables of interest – media type and democracy – are 
represented in Model 3 by a multiplicative interaction term. Examining how these two variables 
interact to influence war outcomes must be done for specific values of democracy and media 
type.  
The influence of media type on war outcomes was examined above by calculating the 
change in probability of winning when media type is varied from its minimum to its maximum 
value. The interaction between media type and regime type can be examined by varying media 
type across the same range of values while setting regime type to one or more values of interest. 
Specifically, the interaction is examined under a non-democratic regime, a regime with an 
average level of democracy, and a regime with a high level of democracy. For this analysis, a 
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democracy will be defined as having a value of initiator democracy=5.6, which is one standard 
deviation greater than the mean value of democracy for all observations in the dataset. A non-
democracy will be defined as having a value of initiator democracy=.89, which is one half of a 
standard deviation lower than the mean for all observations. The change in probability of 
winning is calculated as initiator media type is varied from its minimum to its maximum for both 
initiator democracy=.89 and initiator democracy=5.6. The results are presented in Table 5-6.  
Table 5-6 shows that as the level of democracy in the initiator state varies from non-democratic 
(initiator democracy=.89) to democratic (initiator democracy=5.6), the influence of initiator 
media changing from its minimum to its maximum value increases. For a non- democratic state, 
a maximum variation in media type increases the probability of winning by 40.3%. For a 
democratic state, a maximum variation in media type increases the probability of winning by 
81.8%. These results show that the influence of the media is multiplied by the influence of 
regime type. 
 
Table 5 - 6. Change In Probability Of Win Outcome, Varying Initiator Media Type And Initiator Democracy 
Model 3: Influence of Independent Variables on War Outcome Probabilities 
 Change in Predicted Probabilitiesa 
Independent Variables Change in p(win) 95% Confidence Interval for Change 
Initiator Media Type (With 
Initiator Democracy=Mean) 0.595 0.216 0.974 
Initiator Media Type (With 
Initiator Democracy=.89) 0.403 0.062 0.744 
Initiator Media Type (With 
Initiator Democracy=5.6) 0.818 0.426 0.988 
aChange in the predicted probability of Win outcome, given an increase from minimum to maximum value of 
initiator media type, holding initiator democracy at specified values, holding all other independent variables 
constant at their mean values. 
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Another way to present the same interaction phenomenon is to graphically examine how 
the probability of winning changes as media type varies. Figure 5-1 presents two sets of 
predictions: the probability of a war initiator winning as the initiator media type varies, for both a 
democratic initiator (initiator democracy=5.6) and a nondemocratic initiator (initiator 
democracy=.89). The influence of media on the probability of winning is much higher for the 
democracy than for the non-democracy. While increases in the type of media contribute to 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - 1. Probability of Win Outcome by Initiator Media Level, Democracy and Non-democracy 
Pre-Univ 
Newspaper
Univ 
Newspaper
Press 
Agency
Radio Broadcast 
TV
Democracy U 0.000 0.008 0.187 0.763 0.988
Democracy 0.000 0.002 0.084 0.411 0.818
Democracy L 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.058 0.426
Non-democracy U 0.0059 0.0303 0.1175 0.3147 0.7440
Non-democracy 0.0048 0.0109 0.0565 0.1786 0.4027
Non-democracy L 0.0039 0.0014 0.0044 0.0424 0.0620
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Probability of Win Outcome by Initiator Media Level
Democratic (5.6) and Non-democratic (.89) Initiatior (90% CI)
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increased probability of winning, they do so much more for democratic regimes than for non-
democratic ones. The results show that the influence of a war initiator’s media type on war 
outcomes depends on the regime type of the initiator. 
H7 is therefore supported, based on two different tests. First, the logistic regression 
coefficient for the interaction between democracy and media type in Model 3 (see Table 5-1) is 
statistically significant (p<.05) for at least one of the regression equations. Second, the 
substantive examination the influence of democracy and media type on war outcomes presented 
here graphically shows how the two variables interact. The interaction between democracy and 
media type is both statistically significant and substantively strong:  
 Hypothesis H7: Support 
The results for sub-question 2 are presented next. 
5.3 SUB-QUESTION 2 
Sub-Question 2: To what extent does the international news media differentially influence war 
initiators and targets? 
The theorized credible signaling mechanism of the media has a different relevance for 
war initiator states than for targeted states. Specifically, when a state is attacked, the public 
generally rallies around the leader, which makes audience costs a less reliable indicator of 
resolve. Therefore, while the probability of winning is expected to increase for initiator states 
with more advanced media, the probability of target states winning is not expected to be affected. 
Research question 3 is examined by testing two hypotheses. 
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5.3.1 Hypotheses H8 and H9 
H8 and H9 address the influence of the media on initiator states and target states:  
Hypothesis H8: Probability of winning should vary with type of media for initiator states 
Hypothesis H9: Probability of winning should not vary with type of media for target 
states 
 
During model development, it was observed that whereas initiator media type made a significant 
contribution to Model 3, target media type did not. This suggests that hypotheses H8 and H9 are 
likely to be supported. However, target media type was included in the model specifically so that 
its influence could be examined and compared to the influence of initiator media type. The 
influence of these variables is examined here in two ways. 
The simplest approach is to compare the influence of a maximum change in the type of 
media in the initiator state to a maximum change in the type media in the target state. For the 
initiator media, the probability of winning with pre-universal newspapers (the minimum type of 
media) is compared to the probability of winning with broadcast television (the maximum type 
of media). The comparison is also made between the probability of winning with the target state 
media set to the minimum type and with the target state media set to the maximum type. Then, 
the influence of a maximum change in initiator state media type is compared to the influence of a 
maximum change in target state media type. Table 5-7 presents these results.  
As shown in Table 5-7, a maximum change in the type of media in the initiator state increases 
the probability of the initiator state winning by 59.5%. On the other hand, a maximum change in 
the type of media in the target state decreases the probability of the initiator state winning by 
3.7%. The change in probability as the initiator media varies is both large and statistically 
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significant. On the other hand, the change in probability as the target media varies is neither 
substantively important nor statistically significant. These results lend support for hypotheses H8 
and H9.  
 
 
Table 5 - 7. Change In Win Outcome Probability As Initiator Media, Target Media Vary 
Model 3: Influence of Initiator Media and Target Media on War Outcome Probabilities 
 Change in Predicted Probabilitiesa 
Independent Variables Win 95% Confidence Interval for Change 
Initiator Media Type 0.595 0.216 0.974 
Target Media Type -0.037 -0.424 0.351 
aChange in the predicted probability of Win outcome, given an increase from minimum to maximum value of 
independent variable, holding all other independent variables constant at their mean values. 
 
 
A second, confirming approach to examining the differential influence of the initiator 
media type and the target media type is to graphically plot the change in outcome probabilities as 
the types of media vary. Figure 5-2 presents two sets of predictions: the probability of the 
initiator winning as the initiator media type varies from pre-universal newspaper (the minimum 
value) to broadcast television (the maximum value) and, the probability of the initiator winning 
as the target media type varies over the same range. Each predicted probability is accompanied 
by a 95% confidence interval. The graphical results elaborate on the results presented in Table 
5-7. As the initiator state media type varies through each successive phase, the probability of the 
initiator winning increases. The confidence intervals surrounding the predictions show that the 
change in probability is statistically significant. On the other hand, as the target state media 
varies, the probability of the initiator winning does not change much at all, and the confidence 
intervals overlap, signifying that the change in probability is not statistically significant.  
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Figure 5 - 2. Outcome Probabilities As Initiator Media, Target Media Vary 
 
 
The results presented using both methods show support for hypotheses H8 and H9:  
Hypothesis H8: Support 
Hypothesis H9: Support 
 
The results for sub-question 3 are presented next. 
Pre-Univ 
Newspaper
Univ 
Newspaper
Press Agency Radio Broadcast TV
Init Media U 0.011 0.048 0.138 0.390 0.971
Init Media 0.003 0.019 0.082 0.270 0.598
Init Media L 0.001 0.006 0.026 0.150 0.225
Tgt Media U 0.383 0.291 0.215 0.204 0.234
Tgt Media 0.153 0.148 0.142 0.134 0.116
Tgt Media L 0.077 0.068 0.069 0.063 0.015
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Probability of Win Outcome by Media Type
varying initiator media, target media (90% CI)
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5.4 SUB-QUESTION 3 
Sub-Question 3: To what extent is the influence of the international news media modified by war 
duration? 
The theorized influence of the media on war outcomes is expected to vary with the 
duration of wars. Within the time required for the gap between the leader’s knowledge and the 
public’s knowledge to narrow, the theorized credible signaling mechanism cannot function. 
Therefore, the media is expected to have comparatively less influence on shorter wars and more 
influence on longer wars. H10 addresses the interaction between the influence of media and the 
duration of wars:  
5.4.1 Hypothesis H10 
Hypothesis H10: Influence of media on probability of winning should increase as war duration 
increases. 
As was discussed during the preceding chapter, interactions between time and the media 
variables were not found to be statistically significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis for H10 of 
no relationship cannot be rejected.  
Hypothesis H10: Unable to reject null hypothesis Ho 
5.5 SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS-TESTING RESULTS 
The results for all 10 hypotheses tested in this chapter are summarized in Table 5-8 
  142 
Table 5 - 8. Summary Of Hypothesis Testing Results 
 Expected Finding Result 
Main Research Question: To what extent does the international news media influence the 
outcomes of interstate wars? 
   
H1 Probability of winning should increase as a state’s media type advances.  Support 
H2 Probability of losing should decrease as a state’s media type advances. 
Unable to reject null 
hypothesis Ho 
H3 Probability of winning should increase as a state’s media becomes more independent. 
Unable to reject null 
hypothesis Ho 
H4 Probability of losing should decrease as a state’s media becomes more independent. 
Unable to reject null 
hypothesis Ho 
H5 Probability of winning should increase as a state’s media speed increases. Reject 
H6 Probability of losing should decrease as a state’s media speed increases. 
Unable to reject null 
hypothesis Ho 
Sub-Question 1: To what extent is the influence of the international news media modified by 
regime type? 
H7 The influence of the media on the probability of winning should increase under a democratic regime Support 
Sub-Question 2: To what extent does the international news media differentially influence war 
initiators and targets? 
H8 Probability of winning should vary with type of media for initiator states Support 
H9 Probability of winning should not vary with type of media for target states Support 
Sub-Question 3: To what extent is the influence of the international news media modified by war 
duration? 
H10 Influence of media on probability of winning should increase as war duration increases. 
Unable to reject null 
hypothesis Ho 
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5.6 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The results of the hypothesis testing show partial support for the theory.  
 
Many aspects of the theory are supported 
Media Type. The results indicate that advances in media type appear to contribute to higher 
probability of the initiator winning. As the predominant media type in the initiator state varies 
from pre-universal newspapers to broadcast television, the probability of the initiator winning 
increases by a substantial amount, controlling for other factors. This finding is consistent with 
the theory and suggests that more advanced media types with their enlarged public sphere 
enhance leaders’ ability to credibly signal reveal formerly private information regarding power 
and cost sensitivity.  
Democracy. The results show that democracy appears to modify the influence of media 
type on the probability of winning. In other words, while advances in media type increase the 
probability of winning for all types of regimes, they do so to a greater extent in democracies and 
to a lesser extent in non-democracies. This finding is consistent with the theory and suggests that 
the enlarging public sphere represented by the media interacts with democratic institutions to 
influence war outcomes.  
Influence on Initiators but Not Targets. The results indicate that the type of media 
predominating in an initiator state appears to influence war outcomes, whereas the type of media 
in a target state does not. These results are consistent with the theory. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
elites and the public at large in states that have been attacked are often observed to support 
leaders - the so-called ‘rally ‘round the flag’ phenomenon. The rally effects temporarily obscure 
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dissenting views and thereby mute the credible signaling role of both democratic institutions and 
the media. Therefore, the influence of media type is expected in initiator states but not in target 
states.  
One aspect of the theory must be rejected 
Media Speed influence on Winning. The results suggest that increases in initiator media speed 
appear to contribute to a lower probability of winning, in contrast to the influence of media type. 
Although the theory developed in Chapter 3 is silent regarding the influence of media speed on 
war outcomes, an assumption was made that the influence of speed would be in the same 
direction as media type. That is, if a widening public sphere as a result of the emergence of new 
types of media would enable leaders to more credibly signal, then being able to do so faster 
should have a consistent influence, at least in terms of the direction of influence. The results 
indicate that increases in initiator media speed in fact have the opposite effect of increases in 
media type, which is quite surprising. Both methodological and theoretical explanations for this 
unexpected result are discussed next.  
A methodological explanation for this result is that since speed and type are measures of 
the same phenomenon (the media), it may be inappropriate to vary one while holding the other 
constant. This explanation is explored by varying initiator media type and media speed in unison, 
as follows. The appropriate value of initiator media speed for each type of initiator media is 
determined from the dataset. For the minimum type of initiator media (pre-universal newspaper), 
the mean value of initiator media speed is 3.47 dispatches per day. For the maximum type, media 
speed is 29.58 dispatches per day. The difference in the predicted outcomes as media type and 
media speed are varied from minimum to maximum in unison is presented in Table 5-9.  
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Table 5 - 9. Model 3: Influence Of Initiator Media Type And Speed On War Outcome Probabilities 
Model 3: Influence of Initiator Media type and speed on War Outcome Probabilities 
 Change in Predicted Probabilitiesa 
Outcome Change 95% Confidence Interval for Change 
Win 0.193 -0.028 0.563 
Lose 0.043 -0.075 0.161 
aChange in the predicted probability of outcome, given an increase from minimum to maximum value of initiator 
media type and initiator media speed, holding all other independent variables constant at their mean values. 
 
 
Table 5-9 shows that as both media type and media speed are varied, the probability of 
winning increases by 19.3%, which supports the theory. However, the confidence interval 
surrounding this prediction ranges from a decrease of 2.8% to an increase of 56.3%, making the 
prediction statistically insignificant. At the same time, varying media type and speed together in 
this manner yields a prediction that the probability of losing increases by 4.3%, which supports 
the theory but is also, however, a statistically insignificant prediction. While it appears from 
these results that it may be more appropriate to examine the influence of media type and media 
speed by varying them together, no statistically significant conclusions can be drawn from this 
test. Similarly, explorations of an interaction effect between the two variables yield no 
significant findings. However, this exploration suggests that the influence of media speed is not 
universally in opposition to the predictions of the theory, and in that sense do not necessarily 
critically wound the theory advanced in this paper. Other possible explanations for the surprising 
findings regarding the influence of media speed are examined next. 
A theoretical explanation for the unexpected finding regarding the influence of media 
speed is that speed may play a different informational role than media type. The media literature 
examined in Chapter 2 specifically addresses the expanding public sphere, new forms of public 
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engagement and the reciprocal influence on domestic politics that takes place as different types 
of media emerge. The literature is silent about the specific role of the speed with which the 
media gathers and reports news.  
Another theoretical explanation for the unexpected finding regarding the influence of 
media speed is that speed may not play an informational role at all. Rather, it is possible that 
media speed is a reflection of technological advances that somehow enable opponents to counter 
the advantages conferred by democratic institutions and the media. During model development, 
it was noted that media speed does not appear to interact with democracy variables to a 
statistically significant degree. This finding lends some support to the concept that speed may not 
function in concert with democratic institutions the way media type appears to do. Analysis of 
the influence of media speed in the context of the regime type variables included in model 3 fails 
to find positive or negative evidence regarding this concept (analysis omitted). Neither of the 
theoretical explanations offered here for the surprising influence of media speed on war 
outcomes are particularly satisfying. Those aspects of the theory that can neither be supported 
nor rejected by the hypothesis tests are discussed next.  
Several aspects of the theory can neither be supported nor rejected 
Media type influence on losing. Predictions from the model regarding the influence of media 
type on the probability of losing appear to agree with theory but are not statistically significant. 
The model predicts that as the media type varies from minimum to maximum, the probability of 
losing decreases by 9.9%, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from a decrease of 22.1% to 
an increase of 35.5%. The wide confidence interval surrounding the predicted value is a 
consequence of weaknesses in model 3 that were noted during model development. In particular, 
model 3 produces relatively large standard errors for some of the logistic coefficients. Loosening 
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the confidence level surrounding the model’s predictions reveals that the predicted 9.9% 
decrease in probability of losing becomes significant at the 60% confidence level. The theory 
regarding the influence of media type on the probability of losing may be correct, but a stronger 
model is needed to support the theory at the 95% confidence level. The weak model and/or the 
limited number of observations in the dataset also limit the ability to support or reject predictions 
regarding the influence of media speed and media independence, which are discussed next.  
Media speed influence on losing. Increases in media speed appear to influence the 
probability of winning, but the influence of media speed on the probability of losing is unclear. 
The model predicts an increase of 40.5% in the probability of losing as media speed increases, 
but the confidence interval surrounding the prediction is so wide as to render the prediction 
statistically insignificant. The influence of media type and media speed on the probability of the 
initiator losing can only be confidently tested using a stronger model and/or more observations.  
Media Independence influence on Winning. Increases in level of media independence 
appear to contribute to a higher probability of winning when the initiator is democratic. This 
result is consistent with what is expected based on the theory, however, the confidence interval 
surrounding the prediction falls just outside the 95% confidence interval. Hence, the prediction 
that media independence influences the probability of winning can neither be supported nor 
rejected, in the strictest sense. However, given that the predicted influence is directionally 
consistent with the theory and is just outside the range of statistical significance, it is reasonable 
to consider the influence of media independence as perhaps increasing the probability of winning 
as predicted by the theory, and most likely not critically wounding the theory.  
Media Independence influence on Losing. Increases in target state media independence 
from state-controlled to de facto independence appear to influence the probability of winning, 
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but the influence of media independence on the probability of losing is unclear. The model 
predicts a slight 0.4% decrease in the probability of losing as media independence varies across 
its entire range, but the confidence interval surrounding the prediction is such that the prediction 
is not statistically significant. The influence of media independence on the probability of losing 
can only be confidently tested using a stronger model and/or larger number of observations.  
Modifying influence of time. The theory predicts that the influence of the media may play 
out over time in one or more ways. The media may exert an ex ante influence on war outcomes 
because its mere presence influences leaders’ threats and actions. The media may also exert an 
informing influence on leaders as wars unfold. To the extent the second informing mechanism is 
present, the passage of time during a war should modify the influence of media type on war 
outcomes. But the statistical models developed in this study do not show time interacted with 
media variables having a statistically significant relationship to war outcomes. Without such 
interaction, it is impossible to say to what extent time modifies the influence of the media on war 
outcomes. Thus, the results make it impossible to conclude how the influence of the media 
differs in short wars as compared to longer wars, or how the media influences the probability of 
wars continuing.  
The inability to reject the null hypothesis that time has no modifying effect on the 
influence of the media leaves open several possibilities. One possibility is that the influence of 
the media on outcomes is modified to some extent by the passage of time during wars, but that 
the current design is unable to confidently measure such influence. While the statistical model 
used in this study is unable to precisely state the extent and direction of any modifying influence 
of time, it is possible to infer that any such influence during the course must be relatively small 
and unimportant. Therefore, in a practical sense, it is reasonable to conclude that the passage of 
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time as a conflict unfolds does not, to any important extent, modify the media’s influence on war 
outcomes.  
Another possibility is that the media only exerts its influence on leaders before wars start, 
by constraining leaders who know that their speech and audience reaction to their speech will be 
transmitted via the media, and who know that foreign leaders know the same. The design of the 
current study precludes an examination of the ex ante influence of the media, since it is restricted 
to examining wars that are underway. The need to examine this possible explanation is discussed 
in the next chapter.  
At this point, the findings presented in this chapter are summarized. 
5.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY: RESULTS 
5.7.1 Statistical Results  
In this chapter, the theory advanced in this paper was tested using ten hypotheses that were 
advanced in Chapter 3. The test results provide partial support for the theory. Overall, adding 
media variables to an existing model of war outcomes significantly improves the explanatory 
power of that model (.001). Several more specific findings also support the theory, as follows.  
The results support most aspects of the theory. As the type of media in a war initiator 
state becomes more advanced, the probability of the initiator winning significantly and 
substantially increases, controlling for other factors known to influence wars. Similarly, 
increases in the independence of the initiator media appear to substantially increase the 
probability of winning for democratic initiators, although this prediction falls just short of 
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statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. In addition, as the level of democracy in a 
war initiator state increases, it appears to interact with the type of media and the level of media 
independence to further increase the probability of the initiator winning. The results also support 
the theory in that the influence of the media occurs in the war initiator state but not in the target 
state.  
The influence of the type of media on the probability of winning does not appear to be 
affected by the passage of time (i.e., as the duration of a war increases).  
Findings regarding the influence of media speed are the opposite of what is predicted by 
the theory. Increases in media speed appear to contribute to a lower probability of winning, 
holding all other variables at their mean values. However, varying media speed and media type 
in unison reveal that the influence of media speed is not in all cases opposite of that predicted by 
the theory. Further research is required to more clearly understand the role of media speed.  
Finally, some predictions of the theory can neither be supported nor rejected based on the 
results. The influence of increases in media type, increases in media speed and increases in 
media independence on the probability of the initiator losing cannot be determined to a 
satisfactory level of statistical significance using the research design and limited dataset 
employed here. The consistent inability to confidently predict the influence of the media on the 
probability of losing may be related to the statistical model and dataset used. The dataset on 
which the model is based contains only 19 ‘lose’ outcomes out of a total of 193 observations, in 
contrast to 50 ‘win’ outcomes18
                                                 
18 The relatively few instances of the ‘lose’ outcome in the dataset also contribute to the model under-predicting the 
‘lose’ outcome, as discussed during examination of the model’s proportional reduction in error (PRE) in Section 
. The relatively few instances of the ‘lose’ outcome make it 
difficult for the model to confidently predict the probability of ‘lose’ outcomes. Unfortunately, 
8.5.1. 
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the range of predictions generated by the statistical model are such that it is impossible to 
conclude that the influence of these variables is unimportant.  
Drawing the statistical results together, the research questions posed at the outset are 
addressed in the next section.  
5.7.2 Reviewing the Results in Light of the Research Questions 
Main Research Question: To what extent does the international news media influence the 
outcomes of interstate wars?  
The international news media appears to exert a substantial influence on the outcome of 
wars. Several facets of the news media examined here appear to have a strong19
While the results predict the influence of media type and media independence on the 
probability of winning, the influence of the media on the probability of losing cannot be 
predicted with a reasonable level of confidence. This is most likely a limitation of the research 
design.  
 influence on the 
probability of war initiator states winning wars. More advanced types of media and higher levels 
of media independence in initiator states are associated with higher probabilities of winning.  
The results predict that higher speeds of news gathering and reporting are associated with 
a lower probability of winning. Theoretical and methodological explorations undertaken within 
this study do not satisfactorily explain why the speed of media should have the opposite 
influence of the type and independence of media. Additional research is required to understand 
this result.  
                                                 
19 The characterization of the influence as ‘strong’ follows Raftery’s guidance, as discussed in Section 8.5 on page 
229. 
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Sub-Question 1: To what extent is the influence of the international news media 
modified by regime type?  
Higher levels of democracy in a war initiator state appear to increase the influence of 
media type and media independence on war outcomes. Once the level of democracy in a war 
initiator exceeds a nominally-democratic threshold, increases in the level of democracy increase 
the positive influence of media type and media independence on the probability of winning. The 
news media appears to have an influence that is distinct from, but at the same time interacts with, 
the influence of democracy.  
 
Sub-Question 2: To what extent does the international news media differentially 
influence war initiators and targets? 
The influence of the news media appears to influence the prospects of the war initiator 
state winning while not having an influence on the prospects of the target state winning. 
Theoretical implications of this finding are discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Sub-Question 3: To what extent is the influence of the international news media 
modified by war duration? 
The influence of the news media does not appear to be modified by war duration. 
Theoretical implications of this finding are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
In the next chapter, the policy and theoretical implications of the results are discussed.  
  153 
6.0  CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the theoretical implications and policy implications of the results are presented 
along with appropriate discussion. An agenda for future research is presented that suggests how 
to address methodological and substantive concerns with the findings and how to build on the 
findings.  
6.1 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The findings suggest that availability of an additional communication channel appears to 
influence the outcome of wars. The theory advanced in this paper argues that the additional 
channel – the international news media - serves to reveal information about leaders’ cost 
sensitivity. Information about leaders’ cost sensitivity, in turn, helps to resolve disagreements 
and uncertainty about the relative resolve of the parties, which is a precondition to finding a 
negotiated settlement. The finding that the presence of the international news media appears to 
influence the outcome of wars suggests support for the theory. The findings have several 
theoretical implications which are presented here. 
The findings lend support to a conception of war as being at least partially a problem of 
asymmetric information. Slantchev, Schultz and others point to a variety of informing 
mechanisms that may help states to overcome this information problem by revealing information 
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about cost sensitivity (Schultz 2001; Slantchev 2004). Using a formal model, Schultz (1998) 
suggests that the presence within a state of an opposition party decreases the ex ante probability 
of war by clearly revealing the state’s preferences. The theory advanced in this paper argues that 
the media performs an analogous informing function. Given the presence of the media, foreign 
observers have multiple sources of information about the political costs of a given foreign policy 
issue (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989). From the perspective of a foreign observer, two sources who 
are in competition are a more reliable indicator than a single source with a vested interest 
(Milgrom 1986).The findings also complement Slantchev’s insight that fighting plays an 
instrumental role together with negotiations to ultimately force convergence between the two 
parties’ beliefs regarding relative strength and resolve (Slantchev 2004). Although he does not 
specifically test the notion, he speculates that outside channels such as the media and 
intelligence-gathering should play an important role in the process of convergence.  
The results also shed light on treatments of democracy in the literature on war. Whereas 
most literature treats democratic institutions as monolithic features of states, the results of this 
study suggest that the media plays a role that is distinct from, but interacts with, democracy. 
Understanding of the precise influence of democratic institutions may benefit from considering 
the news media as a distinct entity separate from democracy.   
The findings suggest that existing research into the causes of war may suffer from 
omitted variable bias. Some previously published studies of the causes of war and/or the 
performance of democracies in war may warrant re-examination in light of the influence of the 
media identified in this study. To the extent that media variables explain some of the variance in 
war outcomes, that may affect the explanatory role of the material and polity factors included in 
  155 
research to date. Variables representing the news media should also be considered in future 
research alongside such familiar factors as troop strength, strategy, regime type and so forth. 
The results find no significant interaction between time and the media variables. This 
finding makes it impossible to precisely determine the direction and magnitude of any modifying 
effect time may have on the influence of the media. However, the failure to find such interaction 
suggests that whatever modifying effect time may have, it is probably small and relatively 
unimportant. Since the research design only includes wars that are underway (as opposed to the 
crisis onset and escalation phases prior to war), this finding may itself be important. Whatever 
informing influence is exerted by the media, the failure to find interaction with time suggests that 
it is of a static rather than dynamic character. That is, the media does not appear to inform 
leaders in a systematic manner as time passes. This suggests that time-varying informing 
mechanisms such as the revelation of new information or changing information about cost 
sensitivity (as in, for example, a leader’s changing assessment of events), or changing 
understanding on the part of the news media are probably not exerting a systematic influence. In 
an example of the latter mechanism, Baum theorizes that a gap between a leader’s private 
knowledge and the public’s understanding narrows over time (Baum and Potter 2008). The fact 
that no significant interaction could be found between time and the media variables suggests that 
neither changing information nor changing understanding on the part of the media is exerting a 
systematic influence on outcomes. Therefore, it can be inferred that the informing influence of 
the media is static with respect to the passage of time. Future research should investigate the 
temporal aspect of the media’s influence.  
The theoretical implications presented here should be considered in future research into 
the influence of the media on war outcomes. The results and methodological hurdles encountered 
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in the course of the study suggest a number of issues that should be further explored. An agenda 
for future research is presented next. 
6.2 AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The results of this study suggest an agenda for future research to both clarify the findings 
presented here and to extend the findings to other domains. Clarifying the findings of the current 
study entail both methodological improvements and a closer examination of some of the 
substantive findings, and these are discussed first.  
A critical shortcoming of this study is the limited strength of the statistical models. This 
is manifested throughout the results in relatively wide confidence intervals which make it 
impossible to distinguish some predictions from others. During the modeling process, it was 
noted that the existing design is constrained in terms of the finite number of observations (war-
years) available from which to draw inferences, and the number of important variables that must 
be considered, based on theory. The existing design is built on the foundation established in 
Bennett and Stam (1998) so that the contribution of the media could be examined in the context 
of all the other factors known to influence war. Future work should build on a new foundation 
that can maximize inferential leverage and yield more precise findings. Several approaches 
deserve consideration in the future, including pooled cross-sectional time series, hierarchical 
linear modeling, and the use of event datasets to examine a large number of observations at a 
more granular level. 
A hierarchical linear model could draw inference from the fact that the dataset consists of 
war-years which form a hierarchy of states and multi-year wars. Many characteristics of states 
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such as size, geographical situation, etc. do not change from year to year or even from war to 
war. On the other hand, some characteristics such as the salience of the issue at hand are specific 
to a particular dyadic conflict. The distinction between these two classes of information may be 
useful in extracting additional inference from the empirical record. 
A more precise model should facilitate examination of the relative role played by the 
factors traditionally associated with warfare – soldiers, terrain, equipment, strategy, etc. – and the 
informational factors that are the subject of the current study. The influence of the news media 
occurs in the context of these other factors and the current study controls for those. But 
understanding the relative importance of information and material factors can have both 
theoretical and policy implications. How does an understanding of the relative role of 
information affect the interpretation of the historical record?  
Future research may be able to draw on event datasets to examine the role of news 
information at a more granular level while at the same time drawing inference from a large 
number of cases. Event datasets present the empirical record in terms of the daily interactions 
between parties, as opposed to the annual aggregation used in this and many other large-N 
studies. As Gary King has noted, “when the Palestinians launch a mortar attack into Israel, the 
Israeli army does not wait until the end of the calendar year to react. Yet, most modern data 
collections are aggregated to the month or year” (King and Lowe 2003, p. 619). Several event 
datasets are available that code individual events to the precise day they occur, coded according 
to which actors are involved, and the nature of the action. The data are typically coded by 
computer from wire service reports such as Reuters. Drawing on such a more granular source of 
data, the role of the media in crisis onset or in bargaining interactions could perhaps be modeled. 
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A research design challenge in doing so is that most event datasets20
The results suggest that the influence of the media is not systematically modified by the 
passage of time during an ongoing conflict. This finding is puzzling in that presumably the media 
influences leaders’ assessments of relative cost sensitivity during the crisis onset and escalation 
phases prior to war. Once the parties fail to locate a mutually acceptable settlement and opt for 
war, it would seem that any static influence the media might exert would have already occurred. 
Therefore, what would be the ongoing static influence the media might have as leaders engage in 
the ongoing bargaining and fighting that comprise war? Future research should undertake to 
more clearly identify the precise direction and magnitude of any interaction between time and the 
media variables to first confirm the non-findings of this study. Should the lack of interaction be 
confirmed, theoretical exploration should consider the mechanisms whereby the media could 
exert an influence that does not vary with time. Finally, empirical testing should be undertaken to 
test any such theoretical explanations.  
 are based on media reports 
and thus pose a circularity problem as regards determining the influence of the media.  
The results regarding the influence of media speed require further exploration. The 
influence of media speed in isolation suggested by the results contradicts the theory advanced in 
this paper and is quite surprising. Preliminary examinations of the influence of media speed in 
the context of the other media variables suggest that the surprising findings may be a 
consequence of the conceptual framework and research design used in this study. However, 
additional theoretical investigation may be warranted. To the extent that media speed plays a 
different informing role than what is predicted by the theory, what could that role be? On the 
other hand, it is possible that media speed does not have an informing function at all and its 
                                                 
20 See, for example, (King and Lowe 2003) or (Reuveny and Kang 1996). 
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influence must be understood within a different conceptual framework. Theoretical exploration 
of these issues should be undertaken followed by appropriate empirical testing to clarify the role 
of media speed.  
The research design used in this study suggests that the influence of the media on the 
probability of losing is low, but is unable to clearly predict the direction and extent of that 
influence. Future research should explore the theoretical basis for the apparent difference in 
media influence on losing as compared to the influence on winning. Formal modeling or other 
theoretical explorations should examine whether and how the informing influence of media 
primarily affects the prospects for victory. As noted in the discussion above, it is possible that the 
differing results are an artifact of the particular research design and dataset used in this study. 
The relative scarcity of ‘lose’ outcomes in the dataset undoubtedly contribute to the model’s 
inability to confidently predict how the independent variables influence that outcome. So an 
exploration of the issue using a different dataset may provide a more satisfactory explanation. In 
general, though, exploration of the possible theoretical explanations for the difference followed 
by an empirical examination using an appropriate model and dataset are required to more clearly 
understand this aspect of the results.  
The current study explicitly excludes from consideration the content of news reports that 
are distributed by the international news media. The content of news reports can, generally 
speaking, contain information about the particular political costs a leader is incurring in pursuit 
of particular policies as reflected in elite and popular opinion regarding policies. Case studies 
must be conducted on a range of cases to identify the specific causal mechanisms at work and 
determine the extent to which they reflect the behaviors predicted by the theory advanced in this 
dissertation. To the extent possible, such case studies should attempt to identify how the presence 
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of the media, unfolding events, and the reporting of those events influence the beliefs of leaders 
engaged in war. Doing so requires access to personal correspondence or private diaries of leaders 
and a systematic examination of those records within the context of the historical, diplomatic and 
journalistic history of a given conflict. Case studies should be designed that can isolate the 
influence of the broad presence of the media from the specific influence of particular reporting 
on particular events. Such a design should strive to determine the relative contribution of the 
‘media as the message’, as suggested by McLuhan, compared to reporting on specific facts in the 
context of an ongoing conflict.  
Although the availability of public opinion polls in particular states was originally 
included in the design, data limitations dictated that polling be dropped. The relatively recent 
emergence and the limited spread of scientific opinion polling mean that this data is available for 
a relatively few countries. But future research should consider incorporating polling results or 
news content analysis to facilitate a closer examination of select cases. Such research could more 
closely identify the causal mechanisms beneath the influence of the news media. It could also 
identify boundaries within which the phenomenon appears to function, confounding factors that 
may be at work, and other limitations in the influence of the media. 
The results of this study clearly show that the media influences the outcome of wars. The 
results also suggest how the various dimensions of the media appear to contribute to that 
influence. However, because the current study was an initial foray into the nature and extent of 
the media’s influence, the research design employed in the current study was not sufficiently 
focused on the development of critical tests regarding the media’s influence. However, with the 
results of the current study in hand, future research should seek to design and conduct critical 
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tests that can clearly support or reject competing theoretical explanations for the influence of the 
media. 
In addition to future research designed to clarify the findings, future research should also 
be undertaken that extends the findings of this study to other domains. The current study is 
limited to the examination of wars that occur between 1823 and 1990. The information 
environment surrounding interstate wars has clearly evolved in the past 20 years and should be 
examined. A critical first step is to collect data on the emergence of the media over the past two 
decades in order to determine whether recent shifts in the media landscape affect the findings of 
the current study. Further research should employ one or more of the research techniques 
touched on below to examine this more recent period. Both media speeds and media types have 
continued to advance as broadcast television has given way to cable and satellite distribution as 
well as the ubiquity of the internet. The relative roles of media speed and media type identified in 
the current study should definitely be explored in the context of the contemporary environment. 
Furthermore, such research should consider whether the changing international scene since the 
end of the Cold War influences the role of the media.  
The international news media is conceived in the current study as an outside channel of 
information which complements the fighting and negotiations that comprise war. Slantchev 
(2004) has proposed that both media and intelligence-gathering perform similar functions in this 
regard. However, unlike the international news media, clandestine collection of intelligence has 
been a feature of the international political landscape for centuries. Examination of the role of 
intelligence-gathering must begin by clearly defining the qualitative and quantitative variation in 
the norms, practices and techniques of the field over some period of time. Such variation could 
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then be examined to identify and test the extent to which intelligence is linked to war outcomes 
in the fashion that the media appears to be.  
Future research should consider the role of the media during crisis onset and escalation. 
Whereas the current study only examines the role of the media in the outcome of wars, the media 
likely also plays a role in the exchange of threats and demands prior to the use of force. Research 
should consider how the informing influence of the media identified in this study affects the 
exchanges between leaders during crisis information be conducted using a dataset. Exploration 
of the findings using database such as MIDS could accomplish this goal. Another possible 
avenue for exploring the crisis onset phase could be the use of an event dataset which captures 
the detailed daily exchanges between leaders that occur through a variety of channels.  
Policy implications flowing from the results of this study are discussed next. 
6.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Observers of democracy have long debated the proper role for the public in matters of foreign 
policy. Commenting on the young American republic, de Tocqueville anticipated that 
democracies would face difficulty conducting foreign policy. He predicted that “defects inherent 
in democratic institutions are brought to light in the conduct of foreign affairs.” But he also 
observed that the “constitution entrusts the permanent direction of the external interests of the 
nation to the president and the senate which tends in some degree to detach foreign policy from 
the direct control of the people” (de Tocqueville 1839, p. 229). Many contemporary leaders and 
commentators share de Tocqueville’s apprehension about robust public debates and their 
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widespread publication via the news media. According to this view, media reports about such 
debates provide ‘aid and comfort to the enemy.’ 
But the results of this study suggest that states with an advanced, independent news 
media may have a higher probability of winning the wars they initiate. The probability of 
winning is higher for democracies, and becomes higher still, the more democratic the type 
government. The influence of the media on the probability of winning appears to be 
considerable, on the same order of magnitude as such known factors as troop strength, terrain 
and choice of strategy.  
The results of this study suggest that the open debate itself contributes to the prospects 
for success in war, possibly by both constraining domestic leaders and by enhancing the 
credibility of leaders’ statements of resolve. The results are in concert with Ambrose’ argument 
that “secrecy and surprise are the enemies of democracy; open and prolonged debate is the great 
power of democracy” (Ambrose 1991, p. 136). 
The findings of this dissertation represent an initial foray into examining the influence of 
the media on war outcomes. As such, it is premature to drive policy based on the findings. 
Nevertheless, there are important policy implications flowing from the findings. 
A general implication of these results for democratic leaders is that while media reporting 
about criticism of policies may be unwelcome, uncomfortable, and costly in domestic political 
terms, it may at the same time serve an important role in constraining the actions and threats 
undertaken by domestic leaders and/or in helping to credibly communicate resolve to enemy 
leaders.  
More specifically, the conventional wisdom that the media negatively influences the 
prospects for victory across the board appears to be unsubstantiated. To the extent that the 
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conventional view is deeply embedded in the leadership and operations of important institutions 
of government and society, it is likely that a wide variety of policies may exist that 
unquestioningly hamper the function of the media where national security is concerned. 
Therefore, an initial policy priority is to survey the formal and informal policies that curb the 
effective function of the media as a precursor to determining how such policies should change.  
While examining the range of policies that may limit the functioning of the press, it must 
be borne in mind that the findings of this dissertation pertain to the signaling of relative strength 
and resolve at the strategic level by leaders facing one another over issues and wars. At the same 
time the media is apparently participating in such strategic signaling, it is also motivated to 
uncover and report tactical details of war-fighting such as troop movements, overall capacities, 
and the like. The empirical record is full of examples of such revelation, including The Times of 
London reporting on troop conditions and movements during the Crimean War. While the 
revelation of such details is beyond the specific focus of this study, it seems intuitively obvious 
that revealing such details may pose important perils to the prospects for victory. How a press 
motivated to gather and distribute news reports about wars distinguishes the strategic function 
from the tactical one is a daunting challenge. Further research to determine where the strategic 
signaling leaves off and revealing tactical details picks up must be a priority so that policy 
priorities can be shaped with both dynamics in mind.  
The strategic impact of the media as suggested by the findings here must be considered 
against the backdrop of a changing media landscape. Several important changes are underway in 
the media landscape that should be considered. Since the beginning of the emergence of the 
media, the balance of power between states and the media has been shifting, and today is no 
different. At the same time new technologies appear to give the press new means of gathering 
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and distributing news despite state preferences to the contrary, those same technologies are often 
themselves under the control of states. How the balance between states and the media unfolds 
has implications for the existence of a robust media that may in unappreciated ways contribute to 
foreign policy success.  
The balance of power between states and the media is best observed in shiting press 
freedoms around the world. According to Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press index 
(Freedom 2003), after two decades of progress, press freedom is now in decline in almost every 
part of the world. Only 17 percent of the world's citizens live in countries that enjoy a free press. 
In the rest of the world, governments as well as non-state actors control the viewpoints that reach 
citizens and brutally repress independent voices who aim to promote accountability, good 
governance, and economic development. The negative trend is exemplified by recent Iranian 
assault on press freedoms, Chinese internet restrictions and the rise of so-called ‘libel tourism’ 
wherein wealthy individuals from repressive regions use the permissive British courts to silence 
critics. A survey conducted over 15 years ago by the Pew Center (Pew Charitable Trusts. Office 
of the 1994) suggests that public support for press freedoms – even among developed countries – 
has been mixed for some time. Surveying the public in eight countries of North America and 
Western Europe, Pew found that the public generally credit the news media for its positive 
overall impact. Large majorities of respondents reported that the press helps their democracies 
and exerts a good influence on their societies. But the survey also found surprising levels of 
public support for government restrictions on the press. The abstract concept of censorship was 
rejected by most North Americans as well as the French, Germans, Italians, Spaniards and 
British. But when questioned about specific types of stories, “respondents in all nations surveyed 
favored limits on press freedom for reasons ranging from protecting military secrets to reducing 
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portrayals of sex and violence in the media.” (Times Mirror Center for the and the 1994) 
Restrictions on press freedom aimed at discouraging terrorism drew strong majorities in seven of 
the eight countries. Similarly, strong majorities in most of the countries surveyed favored 
censorship to protect military secrets. These attitudes are undoubtedly influenced by the 
conventional wisdom that is at the heart of this dissertation. But nevertheless, they reflect a 
longstanding permissive attitude on the part of the public toward increased state control over the 
media.  
States in general, and the US government in particular, likely take advantage of 
permissive public attitudes toward press restrictions. Within the United States, the Freedom of 
Information Act was passed in 1966 to ensure public access to government documents. In recent 
decades, FOIA has come under attack by successive administrations seeking to conceal 
information from historians and the public in general. The National Security Archive, a, 
independent and non-governmental research institute and library located at The George 
Washington University (National Security, George Washington University. Institute for 
European, and Eurasian 2008), reports that the rate of decisions to classify documents has 
skyrocketed from around 7 million documents classified in 2001 to nearly 25 million documents 
classified in 2007. Similarly, rates of declassification of document have fallen from a peak of 
over 250 million pages declassified per year in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War to 
around 25 million pages in 2007. Underlying the rise in secrecy is a revision of the Executive 
Order on Classified National Security Information in 2003 that eliminates the commitment to 
open government that formerly guided declassification decisions and eliminates the bias toward 
declassification when officials are in doubt. Beyond formal means of discouraging 
declassification, the National Security Archives points to a trend toward defunding the 
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declassification and open records apparatus within the federal government, effectively delaying 
by years or decades the processing of public requests (National Security, George Washington 
University. Institute for European, and Eurasian 2008). To the extent that openness contributes to 
the functions performed by the media that are the subject of this dissertation, these trends 
regarding records declassification suggest that the media contribution to leaders’ signaling are 
likely to be hindered for some time to come.  
In addition to shifting balance of power between states and the media, the very nature of 
the media is changing in profound ways with the atomization of large media conglomerates and 
the rise of so-called citizen journalism in the form of blogs, twitter feeds and so forth. For most 
of the past two centuries, media conglomerates performed a public good by investing in and 
adhering in varying degrees to journalistic standards designed to promote accurate, responsible 
reporting. The smaller, more nimble news start-ups of today do not necessarily share the lofty 
goals embodied in such standards and may not be in an economic position to invest in them 
regardless. A rare instance counter to the overall trend is the recent decision by Google to pull 
search operations out of mainland China in response to interference and censorship by the state 
(O'Rourke, Harris, and Ogilvy 2007). To the extent Google is able to maintain its stance in the 
face of government and competitive pressures, it is a rare bright spot in an otherwise largely 
negative trend regarding the balance of power between the media and states.  
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6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This dissertation has examined the question: To what extent does the international news media 
influence interstate wars? It considers the longstanding charge that media reports of public 
debates about foreign policy provide ‘aid and comfort to the enemy.’ 
New theory is proposed that addresses this policy problem facing democracies, and also 
addresses gaps in the theoretical literature on the causes of war. The theory advanced here argues 
that the presence of the international news media should influence the outcome of wars by 
providing an additional channel through which information about leaders’ cost sensitivity is 
revealed and by reciprocally influencing the beliefs and behavior of leaders and their foreign 
adversaries in the conduct of wars. Novel variables representing five major phases in the 
emergence of the international news media are defined. Original research is conducted using 
primary and secondary sources to characterize the media by year in individual states. The novel 
media variables are combined with variables from other studies to create a dataset spanning 90 
interstate wars involving 51 different states from 1823 through 1990. Hypotheses based on the 
theory are tested using a multinomial logistic regression model.   
The findings show partial support for the theory in that the type of media in a war 
initiator state is strongly and significantly associated with a higher probability of winning. 
Unexpected findings regarding the influence of media speed on the probability of winning, and a 
failure to find a relationship between media and the probability of losing require further 
investigation. Overall, however, the presence of the international news media appears to 
influence the outcome of interstate wars.  
The results have important implications for future theoretical research as well as for 
policy choices regarding the proper role of domestic debates and media reporting thereof. 
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Additional research is required to confirm the findings, examine the unexpected findings, and to 
examine the relevance of the findings in other eras and other phases of war. Deeply rooted 
assumptions within society that media reporting on wars conflicts with national security interests 
must be revisited as part of an examination of policy implications of the findings.   
As for the question that initially inspired this research, this dissertation finds, somewhat 
in contradiction to the conventional wisdom, that states with a robust, independent media appear 
to have a higher probability of winning the wars they initiate. 
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Appendix A  
APPENDIX A 
POPULATION OF CASES 
Table 7 - 1. Population of Cases 
Case  
# 
Year 
Start State A State B 
Year 
End 
# of 
Observations  
(War-Years) 
1 1823 France Spain 1823 1 
2 1828 Russia Turkey 1829 2 
3 1846 United States of America Mexico 1848 3 
4 1848 Italy Austria-Hungary 1849 2 
5 1848 Germany Denmark 1848 1 
6 1849 France Papal States 1849 1 
7 1851 Brazil Argentina 1852 2 
8 1853 Russia Turkey 1856 4 
9 1856 United Kingdom Iran 1857 2 
10 1859 Austria-Hungary France 1859 1 
11 1859 Spain Morocco 1860 2 
12 1860 Italy Papal States 1860 1 
13 1860 Italy Two Sicilies 1860 1 
14 1862 France Mexico 1867 6 
15 1863 Colombia Ecuador 1863 Dropped 
16 1864 Germany Austria-Hungary 1864 Dropped 
17 1864 Paraguay Brazil 1870 7 
18 1865 Chile Spain 1866 2 
19 1866 Germany Austria-Hungary 1866 1 
20 1870 France Germany 1871 2 
21 1877 Russia Turkey 1877 1 
22 1879 Chile Peru 1883 5 
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Table 7-1. Population of Cases (continued) 
Case  
# 
Year 
Start State A State B 
Year 
End 
# of 
Observations  
(War-Years) 
23 1883 France China 1885 3 
24 1885 Guatemala El Salvador 1885 1 
25 1885 Yugoslavia Bulgaria 1885 Dropped 
26 1894 Japan China 1895 2 
27 1897 Greece Turkey 1897 1 
28 1898 United States of America Spain 1898 1 
29 1900 United Kingdom China 1901 2 
30 1904 Japan Russia 1905 2 
31 1906 Guatemala El Salvador 1906 1 
32 1907 Nicaragua El Salvador 1907 1 
33 1909 Spain Morocco 1909 1 
34 1911 Italy Turkey 1912 2 
35 1912 Bulgaria Turkey 1913 2 
36 1913 Turkey Bulgaria 1913 1 
37 1914 Germany Belgium 1914 1 
38 1914 Germany Russia 1917 4 
39 1914 Germany United Kingdom 1918 5 
40 1919 Czechoslovakia Hungary 1919 1 
41 1919 Greece Turkey 1922 4 
42 1920 Poland Russia 1920 1 
43 1929 Russia China 1929 1 
44 1931 Japan China 1933 3 
45 1932 Paraguay Bolivia 1935 4 
46 1935 Italy Ethiopia 1936 2 
47 1937 Japan China 1945 9 
48 1938 Russia Japan 1938 1 
49 1938 Germany Czechoslovakia 1938 1 
50 1938 Germany Austria 1938 1 
51 1939 Germany Poland 1939 1 
52 1939 Japan Russia 1939 1 
53 1939 Russia Finland 1939 1 
54 1940 Germany Belgium 1940 1 
55 1940 Germany Netherlands 1940 1 
56 1940 Germany Denmark 1940 1 
57 1940 Germany Norway 1940 1 
58 1940 Germany France 1940 1 
59 1940 Italy Greece 1940 1 
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Table 7-1. Population of Cases (continued) 
Case  
# 
Year 
Start State A State B 
Year 
End 
# of 
Observations  
(War-Years) 
60 1940 United Kingdom Germany 1945 6 
61 1940 Thailand France 1940 1 
62 1941 Japan United States of America 1945 5 
63 1941 Germany Russia 1945 5 
64 1941 Germany Yugoslavia 1941 1 
65 1941 Germany Greece 1941 1 
66 1946 Vietnam France 1954 9 
67 1947 Pakistan India 1948 2 
68 1948 Egypt Israel 1948 1 
69 1950 North Korea United States of America 1953 4 
70 1956 Russia Hungary 1956 1 
71 1956 United Kingdom Egypt 1956 1 
72 1962 China India 1962 1 
73 1963 Vietnam Republic of Vietnam 1973 11 
74 1965 India Pakistan 1965 1 
75 1967 Israel Egypt 1967 1 
76 1969 El Salvador Honduras 1969 1 
77 1970 Egypt Israel 1970 1 
78 1971 India Pakistan 1971 1 
79 1973 Egypt Israel 1973 1 
80 1974 Turkey Cyprus 1974 1 
81 1975 Vietnam Republic of Vietnam 1975 1 
82 1977 Vietnam Cambodia 1989 13 
83 1977 Somalia Ethiopia 1978 Dropped 
84 1978 Uganda Tanzania 1979 Dropped 
85 1979 China Vietnam 1979 1 
86 1980 Iraq Iran 1988 9 
87 1982 Argentina United Kingdom 1982 1 
88 1982 Israel Syria 1982 1 
89 1985 China Vietnam 1990 6 
90 1986 Vietnam China 1987 2 
  
Total Number Observations: 193 
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Appendix B 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
This appendix presents the analysis required to develop a model of the influence of the 
international news media on war outcomes. Model development is guided first and foremost by 
theory but also draws on modeling recommendations from Hosmer and others. Model 
development proceeds in four stages. First, a baseline model drawing on Bennett & Stam is 
established representing the current state of knowledge about the influences on war outcomes. 
Second, the media variables developed in this study are simply added to Bennett & Stam’s model 
to examine their contributions. Third, variables from Bennett & Stam’s existing study are 
selectively chosen to include as controls in a model that can more effectively test the hypotheses. 
Fourth, media variables (both main-effect and interaction-effects) are added to the control 
variables to yield a model suitable for the purposes of this study. At each stage of model 
development, variables are selected for inclusion based on theory and on their contributions to 
the strength of the model. The process proceeds in an iterative fashion, adding and removing 
variables, assessing the fit of the model, and so on until a suitable model is arrived at. The first 
step is an examination of the variables in a univariable context.  
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B.1 UNIVARIABLE ANALYSIS 
Scatterplots are created of each variable to identify potential separation problems, 
transformations required, etc. Scatterplot output is omitted in the interest of brevity. Following 
Hosmer (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2004), all variables are first examined on a univariate basis, 
starting with nominal variables: 
Nominal Variables 
Variables from Bennett & Stam (1998) 
 
 
 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(3) =  18.2962   Pr = 0.000
          Pearson chi2(3) =  17.3476   Pr = 0.001
     Total         172         21         193 
                                             
         3          19          0          19 
         2          15          0          15 
         1          37         13          50 
         0         101          8         109 
                                             
   outcome           0          1       Total
                    winstr
. tab outcome winstr, chi2 lrchi2
 likelihood-ratio chi2(3) =  19.3663   Pr = 0.000
          Pearson chi2(3) =  15.5034   Pr = 0.001
     Total         157         36         193 
                                             
         3          12          7          19 
         2          13          2          15 
         1          49          1          50 
         0          83         26         109 
                                             
   outcome           0          1       Total
                    losestr
. tab outcome losestr, chi2 lrchi2
 likelihood-ratio chi2(3) =   2.8666   Pr = 0.413
          Pearson chi2(3) =   2.5800   Pr = 0.461
     Total          57        136         193 
                                             
         3           7         12          19 
         2           2         13          15 
         1          14         36          50 
         0          34         75         109 
                                             
   outcome           0          1       Total
                    drawstr
. tab outcome drawstr, chi2 lrchi2
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This analysis reveals a numerical issue with the variable winstr. There are zero cases of 
winstr=1 for outcome=2 or outcome=3, which is a form of separation. This issue must be 
addressed during the modeling process.  
Media variables  
 
 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(3) =   2.4310   Pr = 0.488
          Pearson chi2(3) =   2.6061   Pr = 0.456
     Total          25        168         193 
                                             
         3           4         15          19 
         2           3         12          15 
         1           7         43          50 
         0          11         98         109 
                                             
   outcome           0          1       Total
                    salient
. tab outcome salient, chi2 lrchi2
 likelihood-ratio chi2(3) =   2.3654   Pr = 0.500
          Pearson chi2(3) =   2.5644   Pr = 0.464
     Total          21        172         193 
                                             
         3           2         17          19 
         2           3         12          15 
         1           7         43          50 
         0           9        100         109 
                                             
   outcome           0          1       Total
                   saliento
. tab outcome saliento, chi2 lrchi2
 likelihood-ratio chi2(3) =   1.0800   Pr = 0.782
          Pearson chi2(3) =   0.8239   Pr = 0.844
     Total           2        191         193 
                                             
  Init Los           0         19          19 
      Draw           0         15          15 
  Init Win           1         49          50 
  Continue           1        108         109 
                                             
  outcome2           0          1       Total
                   MAvail_I
. tabulate outcome2 mavail_i, chi2 lrchi2
 likelihood-ratio chi2(3) =   2.8264   Pr = 0.419
          Pearson chi2(3) =   1.5985   Pr = 0.660
     Total          16        177         193 
                                             
  Init Los           2         17          19 
      Draw           0         15          15 
  Init Win           4         46          50 
  Continue          10         99         109 
                                             
  outcome2           0          1       Total
                   MAvail_T
. tabulate outcome2 mavail_t, chi2 lrchi2
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likelihood-ratio chi2(12) =  22.4794   Pr = 0.032
         Pearson chi2(12) =  22.6873   Pr = 0.031
     Total          17         19         52         69         36         193 
                                                                              
         3           5          1          4          6          3          19 
         2           0          3          1          7          4          15 
         1           3          9         15         18          5          50 
         0           9          6         32         38         24         109 
                                                                              
   outcome           1          2          3          4          5       Total
                                   Mtype_IRTV
. tab outcome mtype_irtv, chi2 lrchi2
likelihood-ratio chi2(12) =  17.8803   Pr = 0.119
         Pearson chi2(12) =  15.9468   Pr = 0.194
     Total          28         19         43         63         40         193 
                                                                              
         3           4          1          5          6          3          19 
         2           0          3          1          5          6          15 
         1          11          7         10         16          6          50 
         0          13          8         27         36         25         109 
                                                                              
   outcome           1          2          3          4          5       Total
                                   Mtype_TRTV
. tab outcome mtype_trtv, chi2 lrchi2
 likelihood-ratio chi2(3) =   0.7400   Pr = 0.864
          Pearson chi2(3) =   0.7761   Pr = 0.855
     Total         182         11         193 
                                             
         3          18          1          19 
         2          14          1          15 
         1          46          4          50 
         0         104          5         109 
                                             
   outcome           0          1       Total
                    Poll_I
. tabulate outcome   poll_i, chi2 lrchi2
 likelihood-ratio chi2(3) =   1.6663   Pr = 0.644
          Pearson chi2(3) =   2.0102   Pr = 0.570
     Total         178         15         193 
                                             
         3          16          3          19 
         2          14          1          15 
         1          46          4          50 
         0         102          7         109 
                                             
   outcome           0          1       Total
                    Poll_T
. tabulate outcome   poll_t, chi2 lrchi2
 likelihood-ratio chi2(6) =   9.2841   Pr = 0.158
          Pearson chi2(6) =   9.6733   Pr = 0.139
     Total         113         51         29         193 
                                                        
         3          10          3          6          19 
         2           8          6          1          15 
         1          29         17          4          50 
         0          66         25         18         109 
                                                        
   outcome           1          2          3       Total
                         Mindep_T
. tab outcome  mindep_t, chi2 lrchi2
 likelihood-ratio chi2(6) =   6.7406   Pr = 0.346
          Pearson chi2(6) =   7.0153   Pr = 0.319
     Total         132         55          6         193 
                                                        
         3          12          6          1          19 
         2           9          5          1          15 
         1          29         20          1          50 
         0          82         24          3         109 
                                                        
   outcome           1          2          3       Total
                         Mindep_I
. tab outcome  mindep_i, chi2 lrchi2
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This analysis reveal a numerical issue with the mavail variables – there is complete 
separation because there are zero instances of mavail_I=0 for outcome=draw or outcome=init 
lose. There is quasi-complete separation of mavail_t in that there are zero instances of 
mavail_t=0 for outcome=draw and only two instances for outcome=init lose. The separation is so 
severe that the mavail variables will have to be dropped from any further consideration.  
This analysis also suggests that Poll cannot be used because it is far too rare among the 
193 cases. Thus, it will not be possible to evaluate the influence of polling in this model. 
Variables for which p>.25 are candidates for inclusion in a preliminary model. This 
analysis suggests that winstr losestr initiator media type, target media type, target media 
independence should be considered based on their level of association. Other variables that do 
not exhibit univariate correlation may nevertheless be considered for inclusion based on theory. 
From this point forward, the strategy variables are renamed such that winstr=Istr_1, 
drawstr=Istr_2, and losestr=Istr_3 
Continuous Variables 
Next, the univariate analysis continues with an examination of the continuous variables: 
Variables from Bennett & Stam (1998) 
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(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.346069     .33761    -3.99   0.000    -2.007772   -.6843653
        time    -.0147131   .0098865    -1.49   0.137    -.0340904    .0046641
3             
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.222007   .4093449    -5.43   0.000    -3.024309   -1.419706
        time       .00628   .0073675     0.85   0.394    -.0081601      .02072
2             
                                                                              
       _cons     .1583867   .2426685     0.65   0.514    -.3172349    .6340082
        time    -.0515893   .0125926    -4.10   0.000    -.0762704   -.0269083
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -194.85105                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0817
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =      34.65
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome time, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons     .2188952   .1991624     1.10   0.272     -.171456    .6092464
        time    -.0190992    .005833    -3.27   0.001    -.0305316   -.0076668
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -125.58961                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0497
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0003
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =      13.13
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -125.58961
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -125.5902
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -125.75237
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -132.15368
. logit outcome time
(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.085656   .4231824    -2.57   0.010    -1.915078   -.2562338
    rterrain    -2.125548   1.218536    -1.74   0.081    -4.513834    .2627388
3             
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.349543   .7764558    -4.31   0.000    -4.871368   -1.827717
    rterrain     3.240562    1.55002     2.09   0.037     .2025784    6.278547
2             
                                                                              
       _cons    -.8790875   .3477119    -2.53   0.011     -1.56059   -.1975848
    rterrain     .2747819   .8291152     0.33   0.740    -1.350254    1.899818
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -207.50728                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0220
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0251
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =       9.34
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome rterrain, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons    -.3270462   .2901874    -1.13   0.260    -.8958029    .2417106
    rterrain     .1841342   .6944888     0.27   0.791    -1.177039    1.545307
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  -132.1185                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0003
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.7908
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.07
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -132.1185
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -132.1185
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -132.15368
. logit outcome  rterrain
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(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.361416   .3127841    -4.35   0.000    -1.974461   -.7483702
      sumpop    -2.43e-06   1.55e-06    -1.57   0.117    -5.47e-06    6.10e-07
3             
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.375496   .3818789    -6.22   0.000    -3.123965   -1.627027
      sumpop     1.32e-06   7.45e-07     1.77   0.076    -1.39e-07    2.78e-06
2             
                                                                              
       _cons    -.5120472   .2149947    -2.38   0.017    -.9334291   -.0906654
      sumpop    -1.50e-06   8.16e-07    -1.83   0.067    -3.10e-06    1.03e-07
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -206.32342                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0276
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0085
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =      11.71
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome  sumpop, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1247207    .181653    -0.69   0.492     -.480754    .2313125
      sumpop    -6.75e-07   5.55e-07    -1.22   0.224    -1.76e-06    4.13e-07
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -131.38188                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0058
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.2141
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       1.54
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
. logit outcome  sumpop, nolog
(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.771259    .311543    -5.69   0.000    -2.381872   -1.160646
     summper     7.79e-06   .0000592     0.13   0.895    -.0001082    .0001237
3             
                                                                              
       _cons     -1.85747   .3417646    -5.43   0.000    -2.527316   -1.187623
     summper    -.0000462   .0000813    -0.57   0.570    -.0002055    .0001131
2             
                                                                              
       _cons    -.6247117    .212788    -2.94   0.003    -1.041768    -.207655
     summper    -.0000584    .000051    -1.14   0.252    -.0001583    .0000416
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -211.28229                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0042
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.6177
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =       1.79
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome  summper, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons     -.156187   .1808534    -0.86   0.388    -.5106531    .1982791
     summper    -.0000375   .0000395    -0.95   0.342     -.000115    .0000399
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -131.68552                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0035
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.3332
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.94
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
. logit outcome  summper, nolog
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(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.627083   .5013128    -3.25   0.001    -2.609638   -.6445281
      bofadj    -.2590629   .9540056    -0.27   0.786     -2.12888    1.610754
3             
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.502677   .6141368    -4.08   0.000    -3.706363   -1.298991
      bofadj     1.022644      1.024     1.00   0.318    -.9843601    3.029648
2             
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.507848   .4692842    -5.34   0.000    -3.427628   -1.588068
      bofadj     2.989004   .7003761     4.27   0.000     1.616292    4.361716
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -201.05311                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0524
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0001
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =      22.25
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome bofadj, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.239266   .3371708    -3.68   0.000    -1.900108   -.5784232
      bofadj     1.818585   .5534192     3.29   0.001      .733903    2.903266
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -126.47341                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0430
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0008
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =      11.36
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
. logit outcome bofadj, nolog
(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.595201   .3107333    -5.13   0.000    -2.204227   -.9861749
    distance    -.0000855   .0001158    -0.74   0.461    -.0003125    .0001415
3             
                                                                              
       _cons     -1.93617   .3458537    -5.60   0.000    -2.614031    -1.25831
    distance    -.0000242   .0001106    -0.22   0.827    -.0002409    .0001926
2             
                                                                              
       _cons    -.5984151   .2143674    -2.79   0.005    -1.018567   -.1782628
    distance    -.0001047   .0000806    -1.30   0.194    -.0002627    .0000532
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -211.08284                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0052
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.5346
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =       2.19
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome distance, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons     -.112346   .1823884    -0.62   0.538    -.4698207    .2451287
    distance    -.0000832   .0000637    -1.31   0.191    -.0002081    .0000416
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -131.25199                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0068
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1793
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       1.80
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
. logit outcome distance, nolog
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(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons      -1.1697   .6965372    -1.68   0.093    -2.534888     .195488
     repress    -.1554364   .1799786    -0.86   0.388    -.5081881    .1973152
3             
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.855714   .9928956    -2.88   0.004    -4.801754   -.9096748
     repress     .2162703   .2289632     0.94   0.345    -.2324893    .6650299
2             
                                                                              
       _cons    -.2199918   .4898969    -0.45   0.653    -1.180172    .7401885
     repress    -.1504313   .1250157    -1.20   0.229    -.3954576     .094595
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -210.44047                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0082
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.3245
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =       3.47
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome repress, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons     .0892123    .429148     0.21   0.835    -.7519023    .9303269
     repress    -.0927345   .1073119    -0.86   0.388     -.303062    .1175929
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  -131.7798                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0028
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.3872
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.75
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
. logit outcome repress, nolog
(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons      -1.1697   .6965372    -1.68   0.093    -2.534888     .195488
     repress    -.1554364   .1799786    -0.86   0.388    -.5081881    .1973152
3             
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.855714   .9928956    -2.88   0.004    -4.801754   -.9096748
     repress     .2162703   .2289632     0.94   0.345    -.2324893    .6650299
2             
                                                                              
       _cons    -.2199918   .4898969    -0.45   0.653    -1.180172    .7401885
     repress    -.1504313   .1250157    -1.20   0.229    -.3954576     .094595
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -210.44047                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0082
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.3245
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =       3.47
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome repress, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons    -.2643387   .3950998    -0.67   0.503     -1.03872    .5100426
    represso      .001132   .1092417     0.01   0.992    -.2129778    .2152419
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -132.15362                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0000
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.9917
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.00
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
. logit outcome represso, nolog
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(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.766431   .3128149    -5.65   0.000    -2.379537   -1.153325
       democ     .0084616   .0813201     0.10   0.917    -.1509228     .167846
3             
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.897796   .3353673    -5.66   0.000    -2.555104   -1.240488
       democ    -.0408975   .0975761    -0.42   0.675    -.2321432    .1503482
2             
                                                                              
       _cons    -.9933061   .2260062    -4.40   0.000     -1.43627   -.5503421
       democ     .0801959   .0524603     1.53   0.126    -.0226245    .1830163
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -210.73055                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0068
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.4087
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =       2.89
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome democ, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons    -.3742622   .1859382    -2.01   0.044    -.7386944     -.00983
       democ     .0456984   .0461539     0.99   0.322    -.0447617    .1361584
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -131.66293                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0037
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.3218
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.98
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
. logit outcome democ, nolog
(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.979234   .3299241    -6.00   0.000    -2.625873   -1.332594
      democo      .076873    .063538     1.21   0.226    -.0476592    .2014053
3             
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.055402   .3470062    -5.92   0.000    -2.735522   -1.375283
      democo     .0269744   .0752428     0.36   0.720    -.1204988    .1744476
2             
                                                                              
       _cons    -.8225371   .2126244    -3.87   0.000    -1.239273    -.405801
      democo      .016582   .0478856     0.35   0.729     -.077272    .1104361
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -211.45998                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0034
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.6980
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =       1.43
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome democo, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons    -.3505871   .1821916    -1.92   0.054     -.707676    .0065018
      democo     .0331793   .0401593     0.83   0.409    -.0455315      .11189
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -131.81279                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0026
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.4090
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.68
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
. logit outcome democo, nolog
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Media variables: 
 
(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.766477   .2564553    -6.89   0.000     -2.26912   -1.263834
    surpdiff     -1.78524   5.023244    -0.36   0.722    -11.63062    8.060137
3             
                                                                              
       _cons     -1.98469   .2803361    -7.08   0.000    -2.534139   -1.435242
    surpdiff    -.1541675   5.716732    -0.03   0.978    -11.35876    11.05042
2             
                                                                              
       _cons    -.8546237   .1799979    -4.75   0.000    -1.207413   -.5018343
    surpdiff     11.42061   3.538621     3.23   0.001     4.485041    18.35618
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -204.51415                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0361
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0016
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =      15.32
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome surpdiff, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons    -.2668288   .1475437    -1.81   0.071    -.5560091    .0223516
    surpdiff     6.619235   2.855776     2.32   0.020     1.022017    12.21645
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  -129.0006                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0239
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0120
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       6.31
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
. logit outcome surpdiff, nolog
(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.232327    .472436    -2.61   0.009    -2.158284   -.3063691
   mspeed_iA    -.0273691   .0226671    -1.21   0.227    -.0717957    .0170575
3             
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.377889   .6706979    -3.55   0.000    -3.692432   -1.063345
   mspeed_iA     .0184518   .0276325     0.67   0.504    -.0357069    .0726106
2             
                                                                              
       _cons    -.2636384   .3349405    -0.79   0.431    -.9201096    .3928329
   mspeed_iA    -.0274335   .0157386    -1.74   0.081    -.0582807    .0034137
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -209.67408                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0118
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1715
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =       5.00
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome  mspeed_iA, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons      .119487   .2959321     0.40   0.686    -.4605294    .6995033
   mspeed_iA    -.0197396   .0134535    -1.47   0.142    -.0461079    .0066287
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -131.07038                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0082
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1410
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       2.17
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
. logit outcome  mspeed_iA, nolog
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This analysis suggests that time rough terrain, sum of population, balance of forces 
distance, initiator democracy, target democracy, surprise, initiator media speed, target media 
speed are candidates for inclusion in a preliminary model. As with the nominal variables, other 
variables that do not exhibit univariate correlation may nevertheless be considered for inclusion 
based on theory. 
Multicollinearity 
Variables considered for inclusion in a preliminary model are examined for collinearity 
problems as follows: 
(outcome==0 is the base outcome)
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.086226    .450941    -2.41   0.016    -1.970054   -.2023976
   mspeed_tA      -.03766   .0233147    -1.62   0.106    -.0833559    .0080359
3             
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.798913   .7378213    -3.79   0.000    -4.245016    -1.35281
   mspeed_tA      .037794   .0297609     1.27   0.204    -.0205364    .0961243
2             
                                                                              
       _cons     .0360836   .3159497     0.11   0.909    -.5831664    .6553337
   mspeed_tA     -.048141   .0164197    -2.93   0.003    -.0803231   -.0159589
1             
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -205.17597                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0330
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0029
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =      14.00
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        193
. mlogit outcome  mspeed_tA, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons     .2956531    .283496     1.04   0.297    -.2599889     .851295
   mspeed_tA    -.0310852   .0136844    -2.27   0.023    -.0579061   -.0042643
                                                                              
     outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  -129.5178                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0199
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0217
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       5.27
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
. logit outcome  mspeed_tA, nolog
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The strategy variables – Istr_1, Istr_2, and Istr_3 exhibit large VIFs and as such are a 
cause for serious concern regarding collinearity. I next check whether combining them into a 
single variable initiator strategy reduces this concern. 
 
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0000
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Condition Number 108129252.9642 
---------------------------------
    8     0.0000  108129252.9642
    7     0.0171         18.0149
    6     0.0528         10.2533
    5     0.1348          6.4149
    4     0.2014          5.2480
    3     1.0127          2.3401
    2     1.0356          2.3142
    1     5.5458          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
  Mean VIF  1.32e+14
----------------------------------------------------
mtype_trtv      3.48    1.87    0.2873      0.7127
mtype_irtv      3.53    1.88    0.2833      0.7167
  mindep_t      1.35    1.16    0.7399      0.2601
  mindep_i      1.25    1.12    0.7981      0.2019
    Istr_3  3.08e+14 1.8e+07    0.0000      1.0000
    Istr_2  4.22e+14 2.1e+07    0.0000      1.0000
    Istr_1  1.97e+14 1.4e+07    0.0000      1.0000
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
. collin Istr_1 Istr_2 Istr_3 mindep_i mindep_t mtype_irtv mtype_trtv
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.2472
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Condition Number        18.4622 
---------------------------------
    6     0.0161         18.4622
    5     0.0209         16.2240
    4     0.0765          8.4743
    3     0.1625          5.8123
    2     0.2335          4.8488
    1     5.4905          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
  Mean VIF      2.07
----------------------------------------------------
mtype_trtv      3.45    1.86    0.2902      0.7098
mtype_irtv      3.39    1.84    0.2952      0.7048
  mindep_t      1.33    1.15    0.7530      0.2470
  mindep_i      1.12    1.06    0.8915      0.1085
     strat      1.08    1.04    0.9300      0.0700
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
. collin  strat mindep_i mindep_t mtype_irtv mtype_trtv
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This analysis highlights mild correlation among some of the media variables, with VIF 
values greater than 5 but still less than 10. I can proceed with caution to include these variables 
in a preliminary model. 
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.1286
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Condition Number        13.4864 
---------------------------------
    9     0.0286         13.4864
    8     0.0656          8.9099
    7     0.2467          4.5948
    6     0.4363          3.4552
    5     0.5087          3.2000
    4     0.5741          3.0120
    3     0.8113          2.5337
    2     1.1203          2.1562
    1     5.2084          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
  Mean VIF      2.05
----------------------------------------------------
    democo      1.12    1.06    0.8897      0.1103
     democ      1.09    1.04    0.9196      0.0804
 mspeed_tA      4.63    2.15    0.2161      0.7839
 mspeed_iA      4.65    2.16    0.2150      0.7850
  surpdiff      1.32    1.15    0.7558      0.2442
  distance      1.14    1.07    0.8786      0.1214
    bofadj      1.22    1.10    0.8204      0.1796
    sumpop      1.23    1.11    0.8126      0.1874
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
. collin sumpop bofadj distance surpdiff mspeed_iA mspeed_tA democ democo
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0012
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Condition Number        30.6486 
---------------------------------
    14     0.0102         30.6486
    13     0.0158         24.5858
    12     0.0235         20.1472
    11     0.0309         17.5769
    10     0.0650         12.1159
    9     0.0833         10.7019
    8     0.1495          7.9871
    7     0.3394          5.3015
    6     0.5060          4.3418
    5     0.5452          4.1829
    4     0.6579          3.8079
    3     0.8927          3.2689
    2     1.1411          2.8914
    1     9.5395          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
  Mean VIF      3.15
----------------------------------------------------
    democo      1.47    1.21    0.6795      0.3205
     democ      1.70    1.30    0.5875      0.4125
 mspeed_tA      6.07    2.46    0.1646      0.8354
 mspeed_iA      7.10    2.66    0.1409      0.8591
  surpdiff      1.52    1.23    0.6587      0.3413
  distance      1.60    1.26    0.6257      0.3743
    bofadj      1.61    1.27    0.6198      0.3802
    sumpop      1.32    1.15    0.7585      0.2415
mtype_trtv      6.15    2.48    0.1627      0.8373
mtype_irtv      7.41    2.72    0.1350      0.8650
  mindep_t      1.86    1.36    0.5373      0.4627
  mindep_i      1.80    1.34    0.5565      0.4435
     strat      1.39    1.18    0.7180      0.2820
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
. collin  strat mindep_i mindep_t mtype_irtv mtype_trtv sumpop bofadj distance surpdiff mspeed_iA mspeed_tA democ democo
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MODEL 1: DEVELOPING A BASELINE MODEL 
The theory argues that the international news media should address some of the unexplained 
variance in existing models of war such as Bennett & Stam. An existing model can serve as a 
baseline against which the contribution of media variables can be compared. With slight 
modifications, the Bennett & Stam model can serve as such a baseline for the current study.   
In order to adapt the Bennett & Stam published model to test the theory, it must first be 
modified in two ways. First, the population of observations used by Bennett & Stam is modified 
to match the population used in the current study. The populations are slightly different because 
data reflecting the emergence of the international news media could not be identified for several 
observations, as discussed in section 4.5.2 of the research design chapter on page 96. Second, 
one of the variables used by Bennett & Stam – initiator strategy, reflecting the war initiator’s 
choice of strategy – is modified to enable the statistical model to converge. The issues with the 
initiator strategy variable are discussed next. 
During univariable analysis it was revealed that the dummy variables used by Bennett & 
Stam to represent the initiator strategy – winning strategy, losing strategy, and draw strategy – 
exhibit complete separation which prevents the logistic regression model from converging. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the results published by Bennett & Stam exhibit this failure to converge 
in that no standard error is reported for one or more of these variables. Standard texts on logistic 
regression and supporting documentation for the Stata program used by Bennett & Stam are all 
quite clear that failure to return a standard error is a signal that the model has not converged. 
This problem must be addressed before the Bennett & Stam model can be used as a baseline. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2004) recommend that if a problematic variable 
can be thought of as ordinal, it can be modeled as a continuous variable. Since the three variables 
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- winning strategy, losing strategy, and draw strategy - can be thought of as ordinal, they are 
amenable to this approach. Thus, these three dummy variables have been combined into a single 
ordinal variable - initiator strategy – representing the initiator’s choice of strategy. Doing so 
enables the model to converge and return valid standard error results for each variable.  
A multinomial logistic regression model is created using Stata software that incorporates 
the variables from the Bennett & Stam model and the adjustments described above. This model 
will be henceforth referred to as Model 1. The logistic coefficients from Model 1 are presented in 
Table 8-1. 
Model 1 converges (unlike the one published by Bennett & Stam). The direction, 
magnitude and significance of the coefficients for all three equations closely parallel those 
published by Bennett & Stam. This suggests that the modifications made to adapt the Bennett & 
Stam model– adjustments to the population due to missing data and adjustments to the initiator 
strategy variables to enable the model to converge - have not substantively altered the original 
findings. As such, Model 1 is a suitable baseline against which to compare subsequent models 
that incorporate media variables, as long as several further concerns are addressed. 
One concern is that Model 1 returns unrealistically large coefficients for some of the variables. 
Model 1 is consistent in this respect with the model published by Bennett & Stam. However, the 
large coefficients suggest numerical problems with the underlying data (Hosmer and Lemeshow 
2004, p. 141). Paul Allison presents an in-depth examination of the issues posed by numerical 
problems. The results obtained in Model 1 for the rough terrain, rough terrain*initiator strategy, 
surprise, initiator strategy, and balance of forces variables for one or more outcome categories 
closely match Allison’s description of quasi-separation problems. In particular, he argues that 
“variables with nonexistent coefficients will invariably have large parameter estimates, typically 
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greater than 5.0, and huge standard errors, producing Wald chi-square statistics that are near 
zero” (Altman, Gill, and McDonald 2004, 248). Allison outlines the alternatives available when 
the analyst is confronted with quasi-separation issues: 
Deletion of the problem variable – “I do not recommend this method. If the variable has 
quasi-complete separation with the outcome variable, it is reasonable to suppose that the 
variable has a strong (albeit non-infinite) effect on the outcome variable.” 
Combining categories – “Combining categories may offer a solution.” 
Do nothing and report likelihood ratio chi-squares - “If one leaves the offending 
variables in the model, the coefficients, standard errors, and test statistics for the 
remaining variables are still valid maximum likelihood estimates. So one attractive 
strategy is to leave the problem variables in the model. The coefficients for those 
variables could be reported as + or minus infinity. The standard errors and Wald statistics 
for the problem variables will certainly be incorrect, but as noted above, likelihood ratio 
tests for the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero are still valid. If these statistics are 
not available as options in the computer program, they can be obtained easily by fitting 
the model with and without each problem variable, then taking twice the positive 
difference in the log-likelihoods.”  
Alternative modeling approaches - “One possible solution is to abandon maximum 
likelihood entirely and do exact logistic regression. This method was originally proposed 
by Cox (1970) but was not computationally feasible until the advent of the LogXact 
program and, more recently, the introduction of exact methods to the logistic procedure 
in SAS” (Altman, Gill, and McDonald 2004, p. 248-249). 
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Table 8 - 1. Model 1 Logistic Regression Results 
Model 1: Influence of Independent Variables on War Outcome Probabilities 
 Multinomial Logit Estimatesa 
Independent Variables Win vs. Continue Draw vs. Continue Lose vs. Continue 
Rough Terrain 6.529479  (6.290376) 48.32381  (34.42309) -16.14029*  (8.927644) 
Rough Terrain*Initiator Strategy -.6957015  (1.153714) -3.351371  (5.999703) 3.349206*  (1.769723) 
Sum Of Population -6.79e-08  (1.20e-06) .0000109**  (3.60e-06) -7.08e-06  (3.99e-06) 
Sum Of Military Personnel -.0001714  (.0001149) -.0017494**  (.000796) -.0000155  (.0001383) 
Balance Of Forces 2.338575  (1.542884) 19.64676**  (8.309667) -3.438187  (2.855646) 
Distance -.0000699  (.0001501) .0001564  (.0004926) -.0005707**  (.0002367) 
Initiator Salience -.5281038  (.861708) -4.175576*  (2.370172) -4.036509**  (1.680942) 
Target Salience .3452989  (.6772994) -4.515218*  (2.199748) -1.439625  (1.152502) 
Initiator Repression .648693  (.4450679) -1.067565  (1.21988) 1.326641**  (.6296294) 
Target Repression .4740108  (.4636876) -1.388135  (2.109929) 1.046853  (.8329196) 
Initiator Democracy .3534879*  (.1873286) -.4744913  (.4688359) .2878257  (.240344) 
Target Democracy .0743399  (.181986) -.2749853  (.6087822) .4134581  (.3179676) 
Surprise 13.91535  (8.711352) -19.0096  (18.49763) -24.09474**  (12.26891) 
Balance Of Forces*Time .1967253  (.134314) -.5916587*  (.3043727) -.0344642  (.0931419) 
Initiator Democracy*Time -.0270305*  (.015479) .0783416**  (.0293222) -.0034912  (.0117651) 
Target Democracy*Time -.0057448  (.0148247) .1247455**  (.0460646) .0051591  (.0155911) 
Initiator Repression*Time -.081791**  (.0331885) .1283694**  (.0621259) -.0405511*  (.0232971) 
Target Repression*Time -.0468481  (.0391913) .2908006**  (.1327972) .0168949  (.0433589) 
Rough Terrain*Time -.0040015  (.1233606) -1.34718***  (.4096236) -.0496485  (.1137899) 
Initiator Strategy*Time .0708469  (.0699276) -.3054481**  (.1023783) .0076296  (.0574182) 
Initiator Strategy 2.148025  (1.827937) 10.35885  (11.65945) -7.145301**  (2.512961) 
Time .2403762  (.1870112) -.5049676  (.36028) .1331684  (.1522937) 
(N=193) 
Log likelihood= -111.9515 
X2 (df=66) = 200.45 
aStandard errors are in parentheses 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed tests) 
Pseudo R2 = 0.4724 
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Based on these recommended alternatives, the analysis proceeds by continuing to include 
the offending variables, albeit with caution. The variables seem to be contributing to the model, 
although their magnitude of their contributions should be something less than infinity. The 
impact of these numerical issues is expected to become clear when the substantive results of the 
model are examined. The analysis proceeds with routine diagnostics intended to identify other 
issues with the model.  
The contribution of individual variables is examined by comparing whether a model 
including a given variable fits significantly better than a model without. Introducing additional 
variables will almost always improve the fit of a model, but it is necessary to determine whether 
the observed difference between two models is statistically significant. A likelihood-ratio test is 
used to compare the log likelihoods of the model with (model Y) and without (model X) the 
variable of interest: 
Lr = -2 ln((L(model X)/L(model Y)) = 2(ll(model Y)-ll(model X))  
The resulting test statistic is distributed chi-square, with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of variables added in each of the estimation equations, i.e. 3. (Agresti 2002). Although 
chi-square test can be sensitive to sample size, Agresti recommends that for small sample sizes, 
the likelihood-ratio test is the preferred approach over the alternatives of the Wald test or the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit test (1997). The likelihood ratio test is conducted using 
mlogtest, which is part of the spost package written by Jeremy Freese and J. Scott Long (2001). 
The likelihood-ratio test results in Table 8-2 show that most variables are contributing to the 
model, with a few notable exceptions. In particular, six variables (time, target salience, initiator 
repression, target repression, initiator democracy, target democracy) fail to contribute to a 
statistically significant degree. This concern is noted and the diagnostic analysis proceeds.  
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Table 8 - 2. Model 1 Likelihood-Ratio Test 
 
 
Multicollinearity of the variables included in Model 1 is checked next. Obviously, the full 
model has issues due to the presence of interacted terms. Several authors address the problem of 
collinearity when interaction terms are included (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Braumoeller 
2004; Jaccard 2001). In general, large VIFs are to be expected for interaction terms. Therefore, 
the model is checked without the interaction terms. 
The main effects terms presented in Table 8-3 do not appear to have any significant 
collinearity issues.  
 
Model 1: Likelihood-ratio tests for independent variables (N=193) 
Ho: All coefficients associated with given variable(s) are 0. 
Independent Variables X2 df  P> X2 
Balance Of Forces 15.798 3 0.001 
Balance Of Forces*Time 11.992 3 0.007 
Initiator Democracy*Time 16.787 3 0.001 
Target Democracy*Time 14.261 3 0.003 
Initiator Democracy 7.287 3 0.063 
Target Democracy 3.723 3 0.293 
Distance 7.045 3 0.070 
Initiator Repression*Time 16.708 3 0.001 
Target Repression*Time 10.495 3 0.015 
Initiator Repression 5.713 3 0.126 
Target Repression 4.462 3 0.216 
Rough Terrain 11.993 3 0.007 
Rough Terrain*Initiator Strategy 10.173 3 0.017 
Rough Terrain*Time 29.026 3 0.000 
Initiator Salience 8.24 3 0.041 
Target Salience 6.977 3 0.073 
Initiator Strategy 21.902 3 0.000 
Initiator Strategy*Time 21.13 3 0.000 
Sum Of Military Personnel 13.483 3 0.004 
Sum Of Population 29.847 3 0.000 
Surprise 12.416 3 0.006 
Time 4.055 3 0.256 
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Table 8 - 3. Model 1 Collinearity Diagnostics 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
Rough Terrain 1.15 1.07 0.8689 0.1311 
Sum Of Population 1.37 1.17 0.7322 0.2678 
Sum Of Military Personnel 1.66 1.29 0.6041 0.3959 
Balance Of Forces 1.59 1.26 0.629 0.371 
Distance 1.81 1.35 0.5521 0.4479 
Initiator Salience 1.66 1.29 0.6024 0.3976 
Target Salience 1.18 1.09 0.8439 0.1561 
Initiator Repression 3.36 1.83 0.2977 0.7023 
Target Repression 4.11 2.03 0.2432 0.7568 
Initiator Democracy 3.03 1.74 0.3305 0.6695 
Target Democracy 4.03 2.01 0.248 0.752 
Surprise 1.46 1.21 0.6849 0.3151 
Initiator Strategy 1.61 1.27 0.6226 0.3774 
Time 1.44 1.2 0.695 0.305 
 
 
Model 1 has satisfied diagnostic tests with a few concerns noted. It is therefore a suitable 
baseline model against which models incorporating media variables are to be compared. In the 
next section, model development proceeds by incorporating media variables directly into Model 
1.  
INCORPORATING MEDIA VARIABLES 
The most straightforward approach to examining the contribution of media variables to existing 
models of war is to simply add them to the baseline model. In this section, a series of models 
incorporating media variables is developed by iteratively adding blocks of media variables to the 
baseline model (Model 1), and comparing the strength of each successive model to the baseline 
Model 1. Blocks of variables are added, as opposed to individual variables, because doing so 
simplifies the model development process without sacrificing theory. At the conclusion of model 
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development, the contribution of individual variables to the model is checked to ensure the end 
result is statistically and theoretically valid. The strength of each successive iteration is compared 
to Model 1 using a likelihood-ratio test. The successive iterations are presented in Table 8-4, 
with the results of the likelihood ratio test: the log-likelihood, the degrees of freedom, and the 
resulting statistical significance of each block. 
 
Table 8 - 4. Likelihood-Ratio Tests of Model 1A and Model 1B 
Model 
Name Variable Block (variables) 
Log 
Likelihood df Prob > LR 
Model 1 See above -111.9 66 . 
Model 1A Model 1 + Initiator Media (initiator media type, 
initiator media speed, initiator media 
independence) 
-88.3 75 .000 
Model 1B Model 1 + Target Media (target media type, 
target media speed, target media independence) 
-100.1 75 .001 
Model 1C Model 1 + Initiator Media + Target Media Model fails to converge 
 
 
Table 8-4 shows that when the initiator media block of variables is added to Model 1 to 
form Model 1A, the resulting log likelihood of -89.3 represents a significant (.000) improvement 
over Model 1 without the media variables. Similarly, when the block of target media variables is 
added to Model 1 to form Model 1B, the resulting model is significantly better than Model 1 
(.001). When both initiator and target media variable blocks are added to Model 1 to form Model 
1C, the model fails to converge. In a very limited sense, the results for Model 1A and Model 1B 
show that the media variables address some of the unexplained variance in the original Bennett 
& Stam model. However, there are important problems with simply adding variables to Model 1.  
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Table 8-5 presents the logistic regression coefficients for Model 1A (coefficients for 
Model 1B are omitted in the interest of space). The model returns coefficients that are relatively 
large, and standard errors that are large compared to their coefficients. The cautions regarding 
the large coefficients and standard errors that were discussed above apply equally to Model 1A 
and are therefore a reason for caution. These cautions and the inability of the model to converge 
when all of the media variables are included make Model 1A unsuitable for further exploration. 
Further model development is required to overcome the weaknesses in Model 1 and 
Model 1A. The root of those weaknesses is believed to be the large number of variables 
contained in the models relative to the limited number of observations. Therefore, further model 
development concentrates on very selectively drawing from the variables included in the original 
Bennett & Stam model and including only those media variables which make significant 
contributions to any resulting model. As described in section 4.7 (beginning on page number 
111) of the research design chapter, the inclusion of variables will be guided by theory. 
However, the experience with Model 1 and Model 1A shows that although the process is guided 
by theory, it is bounded by the other limitations of the project – the demands of the research 
questions, the limited number of observations, and so forth. Therefore, the iterative process of 
deleting, refitting, and verifying the model continues. In the next section, the variables included 
in Bennett & Stam are examined more closely and only the most important variables are selected 
for inclusion as control variables in another model. 
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Table 8 - 5. Model 1A with Initiator Media Variables 
Model 1: Influence of Independent Variables on War Outcome Probabilities 
 Multinomial Logit Estimatesa 
Independent Variables Win vs. Continue  Draw vs. Continue  Lose vs. Continue  
Rough Terrain -18.24693  (12.75827) 510.418  (324.845) -18.24693  (12.75827) 
Rough Terrain*Initiator Strategy 9.680631  (6.594544) -157.1906  (133.6525) 9.680631  (6.594544) 
Sum Of Population -7.65e-06  (3.90e-06) .0001001*  (.0000485) -7.65e-06*  (3.90e-06) 
Sum Of Military Personnel -.000041  (.0001624) -.0097814**  (.0037754) -.000041  (.0001624) 
Balance Of Forces -4.4679  (4.100877) 140.8071*  (63.5458) -4.4679  (4.100877) 
Distance -.0006221  (.0002884) .0054601  (.0028921) -.0006221*  (.0002884) 
Initiator Salience -6.007176  (2.439761) -14.10876  (14.23227) -6.007176  (2.439761) 
Target Salience -2.348655  (1.341609) -52.19168  (28.69645) -2.348655**  (1.341609) 
Initiator Repression 1.831764  (.8416176) -26.27997  (17.40302) 1.831764*  (.8416176) 
Target Repression 1.85038  (1.024602) -6.956856  (4.479399) 1.85038  (1.024602) 
Initiator Democracy .1604148*  (.2870863) -18.50998  (9.974731) .1604148  (.2870863) 
Target Democracy .7471154  (.4379391) 4.248282  (3.707215) .7471154  (.4379391) 
Surprise -32.40211  (13.3255) -220.5637*  (105.2141) -32.40211*  (13.3255) 
Balance Of Forces*Time -.0147855  (.1178716) -2.957725*  (1.33575) -.0147855  (.1178716) 
Initiator Democracy*Time -.01178  (.0152985) .5179317  (.281243) -.01178  (.0152985) 
Target Democracy*Time -.000581  (.0179351) .6029141**  (.2459833) -.000581  (.0179351) 
Initiator Repression*Time -.0673132*  (.033938) 1.155701  (.6933748) -.0673132  (.033938) 
Target Repression*Time -.0017881  (.0477898) 1.263019**  (.5283293) -.0017881  (.0477898) 
Rough Terrain*Time -.1188602  (.135389) -9.275641**  (4.190938) -.1188602  (.135389) 
Initiator Strategy*Time .0334061  (.0653701) -2.179872**  (.9778579) .0334061  (.0653701) 
Initiator Strategy -8.993879*  (3.532721) 81.44362  (72.71384) -8.993879*  (3.532721) 
Time .2818598  (.1875464) -1.901421  (2.401803) .2818598  (.1875464) 
Initiator Media Type -1.283421  (.8582182) -36.46416  (20.91818) -1.283421  (.8582182) 
Initiator Media Speed .2032254  ( .110125) 5.838106*  (2.937866) .2032254  (.110125) 
Initiator Media Independence .8127055  (.9451533) 71.68946  (38.1365) .8127055  (.9451533) 
(N=193) 
Log likelihood= -88.30 
X2 (df=75) = 247.45 
aRobust standard errors are in parentheses 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed tests) 
Pseudo R2 = 0.5838 
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SELECTIVELY INCLUDE CONTROL VARIABLES 
In this section, variables serving as controls for factors already known to influence wars are 
selected from among those included in Model 1. Only those variables that make the strongest 
contribution to Model 1 and/or that are dictated by theory should be considered for inclusion as 
controls. Given the large number of variables in Model 1, it is helpful to examine the makeup of 
Model 1 in terms of groups, or blocks, of variables that represent related factors, as were 
presented in Figure 4-2. The first block considered consists of variables addressing material, or 
realist, factors including terrain, balance of forces, the element of surprise, etc. The second block 
consists of variables addressing polity-related factors such as regime type, level of repression, 
etc. The third block consists of simply the time variable.  
The contribution of each block of variables is examined by comparing it, individually and 
in combination, to a null model using a likelihood-ratio test. The results, presented in Table 8-6, 
show that the time variable makes a significant (.000) contribution compared to a null model. It 
also shows that the block of realist variables makes a far stronger contribution (.000) than the 
block of polity variables (.304).  
These results provide guidance about which variables from Model 1 provide the most 
explanatory power and should therefore be included in the model. Not only does time appear to 
make a significant (.000) contribution, it must also be included for theoretical reasons. The 
realist block of variables should be included based on its contribution and also the important role 
played by power (and related material factors) in the theory. While the polity block of variables 
contributes much less than the realist variables, the initiator democracy and target democracy 
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variables from that block should be nevertheless included, since they play an important 
theoretical role as well.  
  
Table 8 - 6. Likelihood-Ratio Tests, Model 1 Variable Blocks 
Variable Block (variables) Log Likelihood DF Prob > LR 
Null Model -212.2 0 . 
Time: Time -194.9 3 .000 
Polity (Initiator Democracy, Target Democracy, 
Initiator Repression, Target Repression, Initiator 
Salience, Target Salience) 
-203.5 18 .304 
Realist: (Rough Terrain, Rough Terrain*Initiator 
Strategy, Sum Of Population, Sum Of Military 
Personnel, Balance Of Forces Distance, Surprise, 
Initiator Strategy) 
-158.3 24 .000 
Polity + Time -187.6 21 .692 
Realist + Time -152.6 27 .000 
Polity + Time + Polity*Time -179.0 33 .388 
Realist + Time + Realist*Time -143.9 36 .000 
 
 
Based on this examination of the variables in Model 1, only the realist variables (rough 
terrain, rough terrain*initiator strategy, sum of population, sum of military personnel, balance 
of forces distance, surprise, initiator strategy), selected polity-related variables (initiator 
democracy, target democracy) and time will be included as control variables. In the next step of 
model development, these control variables are included in a model with the media variables.  
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MODEL 3: MEDIA VARIABLES PLUS CONTROL VARIABLES  
In this section, a model including media and control variables is developed in three steps. First, a 
main-effects model is developed by including variables dictated by theory or that appear to make 
a strong contribution to the model. Next, interaction effects suggested by theory are examined 
and included to yield a preliminary main-effects plus interaction-effects model. Finally, this 
preliminary model is subjected to a series of diagnostic tests and refined by iteratively deleting 
variables, refitting the model, re-testing and so on until a satisfactory final model is arrived at.  
Variables for inclusion in the main-effects model are selected using a likelihood-ratio test 
approach similar to that used above. The contribution of the media variables are examined in the 
context of the control variables, and the results are presented in Table 8-7. 
As shown in Table 8-7, when the Democracy block and the Initiator Media block are 
examined individually, they fail to make a significant contribution to the model (.626 and .252, 
respectively). At this point in the analysis, however, they will nevertheless be included due to 
their importance to the theory. A preliminary main effects model, then, consists of Democracy + 
Realist +Time + Initiator Media + Target Media blocks of variables (or ‘D+R+T+M’ for short). 
Interaction terms are considered next, using a similar approach. As guided by theory and 
presented in Figure 4-3, interactions between media and time and between media and democracy 
are expected. Successive models with a Media*Time block and a Media*Democracy block are 
compared to the preliminary main-effects model (D+R+T+M). The results are presented in Table 
8-8. 
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Table 8 - 7. Likelihood-Ratio Tests, Media and Control Variable Blocks 
Variable Block (variables) Log Likelihood DF Prob > LR 
Null Model -212.2 0 . 
Time: Time -194.9 3 .000 
Democracy: (Initiator Democracy, Target 
Democracy)  -209.9 6 .626 
Realist: (Rough Terrain, Rough Terrain*Initiator 
Strategy, Sum Of Population, Sum Of Military 
Personnel, Balance Of Forces Distance, Surprise, 
Initiator Strategy) 
-158.3 24 .000 
Initiator Media: (Initiator Media Type, Initiator 
Media Speed, Initiator Media Independence) -206.5 9 .252 
Target Media: (Target Media Type, Initiator Media 
Speed, Target Media Independence) -203.7 9 .049 
Democracy + Realist + Time -150.1 33 .000 
Democracy + Realist + Time + Initiator Media -140.1 42 .000 
Democracy + Realist + Time + Target Media -144.1 42 .000 
Democracy + Realist + Time + Initiator Media + 
Target Media (D+R+T+M) 
-132.3 51 .000 
 
 
Table 8 - 8. Likelihood Ratio Test, Interaction Effects 
Variable Block Log Likelihood DF Prob > LR 
Democracy + Realist + Time + Initiator Media + 
Target Media (D+R+T+M) 
-132.3 51 . 
D+R+T+M + Media*Time -119.2 69 .091 
D+R+T+M + Media*Democracy -112.0 69 .001 
D+R+T+M + Media*Time + Media*Democracy Model fails to converge 
 
 
The interaction between time and media predicted by the theory does not appear to be 
supported by this analysis, since the interacted variable block does not appear to make a 
significant contribution (.091). However, the democracy interaction with media variables does 
appear to make a significant contribution to the model (.001). Including both democracy 
  201 
interaction variables and time interaction variables is not possible because the model fails to 
converge. As was the case above, the limited number of observations in the dataset imposes a 
limit on the number of variables that can be included in the model. Therefore, the relatively less-
significant Media*Time interaction variables will be dropped from further model development, 
while the Media*Democracy interaction variables will be included.  
The model development process has thus far yielded a preliminary main effects plus 
interaction effects model consisting of the democracy variables, the realist variables, time, the 
media variables, plus democracy*media interaction variables. The contribution of the individual 
variables is assessed by performing a likelihood-ratio test. The results of the test are presented in 
Table 8-9.  
The results in Table 8-9 show that several variables do not appear to be contributing at a 
significant level: the main-effects variables of target democracy, rough terrain*initiator 
strategy, distance, target media type, and target media independence; and the media interaction 
variables of initiator democracy*initiator media speed, initiator democracy*initiator media 
independence, target democracy*target media independence, target democracy*target media 
type,, and target democracy*target media independence. After a process of iteratively deleting, 
refitting and testing, a final model consisting of main effects plus interaction effects is arrived at, 
labeled Model 3. The logistic regression coefficients for Model 3 are presented in Table 8-10. 
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Table 8 - 9. Interim model: Likelihood-ratio test 
Interim Model: Likelihood-ratio tests for independent variables (N=193) 
Ho: All coefficients associated with given variable(s) are 0. 
Independent Variables 
X2 df P> X2 
Initiator Democracy 7.931 3 0.047 
Target Democracy 4.417 3 0.220 
Time 8.148 3 0.043 
Rough Terrain 9.634 3 0.022 
Rough Terrain*Initiator Strategy 7.367 3 0.061 
Sum Of Population 26.585 3 0.000 
Sum Of Military Personnel 10.476 3 0.015 
Balance Of Forces 12.455 3 0.006 
Distance 6.737 3 0.081 
Surprise 9.171 3 0.027 
Initiator Strategy 22.192 3 0.000 
Target Media Type 3.816 3 0.282 
Target Media Speed 19.807 3 0.000 
Target Media Independence 2.93 3 0.403 
Initiator Media Type 13.113 3 0.004 
Initiator Media Speed 13.511 3 0.004 
Initiator Media Independence 16.255 3 0.001 
Initiator Democracy*Initiator Media Speed 4.825 3 0.185 
Initiator Democracy*Initiator Media Type 12.886 3 0.005 
Initiator Democracy*Initiator Media Independence 5.665 3 0.129 
Target Democracy*Target Media Speed 4.387 3 0.223 
Target Democracy*Target Media Type 5.692 3 0.128 
Target Democracy*Target Media Independence 1.443 3 0.695 
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Table 8 - 10. Model 3 Logistic Regression Results 
Model 3: Influence of Media Variables plus Controls on War Outcome Probabilities 
 Multinomial Logit Estimatesa 
Independent Variables Win vs. Continue Draw vs. Continue 
Lose vs. 
Continue 
Balance Of Forces 3.491063***  (1.098528) 2.43519  (1.957763) -3.74823  (2.642367) 
Sum Of Population -1.13e-06  (1.01e-06) 3.28e-06**  (1.54e-06) -.0000122**  (4.44e-06) 
Rough Terrain 30.34893***  (8.434361) 33.26401**  (12.00702) -11.66131  (11.19558) 
Rough Terrain*Initiator Strategy -13.56259***  (4.009495) -14.33361**  (4.772376) 4.943956  (5.100339) 
Sum Of Military Personnel -.0000399  (.0000718) -.0002304*  (.0001267) .0003848**  (.0001273) 
Initiator Strategy 9.684771***  (2.396563) 8.138004**  (2.791037) -4.963213*  (2.565978) 
Time -.0106329  (.0126406) .0235162  (.0130854) .005305  (.0200067) 
Initiator Democracy -.6116132  (.4166819) -.5390515  (.7409285) 3.826952**  (1.5863) 
Target Democracy .0762646  (.5106091) -.6292981  (.7636223) -3.534492**  (1.267869) 
Initiator Media Type .9802716*  (.5867809) -1.830452  (1.138183) .4185405  (1.162991) 
Initiator Media Speed -.1565062**  (.0689421) -.0455221  (.1166524) .3845732***  (.1153324) 
Initiator Media Independence -.7119558  ( .998833) 3.200408**  (1.218296) 3.783921**  (1.335889) 
Target Media Type -.0789779  (.3113761) .3740885  (.6368387) -.5759963  (.6622109) 
Target Media Speed -.0473793  (.0463894) .1292832  (.0939225) -.3993923***  (.0897512) 
Target Media Independence -.8938125*  (.4825785) -.7848033  (.4835764) .942536  (.9826756) 
Initiator Democracy*Initiator Media Type .1592469*  (.0910348) .2415834  (.15263) -.6664941**  (.3083906) 
Target Democracy*Target Media Type .0169385  (.1181943) .1672011  (.169489) .9046992**  (.3199671) 
Initiator Democracy*Initiator Media Independence .1581317  (.163842) -.3046931  (.2592132) -1.256907**  (.5292474) 
 (N=193) 
Log-likelihood = -121.26 
X2 (df=54) = 6833.49 
Pseudo R2 = 0.4285 
aRobust standard errors are in parentheses 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed tests) 
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Model 3 yields coefficients that are, for the most part, of an appropriate scale. Standard 
errors are, in most cases, of reasonable size relative to the coefficients themselves. The model 
returns robust standard errors. All variables are statistically significant for at least one of the 
three equations, with the exception of target media type and time. However, these variables are 
nevertheless retained because of their importance to the theory. A series of diagnostic tests is run 
next to confirm the strength of the model prior to using it to test hypotheses. 
Model 3 diagnostics 
A likelihood-ratio test is used to examine the contribution of the individual variables in Model 3. 
The results are shown in Table 8-11. 
 
Table 8 - 11. Model 3 Likelihood-Ratio Test 
Model 3: Likelihood-ratio tests for independent variables (N=193) 
Ho: All coefficients associated with given variable(s) are 0. 
Independent Variables X2 df  P> X2 
Balance Of Forces 14.519 3 0.002 
Sum Of Population 22.276 3 0 
Rough Terrain 12.269 3 0.007 
Rough Terrain*Initiator Strategy 9.813 3 0.02 
Sum Of Military Personnel 13.048 3 0.005 
Initiator Strategy 25.679 3 0 
Time 5.083 3 0.166 
Initiator Democracy 12.608 3 0.006 
Target Democracy 13.929 3 0.003 
Initiator Media Type 7.161 3 0.067 
Initiator Media Speed 14.111 3 0.003 
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Initiator Media Independence 16.485 3 0.001 
Target Media Type 0.731 3 0.866 
Target Media Speed 11.244 3 0.01 
Target Media Independence 6.732 3 0.041 
Initiator Democracy*Initiator Media Type 13.93 3 0.003 
Target Democracy*Target Media Type 15.108 3 0.002 
Initiator Democracy*Initiator Media Independence 9.682 3 0.021 
 
The results of the likelihood-ratio test show a significant contribution from most of the 
variables, with the exception of time (.166), initiator media type (.067), target media type (.866). 
Despite their weak contributions, these variables are retained in the model due to their 
importance to the theory. 
Collinearity of the main effects variables contained in Model 3 is examined next:  
 
Table 8 - 12. Model 3 Collinearity Diagnostics 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
Balance Of Forces 1.47 1.21 0.6818 0.3182 
Sum Of Population 1.35 1.16 0.7404 0.2596 
Rough Terrain 1.28 1.13 0.7825 0.2175 
Sum Of Military Personnel 1.44 1.2 0.6966 0.3034 
Initiator Strategy 1.43 1.2 0.6984 0.3016 
Time 1.55 1.24 0.646 0.354 
Initiator Democracy 1.86 1.36 0.5368 0.4632 
Target Democracy 1.51 1.23 0.6607 0.3393 
Initiator Media Type 6.86 2.62 0.1458 0.8542 
Initiator Media Speed 7.25 2.69 0.138 0.862 
Initiator Media Independence 1.83 1.35 0.5456 0.4544 
Target Media Type 5.14 2.27 0.1946 0.8054 
Target Media Speed 6.5 2.55 0.1537 0.8463 
Target Media Independence 1.91 1.38 0.5229 0.4771 
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Collinearity diagnostics show a mild concern with collinearity for the media type and 
media speed variables. The VIFs are, however, well below the threshold of 10 at which the 
variables would be considered for removal from the model. Therefore, they will be retained in 
the model.  
Next, the ability of Model 3 to distinguish between outcomes categories is examined. 
This diagnostic assures that the model meets the assumption of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives required by the multinomial logistic regression model. 
  
Table 8 - 13. Model 3: Likelihood-Ratio Test for Combining Outcome Categories 
Likelihood ratio test for combining alternatives 
Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with a given pair of alternatives are 0 (i.e., 
alternatives can be collapsed). 
Alternatives tested X2 Df P> X2 
-1 2 44.352 18 0.001 
-1 3 93.176 18 0.000 
-1 0 89.043 18 0.000 
-2 3 55.826 18 0.000 
-2 0 29.466 18 0.043 
-3 0 55.066 18 0.000 
 
 
The model has marginal difficulty distinguishing between Continue (0) and Draw (2) 
outcomes. A derivative of Model 3, labeled Model 4, is developed to examine the implications of 
combining these outcome categories. The development and examination of Model 4 is omitted in 
the interest of brevity. In summary, while Model 4 better discriminates between the Continue and 
Draw outcomes, Model 4 does not generate substantive predictions that differ in any important 
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way from those generated by Model 3. Therefore, further analysis focuses on the statistical 
strength and substantive utility of Model 3. 
The proportional reduction in error (PRE) of Model 3 is calculated by generating a 
predicted outcome for each observation in the dataset and comparing each prediction to the 
actual outcome for that observation. For the purposes of this calculation, the predicted outcome 
is defined as the outcome among the four possible values (continue, win, draw, lose) for which 
the model predicts the highest probability value.  
The predicted outcomes from the model (outcomehat) are tabulated against the actual 
outcomes (outcome). A table of outcomehat and outcome for Model 3 is presented in Table 8-14. 
 
Table 8 - 14. Model 3: Proportional Reduction in Error 
Key: Model 3: Proportional Reduction in Error 
 Frequency 
   Row Percentages 
   
   
 
Predicted Outcome (outcomehat) 
 Outcome Continue Win Draw Lose Total 
Continue 95 11 0 3 109 
87.16 10.09 0.00 2.75 100.00 
Win 18 31 1 0 50 
36.00 62.00 2.00 0.00 100.00 
Draw 10 1 14 0 15 
66.67 6.67 26.67 0.00 100.00 
Lose 8 0 0 11 19 
42.11 0.00 0.00 57.89 100.00 
Total 
131 43 5 14 193 
67.88 22.28 2.59 7.25 100.00 
 
The model’s proportional reduction in error is calculated based on these predictions. As 
expected, the model overpredicts the ‘continue’ outcome and underpredicts the other outcomes. 
A null model would predict ‘continue’ for every observation, which would be correct for 
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109/193=56.5% of the observations. By contrast, the above model correctly predicts 
95+31+4+11=141 observations out of 193, or 73.1% of the observations. So the proportional 
reduction in error is (141-109) / (193-109) = 32/84 = 38%. This is a reasonable rate of error 
reduction. 
The goodness-of-fit of Model 3 is evaluated by comparing it with the baseline model 
previously presented. Since Model 3 is not nested in the previously examined models, the 
likelihood-ratio test used above cannot be used to make this comparison. Rather, the Bayesian 
Information Criterion21
Table 8-15
 is relied on to compare Model 3 to Model 1. The goodness-of-fit 
statistics, including the Bayesian Information Criteria, are presented in .  
 
Table 8 - 15. Goodness-Of-Fit Statistics Comparing Model 3 to Model 1 
Model: Model 3 Model 1 Difference 
N: 193 193 0 
Log-Lik Intercept Only -212.176 -212.176 0 
Log-Lik Full Model -121.264 -111.952 -9.312 
D 242.529 (136) 223.904 (124) 18.625 (12) 
LR 181.823 (54) 200.448 (66) 18.625 (12) 
Prob > LR 0 0 0.098 
McFadden's R2 0.428 0.472 -0.044 
McFadden's Adj R2 0.16 0.147 0.013 
ML (Cox-Snell) R2 0.61 0.646 -0.036 
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2 0.686 0.727 -0.04 
Count R2 0.725 0.756 -0.031 
Adj Count R2 0.369 0.44 -0.071 
AIC 1.847 1.875 -0.028 
AIC*n 356.529 361.904 -5.375 
BIC -473.197 -428.67 -44.527 
BIC' 102.362 146.889 -44.527 
BIC used by Stata 542.502 587.03 -44.527 
AIC used by Stata 356.529 361.904 -5.375 
                                                 
21 For all models, fitstat reports the log-likelihoods of the full and intercept-only models, the deviance (D), the 
likelihood ratio chi-square (G2), Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC), AIC*N, the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC), and BIC' (Freese and Long 2001; Stata Corp.). 
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The difference in the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC’) measure of fit of 44.527 
provides very strong support for Model 3 compared to Model 1. The interpretation of the results 
follows Raftery's (1995) guidelines to interpret BIC differences between two models: a BIC 
difference >10 is considered 'very strong' evidence in favor of the model with the smaller BIC; a 
difference of > 6 to 10 is 'strong'; >2 to 6 is 'positive'; and 0 to 2 is 'weak' evidence. The 
difference of 44.527 observed above is therefore characterized as providing ‘very strong’ support 
for Model 3 compared to Model 1.  
Model 3 - residuals 
In order to determine whether Model 3 has flaws in the form of variables or other 
problems that systematically skew the results, the residuals of the model are examined for each 
of the four outcome categories. The residuals for each value of the outcome variable are plotted 
by year, and a 2nd order polynomial trendline is calculated for the resulting plot. The scatterplot 
and trendline for each is presented here: 
  210 
  
Figure 8 - 1. Model 3 Residuals (Continue) 
 
  
Figure 8 - 2. Model 3 Residuals (Win) 
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Figure 8 - 3. Model 3 Residuals (Draw) 
 
  
Figure 8 - 4. Model 3 Residuals (Lose) 
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The residual plots for the four outcome categories highlight shortcomings in the model. 
The residuals for the Continue and Win outcomes exhibit a slight trend, suggesting the model is 
weaker at predicting these outcomes for the earliest and the latest wars. However, the residuals 
for the Draw and Lose outcomes exhibit considerably smaller trends, suggesting a good fit. 
Because no consistent trend appears across all of the categories of the outcome variable, the 
residual analysis does not suggest a data transformation or other immediate remedy that can be 
undertaken at this time. Therefore, the model is judged to be suitable for the purpose of this 
project. 
SUMMARY OF MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
In this appendix, models were developed to test the theory advanced in 3. Model 1 represents the 
conventional wisdom regarding the causes of war in the sense that is contains those variables 
included in previously published studies of war outcomes. For the purposes here, it serves as a 
baseline against which models incorporating media variables are compared. 
Models 1A and 1B add media variables to Model 1. Tests of these models suggest that 
the media variables address some of the unexplained variance in Model 1. However, Models 1A 
and 1B are unsatisfactory in that they return unrealistically large coefficients and relatively large 
standard errors for many variables, and they only contain media variables for the initiator state or 
the target state but not both. Model 1C includes both initiator and target state media variables but 
fails to converge at all. These results necessitated further model development which yielded 
Model 3. 
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Model 3 was developed by selectively including variables from Model 1 and including all media 
variables. In addition, it includes several interaction variables which are suggested by theory and 
pass tests of statistical significance. Model 3 passes all diagnostic tests and is a suitable model 
for examining the influence of the media on war outcomes.  
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